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When uncertain about inflation persistence, central banks are well-advised to adopt a robust strategy when setting interest rates. This robust approach, characterized by a "better safe than sorry" philosophy, entails incurring a modest cost to safeguard against a protracted period of deviating inflation. Applied to the post-pandemic period of exceptional uncertainty and elevated inflation, this strategy would have called for a tightening bias. Specifically, a high level of uncertainty surrounding wage, profit, and price dynamics requires a more front-loaded increase in interest rates compared to a baseline scenario which the policymaker fully understands how shocks to those variables are transmitted to inflation and output. This paper provides empirical evidence of such uncertainty and estimates a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for the euro area to derive a robust interest rate path for the ECB which serves to illustrate the case for insuring against inflation turning out to have greater persistence.
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After hiking rates 14 consecutive times between December 2021 and August 2023 to arrest above-target inflation, the Bank of England (BoE) has held rates at 5.25 percent since then. As the BoE prepares for easing, this paper examines three concurrent monetary policy questions: (a) how have the macroeconomic and financial effects of BoE monetary tightening during the current cycle compared with experiences in other major advanced economies (AEs), and with previous UK tightening cycles; (b) what is the impact of US Fed decisions on UK monetary transmission, and the attendant implications thereof for BoE communications; and (c) how do model-based predictions of UK monetary policy paths (which se...
This paper focuses on negative interest rate policies and covers a broad range of its effects, with a detailed discussion of findings in the academic literature and of broader country experiences.
The notion of a tradeoff between output and financial stabilization is based on monetary-macroprudential models with unique equilibria. Using a game theory setup, this paper shows that multiple equilibria lead to qualitatively different results. Monetary and macroprudential authorities have tools that impose externalities on each other's objectives. One of the tools (macroprudential) is coarse, while the other (monetary policy) is unconstrained. We find that this asymmetry always leads to multiple equilibria, and show that under economically relevant conditions the authorities prefer different equilibria. Giving the unconstrained authority a weight on "helping" the constrained authority ("leaning against the wind") now has unexpected effects. The relation between this weight and the difficulty of coordinating is hump-shaped, and therefore a small degree of leaning worsens outcomes on both authorities' objectives.
This paper takes a new approach to assess the costs and benefits of using different policy tools—macroprudential, monetary, foreign exchange interventions, and capital flow management—in response to changes in financial conditions. The approach evaluates net benefits of policies using quadratic loss functions, estimating policy effects on the full distribution of future output growth and inflation with quantile regressions. Tightening macroprudential policy dampens downside risks to growth stemming from loose financial conditions, and is beneficial in net terms. By contrast, tightening monetary policy entails net losses, calling for caution in the use of monetary policy to “lean against the wind.” These findings hold when policies are used in response to easing global financial conditions. Buying foreign-exchange or tightening capital controls has small net benefits.
Korea’s stars tell of an economy saddled with a real neutral rate (r-star) that has declined significantly in recent decades and is currently below zero. This reflects a significant decline in trend growth, and two large financial crises that triggered significant shifts in the saving-investment balance. Larger fiscal deficits and frothy financial conditions since 2012 have helped offset rising demand for safer assets, preventing the neutral rate from falling further. Nonetheless, the fall in the neutral rate, coupled with its effects on asset returns, has complicated the task of monetary policy stabilization. Korea’s neutral rate is likely to remain low over the medium-term and could fall further, reflecting a structural savings-investment imbalance owing to declining productivity and a rotation in demographics increasing the demand for precautionary saving and convenience yield, and widening the capital risk premia. The COVID pandemic risks magnifying these trends.
The global financial crisis highlighted that the financial system can be most vulnerable when it seems most stable. This paper models non-linear dynamics in banking. Small shocks can lead from an equilibrium with few bank defaults straight to a full freeze. The mechanism is based on amplification between adverse selection on banks' funding market and moral hazard in bank monitoring. Our results imply trade-offs between regulators' microprudential desire to shield individual weak banks and the macroprudential consequences of doing so. Moreover, limiting bank reliance on wholesale funding always reduces systemic risk, but limiting the correlation between bank portfolios does not.
We develop a microfounded New Keynesian model to analyze monetary policy and financial stability issues in open economies with financial fragilities and weakly anchored inflation expectations. We show that foreign exchange intervention (FXI) and capital flow management tools (CFMs) can improve monetary policy tradeoffs under some conditions, including by reducing the need for procyclical tightening in response to capital outflow pressures. Moreover, they can be used in a preemptive way to reduce the risk of a “sudden stop” through curbing a buildup in leverage. While these tools can materially improve welfare, mainly by dampening inefficient fluctuations in risk premia, our analysis also highlights potential limitations, including the possibility that their deployment may forestall needed adjustment in the external balance. Finally, our results also emphasize the power of FXIs to provide domestic stimulus in a liquidity trap.
Many central banks have relied on a range of policy tools, including foreign exchange intervention (FXI) and capital flow management tools (CFMs), to mitigate the effects of volatile capital flows on their economies. We develop an empirically-oriented New Keynesian model to evaluate and quantify how using multiple policy tools can potentially improve monetary policy tradeoffs. Our model embeds nonlinear balance sheet channels and includes a range of empirically-relevant frictions. We show that FXI and CFMs may improve policy tradeoffs under certain conditions, especially for economies with less well-anchored inflation expectations, substantial foreign currency mismatch, and that are more vulnerable to shocks likely to induce capital outflows and exchange rate pressures.