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A clear and original perspective on Kantian ethics that focuses on the dignity, vulnerability and perfectibility of human rational agency.
In an interview with Günther Gaus for German television in 1964, Hannah Arendt insisted that she was not a philosopher but a political theorist. Disillusioned by the cooperation of German intellectuals with the Nazis, she said farewell to philosophy when she fled the country. This book examines Arendt's ideas about thinking, acting and political responsibility, investigating the relationship between the life of the mind and the life of action that preoccupied Arendt throughout her life. By joining in the conversation between Arendt and Gaus, each contributor probes her ideas about thinking and judging and their relation to responsibility, power and violence. An insightful and intelligent treatment of the work of Hannah Arendt, this volume will appeal to a wide number of fields beyond political theory and philosophy, including law, literary studies, social anthropology and cultural history.
Kantian Dignity and its Difficulties defends Kant's doctrine that all human beings have a moral capacity that gives them unconditional dignity. It explains how the reception of this influential doctrine was marred by serious misunderstandings, and how Kant himself fell prey to prejudices inconsistent with the doctrine. The works of J.G. Herder and Richard Price are discussed as providing an important supplement for, and parallel to, what is best in Kant. Thomas Mann's work is then discussed as a paradigmatic example of a transition from a chauvinist reading--influenced by the terrible but highly popular interpretation of Kant by Houston Stewart Chamberlain--to an enlightened understanding of...
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In many histories of modern ethics, Kant is supposed to have ushered in an anti-realist or constructivist turn by holding that unless we ourselves 'author' or lay down moral norms and values for ourselves, our autonomy as agents will be threatened. In this book, Robert Stern challenges the cogency of this 'argument from autonomy', and claims that Kant never subscribed to it. Rather, it is not value realism but the apparent obligatoriness of morality that really poses a challenge to our autonomy: how can this be accounted for without taking away our freedom? The debate the book focuses on therefore concerns whether this obligatoriness should be located in ourselves (Kant), in others (Hegel) or in God (Kierkegaard). Stern traces the historical dialectic that drove the development of these respective theories, and clearly and sympathetically considers their merits and disadvantages; he concludes by arguing that the choice between them remains open.
Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy, political philosophy, and philosophy of judgement have been and continue to be widely discussed among many scholars. The impact of his thinking is beyond doubt and his ideas continue to inspire and encourage an on-going dialogue among many people in our world today. Given the historical and philosophical significance of Kant’s moral, political, and aesthetic theory, and the connection he draws between these theories and the appropriate function and methodology of education, it is surprising that relatively little has been written on Kant’s contribution to education theory. Recently, however, internationally recognized Kant scholars such as Paul Guyer, ...
The series Rethinking Kant bears witness to the richness and vitality of Kantian studies. The series offers an alternative publishing venue of the highest quality, attractive to scholars who want to reach a readership of specialists and non-specialist alike. The collection is unique in its kind, for it garners papers from a whole generation of Kantian thought, ranging from doctoral students and recent PhDs to well-established thinkers in the field. This is the third volume in the series. It contains papers from three regional study groups of the North American Kant Society, and thus takes the pulse of current Kantian scholarship.
This unique collection focuses on the unexamined connections between two contemporary, intensively debated lines of inquiry: Hegel-inspired theories of recognition (Anerkennung) and analytical social ontology. These lines address the roots of human sociality from different conceptual perspectives and have complementary strengths, variously stressing the social constitution of persons in interpersonal relations and the emergence of social and institutional reality through collective intentionality. In this book leading theorists and younger scholars offer original analyses of the connections and suggest new ways in which theories of recognition and current approaches in analytical social ontology can enrich one another.