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The Closed World offers a radically new alternative to the canonical histories of computers and cognitive science. Arguing that we can make sense of computers as tools only when we simultaneously grasp their roles as metaphors and political icons, Paul Edwards shows how Cold War social and cultural contexts shaped emerging computer technology--and were transformed, in turn, by information machines. The Closed World explores three apparently disparate histories--the history of American global power, the history of computing machines, and the history of subjectivity in science and culture--through the lens of the American political imagination. In the process, it reveals intimate links between...
US Defence Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom examines the thirty-year transformation in American military thought and defence strategy that spanned from 1973 through 2003. During these three decades, new technology and operational practices helped form what observers dubbed a 'Revolution in Military Affairs' in the 1990s and a 'New American Way of War' in the 2000s. Robert R. Tomes tells for the first time the story of how innovative approaches to solving battlefield challenges gave rise to non-nuclear strategic strike, the quest to apply information technology to offset Soviet military advantages, and the rise of 'decisive operations' in American military strategy. He details...
"Secretary of Defense Harold Brown worked to counter the Soviet Union's growing military strength during the administration of President Jimmy Carter. The Soviet Union of the Carter years came closest to matching the United States in strategic power than at any other point in the Cold War. By most reckonings, the Kremlin surpassed the West in conventional arms and forces in Central Europe, posing a threat to NATO. In response, Brown--a nuclear physicist--advocated more technologically advanced weapon systems but faced Carter's efforts to reign in the defense budget. Backed by the JCS, the national security adviser, and key members of Congress, Brown persuaded Carter to increase the defense b...
An expert exploration of the foundations of America’s science and technology policies, and the dynamics of its innovation system. Why study science and technology policy? What role does innovation play, and how do we foster it? Economics tells us technological innovation drives economic growth and societal well-being, but technology is always a double-edged sword—great technological advances offer both opportunities and threats. In Pioneering Progress, William Bonvillian explains the complex science and technology innovation system and discusses the challenges of emerging industrial policies. Drawing on in-depth case studies on critical areas such as energy, computing, advanced manufactu...
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Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche.
This book studies the impact of cultural factors on the course of military innovations. One would expect that countries accustomed to similar technologies would undergo analogous changes in their perception of and approach to warfare. However, the intellectual history of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Russia, the US, and Israel indicates the opposite. The US developed technology and weaponry for about a decade without reconceptualizing the existing paradigm about the nature of warfare. Soviet 'new theory of victory' represented a conceptualization which chronologically preceded technological procurement. Israel was the first to utilize the weaponry on the battlefield, but was th...
THE INSURGENTS unfolds against the backdrop of two wars waged against insurgencies-- wars which the Pentagon's top generals didn't know how to fight. But a small group of soldiers and scholars did have a plan for fighting these kinds of wars, people like General David Petraeus and Colonels John Nagl, David Kilcullen, and H.R. McMaster. In order to push the idea of "counterinsurgency" warfare, they behaved like insurgents within their own army-and very self-consciously so. Fred Kaplan explains where this idea came from, and how the men and women who latched onto this idea created a community (some would refer to themselves as a "cabal") that maneuvered the idea through the highest echelons of power. But this is also a cautionary tale about how even creative ideas can harden into dogma, how smart strategists-the "best and the brightest" of our times-can sometimes sway politicians but don't always win wars. The Insurgents made their military more adaptive to the conflicts of the post-Cold War era, but their self-confidence led us deeper into wars that we shouldn't have been fighting and perhaps couldn't have been won.