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Properties and Propositions
This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world. This book will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind.
Higher-Order Metaphysics
This volume explores the use of higher-order logics in metaphysics. Higher-order logics are natural extensions of the common systems of predicate logic, with a history going back to the very beginnings of formal logic. Such logics are well suited to formalize metaphysical views and arguments. Over the last decade, there has been a resurgence of interest in higher-order metaphysics. Seventeen original essays are grouped under five headings. Three introductory chapters present higher-order languages and motivate their use in metaphysics. Three chapters on pure higher-order metaphysics discuss different options of higher-order languages and logics which may be used in metaphysics. Three chapters on applied higher-order metaphysics consider the application of higher-order logic to various central topics of metaphysics. Three historical chapters trace the development of higher-order logic as it relates to metaphysics over the last 150 years. The volume concludes with a discussion, containing two chapters criticizing the use of higher-order logic in metaphysics, as well as responses to these criticisms by two authors.
