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The 15 essays in this collection throw light on central issues in the study of the mind by uniting psychological and philosophical approaches dealing with the connection between temporal representation and memory.
Sven Bernecker presents a new causal theory of memory, examining a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial to the understanding of propositional or factual memory. This book provides sophisticated and comprehensive coverage of a much neglected area of philosophy, and will also appeal to cognitive scientists and psychologists.
In this book, Alan Berger further develops the new theory of reference—as formulated by Kripke and Putnam—applying it in novel ways to many philosophical problems concerning reference and existence. Berger argues that his notion of anaphoric background condition and anaphoric links within a linguistic community are crucial not only to a theory of reference, but to the analysis of these problems as well. The book is organized in three parts. In part I, Berger distinguishes between two styles of rigid designation. Based on this distinction, he develops a theory of reference change for rigid designator terms and shows how this distinction sheds light on identity statements. In part II, he offers an account of belief attribution containing vacuous names within the belief context, of intentional identity statements, and of true negative existential statements. In part III, he analyzes anaphoric expressions (i.e., expressions whose reference is determined in part by other clauses or sentences in a given discourse) and presents a formalization of anaphora and plural quantification.
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This book investigates central issues in the philosophy of memory and is the first book on the metaphysics of memory in four decades. It defends a version of the causal theory of memory and argues for direct realism about memory.
Mindfulness is celebrated everywhere—especially in health psychology and spiritual practices, but also in the arts, business, education, environmentalism, sports, and the use of digital devices. While the current mindfulness movement may be in part the latest fad in a narcissistic and therapeutic culture, it is also worthy of greater philosophical attention. As a study in ethics and moral psychology, Mindfulness in Good Lives remedies the neglect of this subject within philosophy. Mike W. Martin makes sense of the striking variety of concepts of mindfulness by connecting them to the core idea of value-based mindfulness: paying attention to what matters, in light of relevant values. When the values are sound, mindfulness is a virtue that helps implement the kaleidoscope of values in good lives. Health psychologists, who currently dominate the study of mindfulness, often present their research as value-neutral science. Yet they invariably presuppose moral values that should be made transparent. These values, which lie at the interface of morality and mental health, form bridges between philosophy and psychology, and between literature and spirituality.
Simple seeing. Plain talking. Language in use and persons in action. These are among the themes of Virgil Aldrich's writings, from the 1930's onward. Throughout these years, he has been an explorer of conceptual geography: not as a foreign visitor studying an alien land, but close up 'in the language in which we live, move, and have our being'. This is his work. It is clear to those who know him best that he also has fun at it. Yet, in the terms of his oft-cited distinction, it is equally clear that he is to be counted not among the funsters of philosophy, but among its most committed workers. Funsters are those who attempt to do epistemology, metaphysics, or analysis by appealing to example...
THIS ESSAY was begun a long time ago, in 1962, when I spent a year in Rome on a Guggenheim Fellowship. That twenty one years were required to complete it is owing both to the character of the theory presented and to my peculiar habits of mind. The theory presented is a coherence theory of knowledge: the con ception of coherence is here dominant and pervasive. But considera tions of coherence dictate an attention to details. The fact of the matter is that I get hung up on details: everything must fit, and if it does not, I do not want to proceed. A second difficulty was that all the epistemological issues seemed too clear. That may sound weird, but that's the way it is. I write philosophy to make things clear to myself. If, rightly or wrongly, I think I know the answer to a question, I can't bring myself to write it down. What happened, in this case, is that I finally became persuaded, in the course of lecturing on epistemology to under graduates, that not everything was as clear as it should be, that there were gaps in my presentation that were seriously in need of filling.
The philosophy of cognitive science has recently become one of the most exciting and fastest growing domains of philosophical inquiry and analysis. Until the early 1980s, nearly all of the models developed treated cognitive processes -- like problem solving, language comprehension, memory, and higher visual processing -- as rule-governed symbol manipulation. However, this situation has changed dramatically over the last half dozen years. In that period there has been an enormous shift of attention toward connectionist models of cognition that are inspired by the network-like architecture of the brain. Because of their unique architecture and style of processing, connectionist systems are gen...