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This analytically cogent account engages with both the philosophical roots of ideas and their application in institutional structures. Offering a critical overview of political philosophies of welfare it is ideal for advanced students on courses in political science, sociology, social policy, and philosophy.
This book is both an exploration of Judith Shklar's liberalism of fear and an examination of the proper role and limits of political theory. It advances a novel interpretation of Shklar's mature work, one that emphasises its value monism. It also defends a value pluralist approach to resolving moral conflicts and thinking about freedom.
In modern democracies, existing moral pluralism conflicts with a commitment to resolve political disputes by way of moral reasoning. Given this fact, how can there be moral resolutions to political disputes and what type of reasoning is appropriate in the public sphere? Fives explores this by closely analysing the work of MacIntyre and Rawls.
In modern democracies, existing moral pluralism conflicts with a commitment to resolve political disputes by way of moral reasoning. Given this fact, how can there be moral resolutions to political disputes and what type of reasoning is appropriate in the public sphere? Fives explores this by closely analysing the work of MacIntyre and Rawls.
In modern democracies, existing moral pluralism conflicts with a commitment to resolve political disputes by way of moral reasoning. Given this fact, how can there be moral resolutions to political disputes and what type of reasoning is appropriate in the public sphere? Fives explores this by closely analysing the work of MacIntyre and Rawls.
This book puts forward a novel interpretation of Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear. Shklar’s work is usually seen as an important influence for those who take a sceptical approach to political thought and are concerned first and foremost with the avoidance of great evils. In fact, as this book shows, the most important factor shaping her mature work is not her scepticism but rather a value monist approach to both moral conflict and freedom, which represents a radical departure from the value pluralism (and scepticism) of her early work. The book also advances a clear line of argument in defence of value pluralism in political theory, one that builds on but moves beyond Shklar’s own early work.
Philosophy may not seem to be an obvious source to discover methods for successful product innovation management. However, this book shows that systematic reflection on the nature of product innovation management, supported by insights from the philosophy of technology, can illuminate the innovation process in technology and engineering. Presenting methodological guidelines and philosophical reflections, this book guides readers through each phase of product innovation. At each step, ideas from the philosophy of technology are translated into practical guidelines for managing these processes. The book works through the philosophical perspectives on innovation, methods in innovation design and research, and the value and ethical implications of innovation. Bridging the gap between philosophical context and practical methodologies, this book will be highly valuable for postgraduate students and academics researching and teaching innovation and philosophy of technology.
Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of reconciliation has emerged as a central term of political discourse within societies divided by a history of political violence. Reconciliation has been promoted as a way of reckoning with the legacy of past wrongs while opening the way for community in the future. This book examines the issues of transitional justice in the context of contemporary debates in political theory concerning the nature of 'the political'. Bringing together research on transitional justice and political theory, the author argues that if we are to talk of reconciliation in politics we need to think about it in a fundamentally different way than is commonly presupposed; as agonistic rather than restorative.