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The study aims at exposing Meinong's ideas that may be of interest to analytic philosophers. It contains all the basic information concerning Meinong's theory of objects with a special focus upon 'objectives', which are Meinong's propositions. Meinong's theory of meaning and his epistemological views are discussed in detail. An outline of his conception of truth, which is classified as firmly realistic, is followed by a review of the critical works touching upon Meinong's epistemological ideas. Finally, Meinong's theory of objects is presented as inspiring the development of Meinongian logics, with his Aussersein as the prototype of an all-inclusive semantic domain. The issues considered include reference of terms and sentences as well as the general features of a Meinongian-style semantics.
For a long time Franz Brentano has been widely perceived almost exclusively as the re-discoverer of intentionality and the founder of the continental phenomenology. It was only during the last 30 years that his immense importance for the development of analytic philosophy (and also the arbitrariness of the very division between analytic and continental philosophy) became clear. This volume is devoted to Brentano's influence on the Polish Analytic Philosophy better known under the name of: "Lvov-Warsaw School". Contributors: Arianna Betti (Amsterdam), Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (Szczecin and Salzburg), Dale Jacquette (Pennsylvania), Dariusz Lukasiewicz (Bydgoszcz), Maria van der Schaar (Leiden), Peter Simons (Leeds), Barry Smith (Buffalo and Saarbrücken), Jan Wolenski (Cracow).
The articles in this volume discuss the relation between values and ontology, focusing on the significance of ontology for ethics and aesthetics, i.e., themes which due to the raising interest in ontology come to play a central role in contemporary philosophical debate. The contributors address the questions of whether and in which sense values can be considered to be real, whether it is possible to experience them, and in which sense we can speak about their objective validity. These topics – which were also discussed by early phenomenologists like Brentano, Meinong, Ehrenfels, proponents of Gestalt psychology like Köhler, by Husserl, and by French phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty – are approached by both historical and systematic analysis.
The years of study on Husserl’s theory of intentionality have led to a number of non-equivalent interpretations. The present work attempts to investigate the most prominent of these by presenting both their advantages and difficulties. However, its key point is specifically the analysis of Husserl’s theory. This is made in several stages that are concerned with the relation between noesis and noema: whether it is one-to-one or many-to-one, the kind of transcendency and dependency between them, and whether noema supervenes on noesis. Moreover, Husserl’s theory is also examined in—usually ignored—instances of contradiction, nonsense and intentional conflict. The outcome is a fresh reading in which noema occurs as the possibly thinkable content capable of constituting multi-objective references and composed of pure X explained in terms of syntactic matter and form.
Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) belonged to those phenomenologists who never accepted Husserl's transcendental idealism. He devoted a great part of his intellectual energy to the "preparatory" analytical studies in which he hoped to develop an ontological framework suitable for an ultimate refutation of Husserl's idealistic doctrine. In these works we find a rich arsenal of ontological tools which is interesting even for those philosophers who are not interested in the subtleties of the Husserlian tradition or esoteric dialectics of the idealism / realism debate. Contributors: Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (Szczecin and Salzburg), Gregor Haefliger (Fribourg), Guido Küng (Fribourg), Jeff Mitscherling (Guelph), Andrzej Póltawski (Cracow), Peter Simons (Leeds), Edward Swiderski (Fribourg), Amie L. Thomasson (Miami), Daniel von Wachter (Munich).
What is mind? What is its relationship to the physical world? Is consciousness a causative agent in the physical world? With much progress being made in the neurosciences, many have thought that these questions could be answered by reducing them to questions about physical systems such as the brain. But this approach has foundered on the core problem of consciousness: Why is it that some brain processes are accompanied by conscious awareness? This anthology points out new sources and unexamined paths of consciousness research. By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavours to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favour of new and more differentiated positions.
While many of the phenomenological currents in philosophy allegedly utilize a peculiar method, the type under consideration here is characterized by Franz Brentano’s ambition to make philosophy scientific by adopting no other method but that of natural science. Brentano became particularly influential in teaching his students (such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, and Edmund Husserl) his descriptive psychology, which is concerned with mind as intentionally directed at objects. As Brentano and his students continued in their investigations in descriptive psychology, another side of Austrian phenomenology, namely object theory, became more and more prominent. The philosophical orientation under consideration in this collection of essays is accordingly a two-sided discipline, concerned with both mind and objects, and applicable to various areas of philosophy such as epistemology, philosophy of language, value theory, and ontology.