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This volume celebrates the career of John Martin Fischer, whose work on a wide range of topics over the past 40 years has been transformative and inspirational. Fischer’s semicompatibilist view of free will and moral responsibility is perhaps the most widely discussed view of its kind, and his emphasis on the significance of reasons-responsiveness as the capacity that underlies moral accountability has been widely influential. Aside from free will and moral responsibility, Fischer is also well-known for his work on freedom and foreknowledge, the problem of evil, the badness of death, the meaning of life, and the allure of immortality. This volume gathers new essays by leading scholars on some of the major themes of Fischer's work, and it also includes a new piece by Fischer in which he offers a systematic reflection on and defense of the motivations that have shaped his theorizing about moral responsibility. Freedom, Responsibility, and Value will be of interest to scholars and students working on a variety of issues in metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of religion.
This volume unites established authors and rising young voices in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion to offer the single most wide-ranging examination of theological determinism-in terms of both authors represented and issues investigated-published to date. Fifteen contributors present discussions about theological (or divine) determinism, the view that God determines everything that occurs in the world. Some authors provide arguments in favor of this position, while others provide considerations against it. Many contributors investigate the relationship between theological determinism and other philosophical issues (the principle of sufficient reason; the compatibility of determinism and free will; moral luck), theological doctrines (creation ex nihilo; divine forgiveness; the inevitability of sin; the unity of Christ's will with God's), or moral attitudes and practices (trusting God; resenting the ill-will of others; resisting evil). This book is essential reading for all those interested in the relationship between theological determinism and philosophical thought.
The 14 chapters in Ethics at the End of Life: New Issues and Arguments, all published here for the first time, focus on recent thinking in this important area, helping initiate issues and lines of argument that have not been explored previously. At the same time, a reader can use this volume to become oriented to the established questions and positions in end of life ethics, both because new questions are set in their context, and because most of the chapters—written by a team of experts—survey the field as well as add to it. Each chapter includes initial summaries, final conclusions, and a Related Topics section.
How Free Are We? contains a collection of edited interviews from The Free Will Show, a podcast by the philosophers Taylor W. Cyr and Matthew T. Flummer. In an accessible and conversational format, a variety of leading scholars introduce the main issues, questions, and arguments in the free will debate
Political Theory on Death and Dying provides a comprehensive, encyclopedic review that compiles and curates the latest scholarship, research, and debates on the political and social implications of death and dying. Adopting an easy-to-follow chronological and multi-disciplinary approach on 45 canonical figures and thinkers, leading scholars from a diverse range of fields, including political science, philosophy, and English, discuss each thinker’s ethical and philosophical accounts on mortality and death. Each chapter focuses on a single established figure in political philosophy, as well as religious and literary thinkers, covering classical to contemporary thought on death. Through this approach, the chapters are designed to stand alone, allowing the reader to study every entry in isolation and with greater depth, as well as trace how thinkers are influenced by their predecessors. A key contribution to the field, Political Theory on Death and Dying provides an excellent overview for students and researchers who study philosophy of death, the history of political thought, and political philosophy.
Offering not only state-of-the-art introductions from Biblical, historical, and constructive theologians, this volume also fosters an inter-disciplinary and cross-confessional conversation, reclaiming the idea of election as a central notion for any retelling of the biblical narrative. Several essays explore the variety of ways in which election is spoken about in the Scripture, drawing on research from the last twenty years that offers a more sophisticated framework than the traditionally theological categories of “elect” and “reject”. The historical part of the volume covers new analyses of Medieval and post-Reformation Catholic and Protestant debates on predestination, while the book's constructive part contributes to contemporary conversations on the relationship between Trinity, Christology, and election, the development of a post-supersessionist understanding of Israel's chosenness, as well as voices from contextual struggles in South America, Palestine, and South Africa.
This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct - one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism - then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. Although this simple view of freedom clashes with most theories of responsibility, including the most prominent "actual sequence" theories currently on offer, Sartorio argues for its truth. The key,she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer thanthey appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other (counterfactual) reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes andsimpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic.The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways.
This is a concise introduction to one of the central questions of philosophy - are we subject to determinism, or do we possess Free Will, and thus responsibility for our actions? The first part of the book, which in itself amounts to a complete philosophy of mind, considers the claims of the two theories and investigates whether either of them is clear, consistent, complete, or demonstrably true. The remaining chapters deal with the implications of determinism and its significance inour public and private actions. Honderich examines the doctrines of compatibilism, which argues that we are subject to causation but nevertheless free, and incompatibilism, which sees determinism and freedom as mutually exclusive. This debate has been one of philosophy's main battlegrounds for centuries, with thinkers as distinguished as Kant and Hume in opposite camps.
In this book the author examines the stubborn philosophical belief in moral responsibility, surveying the philosophical arguments for it, but focusing on the system that supports these arguments: powerful social and psychological factors that hold the belief in moral responsibility firmly in place.--Publisher's description.