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Extends and adapts G. E. M. Anscombe's philosophy to reveal attempting as a subjective species of intentional action. Locates criminal attempts therein.
Examines the particularly prescient implications that neuroscience has for legal responsibility, highlighting the philosophical and practical challenges that arise.
Exploring the relationship between natural law theory and the philosophy of law, Bebhinn Donnelly proposes a new approach to natural law theory - one which addresses some of the tradition's shortcomings and advances further its approach to Hume's dichotomy. Key features: ¢ Provides a clear definition of `nature' in this context ¢ Contrasts the work of Hume and Kant regarding the `is/ought' issue ¢ Examines the approach in traditional natural law ¢ Presents a full discussion of Finnis and the departure from traditional natural law ¢ Proposes a new, natural law approach to normativity, drawing on the strengths of traditional natural law theory ¢ Illustrates how natural law may provide a normative base for law A Natural Law Approach to Normativity presents an original perspective on natural law theory and will be of interest to academics in philosophy of law, moral/political philosophy, natural law theorists, and students of jurisprudence internationally.
This edited book provides an in-depth examination of the implications of neuroscience for the criminal justice system. It draws together experts from across law, neuroscience, medicine, psychology, criminology, and ethics, and offers an important contribution to current debates at the intersection of these fields. It examines how neuroscience might contribute to fair and more effective criminal justice systems, and how neuroscientific insights and information can be integrated into criminal law in a way that respects fundamental rights and moral values. The book’s first part approaches these questions from a legal perspective, followed by ethical accounts in part two. Its authors address a...
The willful ignorance doctrine says defendants should sometimes be treated as if they know what they don't. This book provides a careful defense of this method of imputing mental states. Though the doctrine is only partly justified and requires reform, it also demonstrates that the criminal law needs more legal fictions of this kind. The resulting theory of when and why the criminal law can pretend we know what we don't has far-reaching implications for legal practice and reveals a pressing need for change.
This book examines mediation topics such as impartiality, self-determination and fair outcomes through popular culture lenses. Popular television shows and award-winning films are used as illustrative examples to illuminate under-represented mediation topics such as feelings and expert intuition, conflicts of interest and repeat business, and deception and caucusing. The author also employs research from Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to demonstrate that real and reel mediation may have more in common than we think. How mediation is imagined in popular culture, compared to how professors teach it and how mediators practise it, provides important affective, ethical, legal, personal and pedagogical insights relevant for mediators, lawyers, professors and students, and may even help develop mediator identity.
This book proposes a different approach to theorising and analysing antitrust issues, working on the premise that at present, antitrust is addressed from top-down and narrow perspectives which in effect limit the attention paid to or exclude issues that could otherwise be considered. This reasoning is motivated by the pursuit of inclusiveness and broadness in the antitrust context. The work contends that traditional top-down antitrust theories are weak because they are incomplete and insufficient in their description and analysis of antitrust issues. Thus, it identifies the need to construct a bottom-up approach. Invariably, such an approach would have to avoid ex ante judgments about the suitability of the normative contents of antitrust laws and theories, lest it fall into the same trap that plagues traditional theories. As a possible solution, the author proposes a procedural account referred to as the person-centred approach (built on theories such as Sen’s Capability) and carefully reviews its practicality.
When creating the norms of criminal law, the legislator should strive for their compatibility with the principle of human dignity while taking into account the ethical legitimacy of criminal law. This thesis is the axis around which The Ethical Legitimization of Criminal Law is constructed. Szczucki shows that criminal law is like a suit; to be a perfect fit, it has to be tailor-made. That is why he argues for three points of reference to guide moral evaluation of criminal law: first, the coherence of the legal system; second, the will of the legislator; and third, the virtues of citizens. Only by analyzing these concepts together in the context of legal culture can one answer the question of what makes good criminal law. The book concludes that an ethical perspective in analyzing, grounding, and evaluating criminal law is inevitable. Appealing to researchers, scholars, and professionals from across the criminal and legal spectrum, this book explores fundamental questions about the nature of ethical perspective in legal analysis.
How neuroethics can be increasingly relevant and informative for inclusive social policy and political discourse about brain science and technologies. Neuroethics, a field just over two decades old, addresses both ethical issues generated in and by brain sciences and the neuroscientific studies of moral and ethical thought and action. These foci are reciprocally interactive and prompt questions of how science and ethics can and should harmonize. In Bioethics and Brains, John R. Shook and James Giordano ask: How can the brain sciences inform ethics? And how might ethics guide the brain sciences and their real-world applications? The authors’ structure for a disciplined neuroethics reconcile...
Ranking of people, schools, products, countries, and just about everything else is part of our daily lives. But we are in a paradoxical relationship with ranking: we believe that ranking is good because it is informative and objective; and we believe ranking is bad because it is biased and subjective, and occasionally, even manipulated. Ranking: The Unwritten Rules of the Social Game We All Play combines the application of scientific theories to everyday experience with entertaining personal stories.