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Fiscal Rules
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 53

Fiscal Rules

Over the past decade, Lesotho and Swaziland have faced significant volatility in their fiscal revenues, owing to highly unstable Southern African Customs Union (SACU) receipts. Based on model analysis, this paper explores the advantages of implementing fiscal rules to deal with such volatility. It finds that the use of a structural balance target could smooth the growth impact from revenue shocks while helping preserve sufficient international reserves during bad times. From a long-term perspective, it suggests possible welfare gains from introducing fiscal rules. Last, it concludes that, based on experiences in other countries, developing strong institutions and improving public financial management are necessary steps to ease the transitions to a rules-based fiscal policy framework.

A Gravity Model of Geopolitics and Financial Fragmentation
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 37

A Gravity Model of Geopolitics and Financial Fragmentation

Do geopolitical tensions between countries influence the cross-border asset allocation of investment funds? Our answer is yes. We estimate gravity models and find that investment funds allocate smaller shares of their portfolios to recipient countries that are geopolitically more distant to their country of origin—with geopolitical distance measured by dissimilarity in countries’ voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly. We also find an investment diversion effect: a recipient country attracts additional investments when its source countries get geopolitically more distant to third-party countries. These results are robust to instrumenting geopolitical distance and using alternative distance measures.

Precautionary Savings in a Small Open Economy Revisited
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 25

Precautionary Savings in a Small Open Economy Revisited

A common assumption in standard economic models is that agents are risk-averse and prudent, and it is often argued that prudence is necessary to generate precautionary savings. This paper shows that prudence is not necessary to generate precautionary savings in small open economy models with more than two periods. A new class of preferences, which enables the isolation of the effect of risk aversion on precautionary savings, is introduced. The effects of changes in risk aversion, interest rates, and persistence and volatility of shocks on average asset holdings are qualitatively identical to the ones observed for standard constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences. These results show that the almost universal assertion in the literature - that only prudent consumers can generate positive levels of precautionary savings - is simply incorrect.

Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 28

Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk

We propose a modification to a baseline sovereign default framework that allows us to quantify the importance of debt dilution in accounting for the level and volatility of the interest rate spread paid by sovereigns. We measure the effects of debt dilution by comparing the simulations of the baseline model (with debt dilution) with the ones of the modified model without dilution. We calibrate the baseline model to mimic the mean and standard deviation of the spread, as well as the external debt level, the mean debt duration and a measure of default frequency in the data. We find that, even without commitment to future repayment policies and withoutcontingency of sovereign debt, if the sover...

The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 200

The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default

An integrated approach to the economics of sovereign default Fiscal crises and sovereign default repeatedly threaten the stability and growth of economies around the world. Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador provide a unified and tractable theoretical framework that elucidates the key economics behind sovereign debt markets, shedding light on the frictions and inefficiencies that prevent the smooth functioning of these markets, and proposing sensible approaches to sovereign debt management. The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default looks at the core friction unique to sovereign debt—the lack of strong legal enforcement—and goes on to examine additional frictions such as deadweight costs of ...

How Governments Borrow
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 193

How Governments Borrow

How Governments Borrow reveals how annual borrowing decisions are informed by domestic politics. The book traces the annual fiscal policymaking process in Emerging Markets (EM) to show how a government's partisan policy preferences are a primary determinant of annual external borrowing decisions and thus patterns of debt accumulation. That sovereign debt composition has partisan political roots provides insights for scholars in political science, international relations, economics, sociology, and public administration that work on sovereign debt. Sovereign debt composition enhances or limits the capacity of an EM government to contribute to social and economic development. Many EMs depend on...

Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies Under Fire-Sale Externalities
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 53

Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies Under Fire-Sale Externalities

I provide an integrated analysis of monetary and macroprudential policies in a model economy featuring a financial friction and a nominal wage rigidity. In this set-up, the monetary authority faces a trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability: While expansionary counter-cyclical monetary policy prevents involuntary unemployment, it also amplifies an inefficient reallocation of capital across sectors. The main contribution of the analysis is threefold: First it highlights a novel channel through which monetary policy can impact financial stability. Second, it shows that, by itself, monetary policy can significantly mitigate the wedge between the constrained efficient and the competitive allocation. Third, regardless of the availability of macroprudential tools, stabilizing demand is usually not optimal for monetary policy.

Fix Vs. Float: Evaluating the Transition to a Sustainable Equilibrium in Bolivia
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 32

Fix Vs. Float: Evaluating the Transition to a Sustainable Equilibrium in Bolivia

Bolivia has achieved noteworthy success over the past 15 years in raising incomes, reducing poverty, and maintaining macroeconomic stability by deploying commodity revenues to finance transfers, public investment, and state-led development, using an exchange rate peg as a policy anchor. However, with the end of the commodity boom in 2014, fiscal deficits have grown and reserves have fallen. One route to restoring long-run sustainability would be to combine fiscal consolidation with a switch to a floating exchange rate. However, a preference for maintaining the peg could be accommodated with adjustments elsewhere in the policy framework. Employing a detailed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the Bolivian economy, this study assesses the long-run sustainability and relative benefits of alternative policy combinations, and calculates optimal adjustment paths for the transition from the present situation to the steady state. It concludes that continued adherence to a fixed-rate regime, while not optimal, is feasible, if supported by a larger fiscal effort.

Sovereign Debt Standstills
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 27

Sovereign Debt Standstills

As a response to economic crises triggered by COVID-19, sovereign debt standstill proposals emphasize debt payment suspensions without haircuts on the face value of debt obligations. We quantify the effects of standstills using a standard default model. We find that a one-year standstill generates welfare gains for the sovereign equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of between 0.1% and 0.3%, depending on the initial shock. However, except when it avoids a default, the standstill also implies capital losses for creditors of between 9% and 27%, which is consistent with their reluctance to participate in these operations and indicates that this reluctance would persist even without a free-riding or holdout problem. Standstills also generate a form of “debt overhang” and thus the opportunity for a “voluntary debt exchange”: complementing the standstill with haircuts could reduce creditors’ losses and simultaneously increase welfare gains. Our results cast doubts on the emphasis on standstills without haircuts.

Region Focus
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 198

Region Focus

  • Type: Book
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  • Published: 2010
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  • Publisher: Unknown

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