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The salience of deposit insurance has increased enormously in recent years as a result of the thrifts crisis in the USA and its proposed introduction to the European Community.
The paper contrasts deposit protection with other forms of insurance, examines why goods and services of all kinds receive warranties and guarantees, and explores the particular characteristics of deposits and banks that merit deposit insurance. It examines a variety of reasons why countries choose to adopt systems of deposit insurance, the pitfalls that can arise from poorly designed schemes, and the features of a scheme that successfully avoids these pitfalls.
Risks and uncertainties?market, financial, operational, social, humanitarian, environmental, and institutional?are the inherent realities of the modern world. Stock market crashes, demonetization of currency, and climate change constitute just a few examples that can adversely impact financial institutions across the globe. To mitigate these risks and avoid a financial crisis, a better understanding of how the economy responds to uncertainties is needed. Maintaining Financial Stability in Times of Risk and Uncertainty is an essential reference source that discusses how risks and uncertainties affect the financial stability and security of individuals and institutions, as well as probable solutions to mitigate risk and achieve financial resilience under uncertainty. Featuring research on topics such as financial fraud, insurance ombudsman, and Knightian uncertainty, this book is developed for researchers, academicians, policymakers, students, and scholars.
The paper surveys the characteristics of explicit systems of deposit insurance in 68 countries. It compares these actual practices with a set of best practices that has been adopted by IMF staff for their advice to member countries. These best practices seek to establish a system of deposit insurance that provides incentives for all parties—whether they are directly or indirectly affected by the guarantee—to keep the financial system sound. The paper discerns some convergence toward best practices in recent years, but notes several areas where improvements in the incentive structure are still necessary.
Explicit deposit insurance (DI) is widely held to be a crucial element of modern financial safety nets. This book draws on an original cross-country dataset on DI systems and design features to examine the impact of DI on banking behavior and assess the policy complications that emerge in developing countries.
This book provides a comprehensive overview of funding arrangements for explicit deposit insurance schemes. Responding to international guidelines and best practice, it discusses policy decisions and operational challenges which deposit insurers face in the financial management of ex-ante deposit insurance funds. Numerous examples are provided, and solutions offered on sources and uses of funds, focusing on target and optimal funding. Coverage includes: the role that modern deposit insurance schemes play in ensuring financial stability how to design the main deposit insurance features in order to maximize compliance with international standards the different types of funding and financial planning for deposit insurance methods for setting the target fund size level optimal deposit insurance funding challenges faced by the European Union members following new deposit insurance and bank resolution directives. The book concludes by providing a comprehensive overview of funding issues and recommendations for deposit insurance schemes in the European Union.
This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.
This paper is a survey of deposit protection arrangements and it compares the key elements of deposit protection schemes around the world. There are more implicit arrangements that guarantee deposits than explicit ones, but there has been a growing tendency since the 1980s for countries to adopt explicit ones largely in response to emerging problems with their financial systems.