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Environmental Taxes and the Double-dividend Hypothesis
The double-dividend hypothesis' suggests that increased taxes on polluting activities can provide two kinds of benefits. The first is an improvement in the environment, and the second is an improvement in economic efficiency from the use of environmental tax revenues to reduce other taxes such as income taxes that distort labor supply and saving decisions. In this paper, we make four main points. First, the validity of the double-dividend hypothesis cannot logically be settled as a general matter. Second, the focus on revenue in this literature is misplaced. We demonstrate that three policies have equivalent impacts on the environment and on labor supply. One of those policies raises revenue...
The Design and Implementation of US Climate Policy
"This book contains the proceedings of an NBER conference held in Washington, DC, on May 13-14, 2010"--Page xi.
Distributional Effects of Environmental and Energy Policy
Many effects of environmental and energy policy are likely to disproportionately burden those with low income. First, it raises the price of fossil-fuel-intensive products that constitute a high fraction of low-income budgets (like gasoline, heating fuel and electricity). Second, the handout of pollution permits to firms provides value to those who own them. Third, low-income individuals may place more value on food and shelter than on improvements in environmental quality, so high-income individuals may get the most benefit of pollution abatement. Fourth, air quality improvements may raise the value of houses owned by landlords, rather than helping renters. These effects might all hurt the poor more than the rich. This book brings together the seminal economics literature that studies whether these fears are valid and whether anything can be done about them.
Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning Or Dumping
Additional solid waste disposal imposes resource and environmental costs, but most residents still pay no additional fee per marginal unit of garbage collection. In a simple model with garbage and recycling as the only two disposal options, we show that the optimizing fee for garbage collection equals the resource cost plus environmental cost. When illicit burning or dumping is a third disposal option, however, the optimizing fee for garbage collection can change sign. Burning or dumping is not a market activity and cannot be taxed directly, but it can be discouraged indirectly by a system with a tax on all output plus a rebate on proper disposal either through recycling or garbage collection. This optimizing fee structure is essentially a deposit-refund system. The output tax helps achieve the first-best allocation even though it may affect the choice between consumption and untaxed leisure, because consumption leads to disposal problems while leisure does not.
The Taxation of Income from Capital
Taxation—both corporate and personal—has been held responsible for the low investment and productivity growth rates experienced in the West during the last decade. This book, a comparative study of the taxation of income from capital in the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and West Germany, establishes for the first time a common framework for analysis that permits accurate comparison of tax systems.
Uncertainty, Welfare Cost, and the "adaptability" of U.S. Corporate Taxes
Alternative corporate tax systems differ in their ability to adapt to changes in the rate of inflation. Absent complete indexing of depreciation allowances, a tax system may use the expected inflation rate to set accelerated depreciation allowances in a way that minimizes the welfare loss from them is allocation of capital. This welfare loss is a nonlinear function of the assumed inflation rate, however, so the welfare loss at the expected inflation rate may be quite different from the expected welfare loss. We compute these two welfare concepts for each of three alternative corporate tax schemes in the U.S. and for two different relationships between inflation and interest rates. One important finding is that the Auerbach-Jorgenson first year recovery plan is not equivalent to indexing as is often claimed, if uncertainty about inflation implies uncertainty about the real after-tax discount rate.
Who Bears the Lifetime Tax Burden?
In Who Bears The Lifetime Tax Burden? Fullerton and Rogers estimate lifetime wage profiles, categorize individuals into lifetime income groups, and re-estimate the pattern of earnings over the lifetime for each group. They use a general equalibrium model that encompasses household demands, work effort, and savings, and they calculate the distribution of burdens for each current tax. Because their model includes all major U.S. federal, state, and local taxes, it can be used to simulate the effects of changes in any of those taxes on investment, productivity, resource allocation, and the distribution of burdens -- Publisher.
Second-best Pollution Taxes
When government needs more revenue than is available from a pollution tax rate equal to marginal environmental damage, our intuition tells us to raise the tax on the clean good above zero and to raise the tax on the dirty good above that first-best Pigouvian rate. Yet new results suggest that the second-best pollution tax is below the Pigouvian rate. This note reconciles these views by pointing out that these new results use a labor tax to acquire additional revenue, and that the labor tax is equivalent to a uniform tax on both clean and dirty goods. Thus, depending on the normalization, the total tax on the dirty good can be above the Pigouvian rate. These recent results are meant to show that the difference between the tax on the dirty good and the tax on the clean good is less than the Pigouvian rate. Any one tax rate can be set to zero as a conceptual matter, but implementation of some taxes might be easier than others as a practical matter.
