You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
Drawing from post-war reports commissioned by U.S. Army intelligence, World War II historian Steven H. Newton has translated, compiled, and edited the battle accounts of one of Germany's finest panzer commanders and a skilled tactician of tank warfare. Throughout most of the war, Erhard Raus was a highly respected field commander in the German-Soviet war on the eastern front, and after the war he wrote an insightful analysis of German strategy in that campaign.The Raus memoir covers the Russian campaign from the first day of the war to his relief from command at Hitler's order in the spring of 1945. It includes a detailed examination of the 6th Panzer Division's drive to Leningrad, Raus's own experiences in the Soviet winter counteroffensive around Moscow, the unsuccessful attempt to relieve Stalingrad, and the final desperate battles inside Germany at the end of the war. His battlefield experience and keen tactical eye make his memoir especially valuable for scholars, and his narrative is as readable as Heinz Guderian's celebrated Panzer Leader.
General Erhard Raus was one of the German Army's finest panzer generals and a leading exponent of blitzkrieg in the east. German panzers were witness to the incredible onslaught that was the first few months of Barbarossa, then the gradual strengthening of Russian resistance, counterattack, and, ultimately, the long and drawn- out German retreat. Raus and his panzers therefore were tested in every conceivable tactical situation and, inevitably, Raus became highly versed in all aspects of mobilized warfare. This account by Erhard Raus, edited by leading Eastern Front expert Peter G. Tsouras, concentrates on German efforts to relieve Stalingrad and Raus, as commander of 6th Panzer Division, was in the thick of this bitter action, urging his panzers forwards in a massive effort to break the Soviet stranglehold. Written originally to brief the American Army, this valuable material is now made available for the first time.
Hitler's tank divisions were his most lethal weapons during World War II. From success to failure, in victory and defeat, each division played a role in Hitler's campaign against the Allies. Examines vehicles, armor quality, manpower, and leadership and includes a comprehensive index of individuals, units, battles, and campaigns First guide to chronicle the history of each division from its inception to its destruction Includes a career sketch of every panzer divisional commander
Detailed reports by German commanders: “Powerful testimony to the Germans’ lack of preparation for the harsh climatic conditions of the Russian winter.” —Military Machines International When their troops invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the initial success convinced the German high command that the Red Army could be destroyed west of the Dnepr River and that there would be no need for conducting operations in cold, snow, and mud. They were wrong. In fact, the German war in Russia was so brutal in its extremes that all past experience paled beside it. Everything in Russia—the land, the climate, the distances, and above all the people—were harder, harsher, more unforgiving, and de...
An unprecedented look at German operations on the Russian Front during World War II. The Anvil of War details the German strategies and tactics employed by the commanders on the cataclysmic Russian Front in the Second World War. Monographs by two German officers who served in Russia – Military Improvisations during the Russian Campaign and German Defense Tactics against Russian Breakthrough by General Erhard Rauss, and Operations of Encircled Forces by Generalleutnant Oldwig von Natzmer – show how the Germans adapted techniques to cope with their enemy’s great numerical superiority, and managed to delay and sometimes drive back the “steamroller Russian forces during the German retreat in 1945.” These reports were written as part of a U.S. Army program instigated after the war by Colonel S.L.A. Marshall of the Army Historical Division, who was convinced that no record of the war could be complete without the input of German commanding officers and their main staff officers. The significance of the material detailing the Germans vast experience of fighting the Soviets was emphasized with the fear of a Russian attack during the Cold War.
The battle of Kursk, fought in the summer of 1943, involved six thousand German and Soviet armored vehicles, making it the biggest tank battle of all time and possibly the largest battle of any kind. Students of military history have long recognized the importance of Kursk, also known as "Operation Citadel," and there have been several serious studies of the battle. Yet, the German view of the battle has been largely ignored.After the war, U.S. Army Intelligence officers gathered German commanders' post-war reports of the battle. Due, in part, to poor translations done after the war, these important documents have been overlooked by World War II historians. Steven H. Newton has collected, translated, and edited these accounts, including reports made by the Chiefs of Staff of Army Group South and the Fourth Panzer Army, and by the Army Group Center Operations Officer. As a result, a new and unprecedented picture of German strategy and operations is made available. The translated staff reports are supplemented by Newton's commentary and original research, which challenges a number of widely accepted ideas about this pivotal battle.
A deft, lively, and highly readable history of the demise of the German way of war. As the allies found an antidote to the "shock and awe" approach of the Wehrmacht, the once mighty German army underwent an epic fall from remarkable operational victories to crushing operational defeats, forced to take on a defensive stance in a war it could never win.
Explores how the Wehrmacht's defensive conduct contributed to the radicalisation of behavioural patterns in Germany during the war's final months.
The author of Case White: The Invasion of Poland delves into the strategy and weaponry of armored warfare during the early years of the Russo-German War. The German panzer armies that swept into the Soviet Union in 1941 were an undefeated force that had honed their skill in combined arms warfare to a fine edge. The Germans focused their panzers and tactical air support at points on the battlefield defined as Schwerpunkt—main effort—to smash through any defensive line and then advance to envelope their adversaries. Initially, these methods worked well in the early days of Operation Barbarossa and the tank forces of the Red Army suffered defeat after defeat. Although badly mauled in the op...
“PECULIARITES OF RUSSIAN WARFARE” was prepared by a committee of former German generals and general staff corps officers at the EUCOM Historical Division Interrogation Enclosure, Neustadt, Germany, in late 1947 and early 1948. All members of the committee, however, had extensive experience on the Eastern Front during the period 1941-45. The principal author, for example, commanded, in succession, a panzer division, a corps, a panzer army, and an army group. “...the report has had to be limited to a description of the characteristic traits of the Russian soldier, and their influence on the conduct of battle. The extent to which the political, economic, and social conditions of the count...