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Rabbi Yehoshua Aisek Shapira lived in the 19th century and was the great-grandson of Rabbi Luria, the famed Kabbalist of Safed. Rabbi Aisel Slonimer, as he was known, spent most of his rabbinic life in Slonim, in the Grodno district of Byelorussia, He was called Harif (Sharp) because of his prodigious memory and his sharp tongue. His witticisms and clever retorts are legendary. Rabbi Aisel wrote many of his major works in Slonim, including Emek Yehoshua and Nahlat Yehoshua which encompass his responsa (questions and answers to problems of his day); Noam Yerushalmi, his commentary and glosses on the Jerusalem Talmud; and Sefat HaNahal and Ibbei HaNahal which contain many of his sermons.
The original and creative analyses presented in this work represent a new understanding of the exciting field of personality and disease. Contributors offer current research findings and their experienced opinions on the relationship that exists between personality and disease in a clear, comprehensive fashion. Among the topics covered are models of linkages between personality and disease, stress and illness, individual differences and health--gender, coping and stress. Personality and social factors or and how they affect the outcome of cancer, are also discussed. The exploration and examination of the issues presented here are extremely valuable and will have a major impact on future research and practice.
The escape from Egypt is the pivotal event in the Old Testament. Through it God gave his people their freedom. For forty tumultuous years God and Moses and a chronically rebellious people suffered and fought and established the foundations of a legal system and a system of ethics that changed the world. The Old Testament reminds us that we must never forget the Exodus, or we will forget who we are. And as we learn about the Exodus, we learn who we are.
Equity can be defined as the use of a more flexible, morally judgmental, and subjective mode of legal decision making that roughly corresponds with historical equity. This Element presents a simple contracting model that captures the role of equity as a safety valve, and shows how it can solve problems posed by opportunists–agents with unusual willingness and ability to take advantage of necessary imperfections in the law. In this model, a simple but imperfect formal legal regime is able to achieve first best in the absence of opportunists. But when opportunists are added, a more flexible regime (equity), can be preferred. However, equity is also vulnerable to being used opportunistically by the parties it intends to protect. Hence, the Element shows that it is often preferable to limit equity, reserving it for use only against those who appear sufficiently likely to be opportunists.
Congress and the president are not the only branches that deal with fiscal issues in times of war. In this innovative book, Nancy Staudt focuses on the role of federal courts in fiscal matters during warfare and high-cost national defense emergencies. There is, she argues, a judicial power of the purse that becomes evident upon examining the budgetary effects of judicial decision making. The book provides substantial evidence that judges are willing—maybe even eager—to redirect private monies into government hands when the country is in peril, but when the judges receive convincing cues that ongoing wartime activities undermine the nation’s interests, they are more likely to withhold funds from the government by deciding cases in favor of private individuals and entities who show up in court. In stark contrast with conventional legal, political, and institutional thought that privileges factors associated with individual preferences, The Judicial Power of the Purse sheds light on environmental factors in judicial decision making and will be an excellent read for students of judicial behavior in political science and law.
Selected writings illuminate a century of international dance.
Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on 'contracts as reference points'. Including a contingency of the form, 'The buyer will require a good in event E', has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if E occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in E can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside E. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract is strictly superior to a contingent contract. If parties have different views about the division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be superior if including a contingency would lead to divergent reference points.
Although much has been written about innovation in the past several years, not all parts of the innovation lifecycle have been given the same treatment. This volume focuses on the important first step of arranging financing for innovation before it is made, and explores the feedback effect that innovation can have on finance itself. The book brings together a diverse group of leading scholars in order to address the financing of innovation. The chapters address three key areas, intellectual property, venture capital, and financial engineering in the capital markets, in order to provide fresh and insightful analyses of current and future economic developments in financing innovation. Chapters...