You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
Many governments have faced serious instability as a result of their contingent liabilities. But conventional public finance analysis and institutions fail to address such fiscal risks. This book aims to provide motivation and practical guidance to governments seeking to improve theirmanagement of fiscal risks. The book addresses some of the difficult analytical and institutional challenges that face reformers tooling up to manage government fiscal risks. It discusses the inadequacies of conventional practices as well as recent advances in dealing with fiscal risk.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are popular around the world, in part because they allow governments to secure much-needed investment in public services without immediately having to raise taxes or borrow. Yet, PPPs pose a fiscal danger because a government's desire to avoid reporting immediate liabilities may blind it to future fiscal costs and risks. Although PPPs may not blemish governments' reported fiscal statements in the short term, they do create fiscal obligations. This increases fiscal vulnerability and can result in poorly-designed PPPs. The extent of the danger depends on the fiscal institutions that shape and constrain government decisions toward PPPs. Such fiscal institutions affect decisionmaking incentives. Better fiscal institutions therefore can increase the chance that PPPs will be well designed and appropriately used.
Governments' contingent liabilities increase fiscal vulnerability, but are omitted in traditional measures of the current deficit. In the Czech Republic this omission may mean that fiscal adjustment has been overstated by 3 to 4 percent of annual GDP, with future budgets having to pay for past guarantees. The stock of existing contingent liabilities in Macedonia could add 2 to 4 percent of GDP to that country's future deficits.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are popular around the world, in part because they allow governments to secure much-needed investment in public services without immediately having to raise taxes or borrow. Yet, PPPs pose a fiscal danger because a government's desire to avoid reporting immediate liabilities may blind it to future fiscal costs and risks. Although PPPs may not blemish governments' reported fiscal statements in the short term, they do create fiscal obligations. This increases fiscal vulnerability and can result in poorly-designed PPPs. The extent of the danger depends on the fiscal institutions that shape and constrain government decisions toward PPPs. Such fiscal institutions affect decisionmaking incentives. Better fiscal institutions therefore can increase the chance that PPPs will be well designed and appropriately used.
This report examines the role of incentives, trust, and engagement as critical determinants of service delivery performance in MENA countries. Focusing on education and health, the report illustrates how the weak external and internal accountability undermines policy implementation and service delivery performance and how such a cycle of poor performance can be counteracted. Case studies of local success reveal the importance of both formal and informal accountability relationships and the role of local leadership in inspiring and institutionalizing incentives toward better service delivery performance. Enhancing services for MENA citizens requires forging a stronger social contract among pu...
This report states that the future of East Asian countries depends on the capacity and performance of local and provincial governments. Decentralization has unleashed local initiative and energy, with new ways to deliver services to people, with potential for continued improvement. The report, which focuses on six countries, notes the differences in the approach to decentralizing government in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam
Discusses conceptual and methodological issues relating to tax expenditures, provides a framework for evaluating them, offers case studies on government treatment of tax expenditures from developed and transition economies, and outlines generally applicable policy options. Provides case studies of the treatment of tax expenditures in Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United States. Each chapter presents how the nation defines tax expenditures and the corresponding benchmark tax system.
Many governments have faced serious instability as a result of their contingent liabilities. But conventional public finance analysis and institutions fail to address such fiscal risks. This book aims to provide motivation and practical guidance to governments seeking to improve their management of fiscal risks. The book addresses some of the difficult analytical and institutional challenges that face reformers tooling up to manage government fiscal risks. It discusses the inadequacies of conventional practices as well as recent advances in dealing with fiscal risk.