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The word "strategy" pervades American conversation and our news media and is most often used as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a "vision" of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental--local, state, or federal--levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than "what we would like to do next" is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. This "little book" talks about big strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides a framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentioned above. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects of strategy that appear to have universal application. The theory also may have application to the strategy of nonstate actors, institutions, and businesses, but the explicit purpose and perspective offered herein focus on the nation-state.
This book focuses on strategic theory, strategic thinking and strategy formulation. It provides theory and framework for considering and formulating all state strategy. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects of strategy that appear to have a universal application. With the proper environmental assessment and appraisal, it argues key strategic factors can be identified and strategy appropriately formulated in rational expression of ends, ways, and means. This book also demonstrates how to develop and clearly articulate the objectives, concepts, and resources in strategy, as well as how to avoid common errors and pitfalls in strategy formulation. It offers practical tests for determining the validity of a particular strategy and ways in which to articulate risk.
The word "strategy" pervades American conversation and our news media and is most often used as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a "vision" of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental--local, state, or federal--levels. Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than "what we would like to do next" is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking. This "little book" talks about big strategy, strategy at the highest levels of the nation-state. It is applicable to grand strategy, national security strategy, national military strategy, and regional or theater strategy. The monograph does not propose a strategy for the United States; rather, it provides a framework for considering strategy at any of the levels mentioned above. It is an examination of theory, exploring those aspects of strategy that appear to have universal application. The theory also may have application to the strategy of nonstate actors, institutions, and businesses, but the explicit purpose and perspective offered herein focus on the nation-state.
Strategy for the nation-state is neither simple nor easy. Good strategy demands much of the military professional whether he is formulating, articulating, evaluating, or executing strategy. Few do it well. It requires the professional to step out of the planning mindset and adopt one more suited for the strategic environment. This is particularly true in periods of great change and turmoil when a successful military strategy must be closely integrated with and may depend on other national strategies of the interagency community. A theory of strategy helps in this transition by educating the professional and disciplining his thinking in any of his roles. This monograph advances a theory of st...
A major contribution to our understanding of contemporary warfare and strategy by one of the world's leading military historians.
Since its creation in 1963, United States Southern Command has been led by 30 senior officers representing all four of the armed forces. None has undertaken his leadership responsibilities with the cultural sensitivity and creativity demonstrated by Admiral Jim Stavridis during his tenure in command. Breaking with tradition, Admiral Stavridis discarded the customary military model as he organized the Southern Command Headquarters. In its place he created an organization designed not to subdue adversaries, but instead to build durable and enduring partnerships with friends. His observation that it is the business of Southern Command to launch "ideas not missiles" into the command's area of responsibility gained strategic resonance throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America, and at the highest levels in Washington, DC.
Dr. Gray examines the currency conversion between tactical behavior and its strategic consequences. All strategy is comprised of tactical actions and Special Operations Forces (SOF) are often tasked with tactical operations with the expectation they will have desired strategic effect. A SOF community seeking to explain its functions needs to be crystal clear in distinguishing between the fundamentally distinctive meanings. If there is confusion about these two concepts-and the author believes there is-then charting a sensible relationship between them is then impossible. The author explains as an example that, "there are no, indeed there cannot be, any 'strategic' troops, forces, or weapons, for the simple reason that all troops, forces, and weapons have strategic meaning, be it ever so slight, or even arguable." This monograph attempts to reinforce the understanding of strategy and tactics by using historical examples where the two have failed each other. In the end, there must be the necessary direction and leadership that provides solid strategic sense so that SOF may achieve the effects needed to advance U.S. policy.
The U.S. Army has always regarded preparing for war as its peacetime role, but how it fulfilled that duty has changed dramatically between the War of 1812 and World War I. J. P. Clark shows how differing personal experiences of war and peace among successive generations of professional soldiers left their mark upon the Army and its ways.
When the United States entered World War II, it took more than industrial might to transform its tiny army—smaller than even Portugal's—into an overseas fighting force of more than eight and a half million. Peter Schifferle contends that the determination of American army officers to be prepared for the next big war was an essential component in America's ultimate triumph over its adversaries. Crucial to that preparation were the army schools at Fort Leavenworth. Interwar Army officers, haunted by the bloodshed of World War I's Meuse-Argonne Offensive, fully expected to return to Europe to conclude the "unfinished business" of that conflict, and they prepared well. Schifferle examines fo...