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Governance and Public Policy in Canada lays the foundation for a systematic analysis of policy developments, shaped as they are by multiple players, institutional tensions, and governance legacies. Arguing that provinces are now the most central site of governance and policy innovation, the book assesses the role of the provinces and places the provincial state in its broader economic, institutional, social, and territorial context. The aim throughout is to highlight the crucial role of provinces in policy changes that directly affect the lives of citizens. Three key themes unify this book. First, it addresses the role of policy convergence and divergence among provinces. Although the analys...
Governance and Public Policy in Canada lays the foundation for a systematic analysis of policy developments, shaped as they are by multiple players, institutional tensions, and governance legacies. Arguing that provinces are now the most central site of governance and policy innovation, the book assesses the role of the provinces and places the provincial state in its broader economic, institutional, social, and territorial context. The aim throughout is to highlight the crucial role of provinces in policy changes that directly affect the lives of citizens. Three key themes unify this book. First, it addresses the role of policy convergence and divergence among provinces. Although the analys...
Mining and petroleum projects share characteristics distinguishing them from other sectors of the economy, which has led to the use of dedicated fiscal regimes for these projects. The IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department uses fiscal modeling to evaluate extractive industry fiscal regimes for its member countries, and trains country officials on key modeling concepts. This paper outlines important preconditions needed for effective fiscal modeling, key evaluation metrics, and emphasizes the importance of transparent modeling practices. It then examines the modeling of commonly-used fiscal instruments and highligts where their economic impact differs, and how fiscal models can inform fiscal regime design.
In October 1992 Canada's political leaders asked voters to accept the Charlottetown Accord, a comprehensive package of constitutional amendments that was the product of years of negotiation, consultation, and compromise. Canadians rejected it outright, effectively halting the country's formal constitutional evolution. But what did the No vote mean? Were voters making a considered judgment after thorough consideration of the package or were they expressing their anger with politicians, particularly Prime Minister Brian Mulroney? The Challenge of Direct Democracy provides the definitive account of the 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.
This Selected Issues paper examines Burkina Faso’s banking system and traces its macro-financial linkages. The analysis builds upon the macro-financial linkages work conducted in the context of the Article IV consultation with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Overall, the banking system remains profitable and well-capitalized, but its ability to support the real economy needs to be improved if the authorities are to reach their development goals. Moreover, financial inclusion remains low, and despite recent progress on basic access to the financial system, significant barriers to accessing credit remain; particularly for women, rural inhabitants, and the agricultural sector. The available data indicates that the banking system remains well-capitalized and profitable. Systemic risks remain broadly contained, and new banks have come into operation, but there is significant scope to improve the banking system’s ability to support the real economy and financial inclusion. Deteriorating security conditions could undermine banks’ ability to expand into underserved remote areas.
The benchmark optimal income taxation model of Mirrlees (1971) finds that the optimal marginal income tax rate (MIT) is always non-negative. A key model assumption is the coincidence between social and individual work preferences. This paper extends the model to allow for differences in social and individual work preferences. The theoretical and simulation analyses show that under this model, when the government places a higher social weight on work than individuals, the optimal MIT schedule is shifted downwards, introducing the possibility for optimal wage subsidies at the bottom of the income distribution. This implies lower revenues, demogrants, and overall progressivity.
Personal Income Tax (PIT) is one of the key sources of revenues in Advanced Economies (AEs) but plays a much more limited role in Low-Income Developing Countries (LIDCs) and Emerging Market Economies (EMEs), both in terms of revenue and redistributive impact. Notwithstanding, this paper shows that LIDCs and EMEs increased their PIT-to-GDP revenue by 110 and 48 percent, respectively, during the 1990-2019 period, a marked improvement in the PIT revenue performance. We find that this rise was driven primarily by economic developments and to a lesser extent by changes in the design of PIT systems. We also find that LIDCs that improved their tax-to-GDP ratios relied on a broader set of tax instruments and not exclusively on the PIT, suggesting that a successful revenue mobilization strategy of developing countries requires a comprehensive approach covering a wider range of taxes. Finally, using a newly assembled dataset of PIT characteristics of 157 countries over the 2006-2018 period, we estimate a novel redistribution index of the PIT in LIDCs. We show that the contribution of the PIT to inequality reductions has been significant.
This paper develops a simple model to explore whether a higher detection probability for offshore tax evaders—e.g. because of improved exchange of information between countries and/or due to digitalization of tax administrations—renders it optimal for governments to introduce a voluntary disclosure program (VDP) and, if so, under what terms. We find that if the VDP is unanticipated, it is likely to be optimal for a revenue-maximizing government to introduce a VDP with relatively generous terms, i.e. a low or even negative penalty. When anticipated, however, the VDP is neither incentive compatible nor optimal, as it induces otherwise compliant taxpayers to evade tax. A VDP can then only be beneficial if tax evasion induces an external social cost beyond the direct revenue foregone, e.g., due to adverse effects on overall tax morale. In contrast to the common view that VDPs should come along with additional enforcement effort, we find that governments should relax enforcement if the VDP itself provides more powerful incentives to come clean.