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'To non-economists, it is hard to understand why economists spend so much effort on the competitive model whereas the world seems to be replete with large and powerful economic actors. In this respect, Jean Gabszewicz is atypical: he has spent most of his research time working on imperfectly competitive markets. However, instead of restricting himself to partial equilibrium analyses, he has tackled from the outset the problem of imperfect competition in a system of interrelated markets with the aim of studying how market power is spread throughout the whole system. This is one of the most challenging and fascinating tasks that economists face. But this is also a very hard one, and may explai...
Analyses the economic theory of urban land use in both its positive and normative aspects.
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
This book presents a critical review of the empirical literature that studies the efficiency of the forward and futures markets for foreign exchange. It provides a useful foundation for research in developing quantitative measures of risk and expected return in international finance.
First published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
First published in 1995. The text is technically precise but at the same time accessible, and is carried forward by numerous examples. The chapters focus on vote counting rules, voting agendas, voter preferences, sincere and sophisticated voting strategies, solution sets, voting outcomes, agendas control, and agenda formation. The author himself has made prior research contributions to a number of these topics.
First Published in 1988. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
First published in 1990. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
First published in 1994. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
First Published in 1991. This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalises earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently studying the willingness and ability of these agents to transmit information through their actions. The monograph includes models of agenda control in legislatures and elections, veto threats and debate, electoral competition, regulation building, bargaining in the shadow of war and sophisticated voting. Within each topic the principal focus is on how the presence of asymmetric information enriches the strategic environment of the participants as well as how it rationalises certain types of political behavior and political institutions as equilibrium phenomena in an 'incomplete information' world.