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In Defence of Naval Supremacy
In his groundbreaking work, In Defence of Naval Supremacy, Sumida presents a provocative and authoritative revisionist history of the origins, nature and consequences of the "Dreadnought Revolution" of 1906. Based on intensive and extensive archival research, the book strives to explain vital financial and technical matters which enable readers to observe the complex interplay of fiscal, technical, strategic, and personal factors that shaped the course of British naval decision-making during the critical quarter century that preceded the outbreak of the First World War.
Decoding Clausewitz
For nearly two centuries, On War, by Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831), has been the bible for statesmen and military professionals, strategists, theorists, and historians concerned about armed conflict. The source of the famous aphorism that "war is an extension of politics by other means," it has been widely read and debated. But, as Jon Sumida shows in this daring new look at Clausewitz's magnum opus, its full meaning has eluded most readers-until now. Approaching Clausewitz's classic as if it were an encoded text, Sumida deciphers this cryptic masterwork and offers a more productive way of looking at the sources and evolution of its author's thought. Sumida argues that On...
Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command
Between 1890 and 1913, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan published a series of books on naval warfare in the age of sail, which established his reputation as the founder of modern strategic history. The author of this work argues that Mahan has been misunderstood and reconsiders his works.
Churchill and Sea Power
This book is the first major study of Winston Churchill's record as a naval strategist and his impact as the most prominent guardian of Britain's sea power in the modern era. The book debunks many popular and well-entrenched myths surrounding controversial episodes in both World Wars, including the Dardanelles disaster, the Norwegian Campaign, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the devastating loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse in 1941. It shows that many common criticisms of Churchill have been exaggerated, but also that some of his mistakes have been largely overlooked. The book also examines Churchill's evolution as a maritime strategist over the course of his career, and documents his critical part in managing Britain's naval decline during the first half of the twentieth century. Churchill's genuine affection for the Royal Navy has often distracted attention from the fact that his views on sea power were pragmatic and unsentimental. For, as Christopher M. Bell shows, in a period dominated by declining resources, global threats, and rapid technological change, it was increasingly air rather than sea power that Churchill looked to as the foundation of Britain's security.
Marie Von Clausewitz
Bellinger capitalizes on the recent discovery of a vast archive of material to produce the first complete biography of Marie von Clausewitz
Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War
This stylish and highly entertaining account of the origins of the Franco-Dutch War of 1672 is based on massive archival researches covering twelve countries. Contrary to the accepted historical opinion that there was a meeting of minds within Louis XIV's conseil d'en haut over the desirability of the war, Professor Sonnino chronicles a story of bitter division, in the course of which the contrasting personalities of the king and of his most intimate advisors emerge in vivid detail. Racine once eulogized the war as a brilliantly executed venture which put the insolent Dutch in their place. Saint-Simon, on the other hand, saw it as the disastrous result of endemic jealousies, in which Le Tellier and Louvois sought to displace Colbert in Louis' affections. From these early views the modern consensus, in spite of occasional dissenters, has gradually evolved. Professor Sonnino, however, breaks through the maze of interpretations with decisive new evidence, and in an unusually clear and lively evocation of the emotional element which pervaded high policy, explains the many agonizing decisions that preceded one of the most dramatic conflicts of the seventeenth century.
Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century
Clausewitz's On War has, at least until very recently, been regarded as the most important work of theory on its subject. But since the end of the Cold War in 1990, and even more since the 9/11 attacks on the United states in 2001, an increasing number of commentators have argued that On War has lost its analytical edge as a tool for understanding war. They have argued that Clausewitz was concerned solely with inter-state war and with properly defined armies, and that the sorts of conflicts which he discussed are therefore part of a historical pattern which dominated Europe between 1648, the end of the Thirty Years War, and 1990 itself. Some have gone further, and suggested that Clausewitz's...
The Fog of Peace and War Planning
How do we plan under conditions of uncertainty? The perspective of military planners is a key organizing framework: do they see themselves as preparing to administer a peace, or preparing to fight a future war? Most interwar volumes examine only the 1920s and the 1930s. This new volume goes back, and forward in time, to draw on a greater expanse of history in order to tease out lessons for contemporary planners. These chapters are grouped into four periods: 1815-1856, 1871-1914, 1918-1938, and post-Second World War. They progress from low-tech to high-tech concerns, for example, the first period examines armies, while the second period examines navies, the third asseses navies combined with air forces, and finally for the Kaiser chapter explores nuclear issues and decision-making.
The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–39
This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.
