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Philosophy and the Emotions
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 264

Philosophy and the Emotions

This major volume of original essays maps the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the relation between consciousness and body; by analysing the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by emotions; and by exploring questions of value in making sense of emotions at a political, ethical and personal level. Leading researchers in the field reflect on the nature of human feelings, how and why we understand what other people feel, and the way in which our values become involved in specific emotional phenomena, such as guilt, fear, shame, amusement, or love. This collection addresses important questions in the philosophy of mind and comments on the implications of research in biology, cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis, and narrative theory for the philosophical understanding of emotions.

Reasons for Action
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 533

Reasons for Action

What are our reasons for acting? Morality purports to give us these reasons, and so do norms of prudence and the laws of society. The theory of practical reason assesses the authority of these potentially competing claims, and for this reason philosophers with a wide range of interests have converged on the topic of reasons for action. This volume contains eleven essays on practical reason by leading and emerging philosophers. Topics include the differences between practical and theoretical rationality, practical conditionals and the wide-scope ought, the explanation of action, the sources of reasons, and the relationship between morality and reasons for action. The volume will be essential reading for all philosophers interested in ethics and practical reason.

Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 267

Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility

New essays by leading moral philosophers on the nature and ethics of self-blame, and its connections to moral responsibility.

Ethical Sentimentalism
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 305

Ethical Sentimentalism

This volume provides the first comprehensive evaluation of 'sentimentalism' - one of the most dominant moral theories in philosophy today.

Fittingness
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 539

Fittingness

Fittingness explores the nature, roles, and applications of the notion of fittingness in contemporary normative and metanormative philosophy. The fittingness relation is the relation in which a response stands to a feature of the world when that feature merits, or is worthy of, that response. In the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, this notion of fittingness played a prominent role in the theories of the period's most influential ethical theorists, and in recent years it has regained prominence, promising to enrich the theoretical resources of contemporary theorists working in the philosophy of normativity. This volume is the first central discussion of the notion of fit to date. It...

The Philosophy of Envy
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 265

The Philosophy of Envy

Envy is almost universally condemned. But is its reputation warranted? Sara Protasi argues envy is multifaceted and sometimes even virtuous.

The Limits of Moral Authority
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 246

The Limits of Moral Authority

Dale Dorsey considers one of the most fundamental questions in philosophical ethics: to what extent do the demands of morality have normative authority over us and our lives? Must we conform to moral requirements? Most who have addressed this question have treated the normative significance of morality as simply a fact to be explained. But Dorsey argues that this traditional assumption is misguided. According to Dorsey, not only are we not required to conform to moral demands, conforming to morality's demands will not always even be normatively permissible—-moral behavior can be (quite literally) wrong. This view is significant not only for understanding the content and force of the moral point of view, but also for understanding the basic elements of how one ought to live.

Emotion Theory: The Routledge Comprehensive Guide
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 1160

Emotion Theory: The Routledge Comprehensive Guide

Emotion Theory: The Routledge Comprehensive Guide is the first interdisciplinary reference resource which authoritatively takes stock of the progress made both in the philosophy of emotions and in the affective sciences from Ancient Greece to today. A two-volume landmark publication, it provides an overview of emotion theory unrivaled in terms of its comprehensiveness, accessibility and systematicity. Comprising 62 chapters by 101 leading emotion theorists in philosophy, classics, psychology, biology, psychiatry, neuroscience and sociology, the collection is organized as follows: Volume I: Part I: History of Emotion Theory (10 chapters) Part II: Contemporary Theories of Emotions (10 chapters...

The Philosophy of Trust
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 310

The Philosophy of Trust

Trust is central to our social lives. We know by trusting what others tell us. We act on that basis, and on the basis of trust in their promises and implicit commitments. So trust underpins both epistemic and practical cooperation and is key to philosophical debates on the conditions of its possibility. It is difficult to overstate the significance of these issues. On the practical side, discussions of cooperation address what makes society possible-of how it is that life is not a Hobbesian war of all against all. On the epistemic side, discussions of cooperation address what makes the pooling of knowledge possible-and so the edifice that is science. But trust is not merely central to our lives instrumentally; trusting relations are themselves of great value, and in trusting others, we realise distinctive forms of value. What are these forms of value, and how is trust central to our lives? These questions are explored and developed in this volume, which collects fifteen new essays on the philosophy of trust. They develop and extend existing philosophical discussion of trust and will provide a reference point for future work on trust.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9
  • Language: en
  • Pages: 314

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.