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Understanding the Use of Long-term Finance in Developing Economies
This short paper reviews recent literature on the use of long-term finance in developing economies (relative to advanced ones) to identify where long-term financing occurs, and what role different financial intermediaries and markets play in extending this type of financing. Although banks are the most important providers of credit, they do not seem to offer long-term financing. Capital markets have grown since the 1990s and can provide financing at fairly long terms. But few firms use these markets. Only some institutional investors provide funding at long-term maturities. Governments might help to expand long-term financing, although with limited policy tools.
Bank Ownership
This paper presents recent trends in bank ownership across countries and summarizes the evidence regarding the implications of bank ownership structure for bank performance and competition, financial stability, and access to finance. The evidence reviewed suggests that foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic banks in developing countries, promote competition in host banking sectors, and help stabilize credit when host countries face idiosyncratic shocks. But there are tradeoffs, since foreign-owned banks can transmit external shocks and might not always expand access to credit. The record on the impact of government bank ownership suggests few benefits, especially for developing countries.
Foreign Bank Participation and Crises in Developing Countries
This paper describes the recent trends in foreign bank ownership in developing countries, summarizes the existing evidence on the causes and implications of foreign bank presence, and reexamines the link between banking crises and foreign bank participation. Using data on the share of banking sector assets held by foreign banks in over 100 developing countries during 1995-2002, the results show that countries that experienced a banking crisis tended to have higher levels of foreign bank participation than those that did not. Furthermore, panel regressions indicate that foreign participation increased as a result of crises rather than prior to them. However, post-crisis increases in foreign participation did not coincide with increased credit to the private sector, perhaps because in many cases foreign banks acquired distressed banks.
How Foreign Participation and Market Concentration Impact Bank Spreads
Increasing foreign participation and high concentration levels characterize the recent evolution of banking sectors' market structures in developing countries. Martinez Peria and Mody analyze the impact of these factors on Latin American bank spreads during the late 1990s. Their results suggest that foreign banks were able to charge lower spreads relative to domestic banks. This was more so for de novo foreign banks than for those that entered through acquisitions. The overall level of foreign bank participation seemed to influence spreads indirectly, primarily through its effect on administrative costs. Bank concentration was positively and directly related to both higher spreads and costs. This paper--a product of Finance, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand banking sector market structure changes in developing countries.
Macroprudential Policy Effects
The global financial crisis (GFC) underscored the need for additional policy tools to safeguard financial stability and ultimately macroeconomic stability. Systemic financial vulnerabilities had developed under a seemingly tranquil macroeconomic surface of low inflation and small output gaps. This challenged the precrisis view that achieving these traditional policy targets was a sufficient condition for macroeconomic stability. Thus, new tools had to be deployed to target specific financial vulnerabilities and to build buffers to cushion adverse aggregate shocks, while allowing traditional policy levers, including monetary and microprudential policies to focus on their traditional roles. Ma...
How Banks Go Abroad
"The authors examine the factors that influence banks' type of organizational form when operating in foreign markets using an original database of the branches and subsidiaries in Latin America and Eastern Europe of the top 100 international banks. They find that regulation, taxation, the degree of desired penetration in the local market, and host-country economic and political risks matter. Banks are more likely to operate as branches in countries that have higher corporate taxes and when they face lower regulatory restrictions on bank entry, in general, and on foreign branches, in particular. Subsidiaries are the preferred organizational form by banks that seek to penetrate the local market establishing large and mostly retail operations. Finally, there is evidence that economic and political risks have opposite effects on the type of organizational form, suggesting that legal differences in the degree of parent bank responsibility vis-à-vis branches and subsidiaries under different risk scenarios play an important role in the kind of operations international banks maintain overseas "--World Bank web site.
The Impact of Banking Crises on Money Demand and Price Stability
Policymakers in countries undergoing banking crises should not worry about the structural stability of money demand functions; the behavior of money demand during crises can be modeled by the same function used during periods of tranquility. But policymakers should be aware that in some instances crises can give rise to variance instability in the price or inflation equations.
When They Go Low, We Go High? Measuring Bank Market Power in a Low-for-Long Environment
We examine trends in bank competition since the early 2000s. The Lerner index—arguably the most commonly used measure—shows evidence of a marked increase in market power in advanced economies, especially after the global financial crisis. But other frequently used indicators of banking sector competition seem much more muted. We show that the significant drop in policy rates that occurred in the aftermath of the crisis could explain the seeming disconnect. Adjusting the Lerner index for the impact of policy rates reveals that market power has been fairly constant in advanced economies—consistent with the other signals and similar to the pattern observed in emerging markets.
Market Discipline Under Systemic Risk
"Levy-Yeyati, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler show that systemic risk exerts a significant impact on the behavior of depositors, sometimes overshadowing their responses to standard bank fundamentals. Systemic risk can affect market discipline both regardless of and through bank fundamentals. First, worsening systemic conditions can directly threaten the value of deposits by way of dual agency problems. Second, to the extent that banks are exposed to systemic risk, systemic shocks lead to a future deterioration of fundamentals not captured by their current values. Using data from the recent banking crises in Argentina and Uruguay, the authors show that market discipline is indeed quite robust o...
Foreign Bank Subsidiaries’ Default Risk during the Global Crisis
This paper examines the association between the default risk of foreign bank subsidiaries in developing countries and their parents during the global financial crisis, with the purpose of determining the size and sign of this correlation and, more importantly, understanding what factors can help insulate affiliates from their parents. We find evidence of a significant and robust positive correlation between parent banks’ and foreign subsidiaries’ default risk. This correlation is lower for subsidiaries that have a higher share of retail deposit funding and that are more independently managed from their parents. Host country bank regulations also influence the extent to which shocks to the parents affect the subsidiaries’ default risk. In particular, the correlation between the default risk of subsidiaries and their parents is lower for subsidiaries operating in countries that impose higher capital, reserve, provisioning, and disclosure requirements, and tougher restrictions on bank activities.
