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The First Sense
An empirically informed philosophical account of human touch as a single, unified sensory modality that plays a central role in perception. It is through touch that we are able to interact directly with the world; it is our primary conduit of both pleasure and pain. Touch may be our most immediate and powerful sense--"the first sense" because of the central role it plays in experience. In this book, Matthew Fulkerson proposes that human touch, despite its functional diversity, is a single, unified sensory modality. Fulkerson offers a philosophical account of touch, reflecting the interests, methods, and approach that define contemporary philosophy; but his argument is informed throughout by ...
Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience
This volume is product of the third online consciousness conference, held at http://consciousnessonline.com in February and March 2011. Chapters range over epistemological issues in the science and philosophy of perception, what neuroscience can do to help us solve philosophical issues in the philosophy of mind, what the true nature of black and white vision, pain, auditory, olfactory, or multi-modal experiences are, to higher-order theories of consciousness, synesthesia, among others. Each chapter includes a target article, commentaries, and in most cases, a final response from the author. Though wide-ranging all of the papers aim to understand consciousness both from the inside, as we experience it, and from the outside as we encounter it in our science. The Online Consciousness Conference, founded and organized by Richard Brown, is dedicated to the rigorous study of consciousness and mind. The goal is to bring philosophers, scientists, and interested lay persons together in an online venue to promote high-level discussion and exchanging of views, ideas and data related to the scientific and philosophical study of consciousness.
The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception
The present volume is the first to instead focus on the epistemology of non-visual perception-hearing, touch, taste, and cross-sensory experiences. Drawing on recent empirical studies of emotion, perception, and decision-making, it breaks new ground on discussions of whether or not perceptual experience can yield justified beliefs or knowledge and how to characterize those beliefs.
The World at Our Fingertips
What difference is there between the visual experience of watching the moon in the sky and the visual experience of seeing a snake slither by your foot? It is easy to believe our interpretation of the world is split into a binary mode, between the bodily self and everything outside it. There is, however, a buffer zone in the immediate surrounding of the body, known as peripersonal space, in which boundaries are blurred. The notion of peripersonal space calls into question not only our entrenched theories of perception, but also has major implications on the way we perceive personal and social awareness. Research has yielded a vast array of exciting discoveries on peripersonal space, across a...
Perception-Cognition Interface & Cross-Modal Experiences: Insights into Unified Consciousness
The present Research Topic explores closely related aspects of mental functioning, namely an interplay between perception and cognition, interactions among various sensory modalities, and finally, more or less unified conscious experiences arising in the context of these relations. Contributions emphasize a high flexibility observed in perception and may be seen as potential challenges to the traditional modular architecture of perceptual systems. Although the articles describe different phenomena, they follow one common theme - to investigate broadly understood unified experience - by studying either perception-cognition integration or the integration between sensory modalities. These integ...
Elemental Encounters in the Contemporary Irish Novel
The underlying premise of this book is that reading is touching. Words leap out of their beds and pierce flesh like a knife. Storytelling breathes within the dynamic of encounters with air, fire, earth and water, permeated by emotion, imagination and touch. These ideas are contextualized within ancient community rituals, social justice gatherings, pedagogical practices, and map-making. The four elements are retrieved from exile as imaginative, corporeal, and generative substances that operate within stories like medicine bundles. Reading becomes a Deleuzian ‘enterprise of health’, a challenging experience that grasps Paulo Freire’s generative themes, and is simultaneously thought-provoking and valuable. The capacious literary space capable of housing this sensual ferment is the novel. More verb than noun, the novel is an elemental bundle that engages with flesh in all its manifestations. This book spotlights Irish novels by John Banville and Mary Morrissy, exploring how they revitalise the elements with sensual, social, and tactile textures.
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
"What is the difference between seeing and thinking? Is the border between seeing and thinking a joint in nature in the sense of a fundamental explanatory difference? Is it a difference of degree? Does thinking affect seeing, i.e. is seeing "cognitively penetrable"? Are we aware of faces, causation, numerosity and other "high-level" properties or only of the colors, shapes and textures that-according to the advocate of high level perception--are the basis on which we see them? Is perception conceptual and propositional? Is perception iconic or more akin to language in being discursive? Is seeing singular? Which is more fundamental, visual attribution or visual discrimination? Is all seeing s...
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind
A timely collection of debates concerning the major themes and topics in philosophy of mind, fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments in the field Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind provides a lively and engaging introduction to the conceptual background, ongoing debates, and contentious issues in the field today. Original essays by more than 30 of the discipline’s most influential thinkers offer opposing perspectives on a series of contested questions regarding mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities. Written to appeal to non-specialists and professional philosophers ali...
Perceptual Experience
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Christopher S. Hill argues that perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of worldly items, and that the relevant form of representation can be explained in broadly biological terms. He then maintains that the representational contents of perceptual experiences are perceptual appearances, interpreted as relational, viewpoint-dependent properties of external objects. There is also a complementary explanation of how the objects that possess these prop...
Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind
This volume attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. The worry is that we critical thinkers are all in "epistemic bad faith" in light of what psychology tells us. After all, the research shows not merely that we are bad at detecting "ego-threatening" thoughts à la Freud. It also indicates that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts—e.g., reasons for our moral judgments of others (Haidt 2001), and even mundane reasons for buying one pair of stockings over another! (Nisbett & Wilson 1977) However, reflection on one’s thoughts requires knowing what those thoughts are in the first place. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? The activity would just display naivety about psychology. Yet while respecting all the data, this book argues that, remarkably, we are sometimes infallible in our self-discerning judgments. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and there is no Cartesian ambition to provide a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible.
