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Parts three and four are devoted to algebraic and combinatorial aspects of social choice theory, including analyses of Arrow's Theorem, consensus functions, and the role of geometry. Part five deals with the application of cooperative game theory to social choice.
This volume brings together papers, which were ?rst presented at the International Conference on Rational Choice, Individual Rights and Non-Welfaristic Normative Economics, held in honour of Kotaro Suzumura at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, on 11–13 March 2006, and which have subsequently gone through the usual process of review by referees. We have been helped by many individuals and institutions in organizing the conference and putting this volume together. We are grateful to the authors of this volume for contributing their papers and to the referees who reviewed the papers. We gratefully acknowledge the very generous fundings by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and ...
Harrie de Swart is a Dutch logician and mathematician with a great and open int- est in applications of logic. After being confronted with Arrow’s Theorem, Harrie became very interested in social choice theory. In 1986 he took the initiative to start up a group of Dutch scientists for the study of social choice theory. This initiative grew out to a research group and a series of colloquia, which were held approximately every month at the University of Tilburg in The Netherlands. The organization of the colloquia was in the hands of Harrie and under his guidance they became more and more internationally known. Many international scholars liked visiting the social choice colloquia in Tilburg...
Discusses how standard economics may be improved by an understanding of moral philosophy.
This book provides a practical guide to how groups of people, everywhere, from the local village council to the United Nations Security Council, can best make collective decisions. By comparing the many voting procedures used in democratic decision-making, it explains why win-or-lose binary voting can be inaccurate and divisive, while the more inclusive preferential points system of voting can be so much more accurate and, therefore, more democratic; indeed, it is a win-win methodology. The text, essential reading for anyone interested in fair and participatory collective decision-making, also compares the most common electoral systems.
This book presents some of the more recent developments in nonlinear time series, including Bayesian analysis and cointegration tests.
Presents an analysis of what justice is, the transcendental theory of justice and its drawbacks, and a persuasive argument for a comparative perspective on justice that can guide us in the choice between alternatives.
This book describes the voting procedures by which majority rule may be replaced by a more consensual system of governance. In a word, such an inclusive polity can be achieved by asking the voters or, more usually, their representatives in councils and parliaments, to state their preferences, so to facilitate the identification of that option which gains the highest average preference score.
This volume offers an exposition and evaluation of major work in social contract theory from 1950 to the present.
This unique troika of Handbooks provides indispensable coverage of the history of economic analysis. Edited by two of the foremost academics in the field, the volumes gather together insightful and original contributions from scholars across the world. The encyclopaedic breadth and scope of the original entries will make these Handbooks an invaluable source of knowledge for all serious students and scholars of the history of economic thought.