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Bayesian Rationality
For almost 2,500 years, the Western concept of what is to be human has been dominated by the idea that the mind is the seat of reason - humans are, almost by definition, the rational animal. In this text a more radical suggestion for explaining these puzzling aspects of human reasoning is put forward.
Rationality In An Uncertain World
This book brings together an influential sequence of papers that argue for a radical re-conceptualisation of the psychology of inference, and of cognitive science more generally. The papers demonstrate that the thesis that logic provides the basis of human inference is central to much cognitive science, although the commitment to this view is often implicit. They then note that almost all human inference is uncertain, whereas logic is the calculus of certain inference. This mismatch means that logic is not the appropriate model for human thought. Oaksford and Chater's argument draws on research in computer science, artificial intelligence and philosophy of science, in addition to experimenta...
The Probabilistic Mind
The Probabilistic Mind is a follow-up to the influential and highly cited Rational Models of Cognition (OUP, 1998). It brings together developmetns in understanding how, and how far, high-level cognitive processes can be understood in rational terms, and particularly using probabilistic Bayesian methods.
Cognition and Conditionals
The conditional, if...then, is probably the most important term in natural language and forms the core of systems of logic and mental representation. Cognition and Conditionals is the first volume for over 20 years that brings together recent developments in the cognitive science and psychology of conditional reasoning.
From Is to Ought: The Place of Normative Models in the Study of Human Thought
In the study of human thinking, two main research questions can be asked: “Descriptive Q: What is human thinking like? Normative Q: What ought human thinking be like?” For decades, these two questions have dominated the field, and the relationship between them generated many a controversy. Empirical normativist approaches regard the answers to these questions as positively correlated – in essence, human thinking is what it ought to be (although what counts as the ‘ought’ standard is moot). In contemporary theories of reasoning and decision making, this is often associated with a Panglossian framework, an adaptationist approach which regards human thinking as a priori rational. In c...
Emotional Cognition
Emotional Cognition gives the reader an up to date overview of the current state of emotion and cognition research that is striving for computationally explicit accounts of the relationship between these two domains. Many different areas are covered by some of the leading theorists and researchers in this area and the book crosses a range of domains, from the neurosciences through cognition and formal models to philosophy. Specific chapters consider, amongst other things, the role of emotion in decision-making, the representation and evaluation of emotive events, the relationship of affect on working memory and goal regulation. The emergence of such an integrative, computational, approach in emotion and cognition research is a unique and exciting development, one that will be of interest to established scholars as much as graduate students feeling their way in this area, and applicable to research in applied as well as purely theoretical domains. (Series B)
Reason and Nature
In a series of essays nine philosophers and two psychologists address three main themes: the status of norms of rationality; the precise form taken by them; and the role of norms in belief and actions.
A Plea for Plausibility
This book develops an original theory of decision-making based on the concept of plausibility. The author advocates plausible reasoning as a general philosophical method and demonstrates how it can be applied to problems in argumentation theory, scientific theory choice, risk management, ethics, law, economics, and epistemology. Human decisions are conditioned by formidable uncertainty. The standard resource for dealing rationally with uncertainty is the mathematical concept of probability. The probability calculus is well-known, but since the numerical demands for applying it cannot usually be met, it is not widely applicable. By contrast, the concept of plausibility is widely applicable, b...
The Reasoning Brain: The Interplay between Cognitive Neuroscience and Theories of Reasoning
Despite the centrality of rationality to our identity as a species (let alone the scientific endeavour), and the fact that it has been studied for several millennia, the present state of our knowledge of the mechanisms underlying logical reasoning remains highly fragmented. For example, a recent review concluded that none of the extant (12!) theories provide an adequate account (Khemlani & Johnson- Laird, 2011), while other authors argue that we are on the brink of a paradigm change, where the old binary logic framework will be washed away and replaced by more modern (and correct) probabilistic and Bayesian approaches (see for example Elqayam & Over, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2009; Over, 2009...
Human preferences and risky choices
"There are different views on what preferences for risks are and whether they are indicators of stable, underlying generic cognitive systems. Preferences could be conceived as an attitude towards a set of properties of context, memory and affect - a gauge of how much uncertainty one is willing to tolerate. This Research Topic aims to initiate a discussion on the stability of preferences for risks - as research has shown that different decision domains, response modes, and framing facilitate preference reversals. A consistent claim from behavioural decision researchers is that, contrary to the assumptions of classical economics, preferences are not stable and inherent constructs in individual...
