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Payment Systems, Monetary Policy and the Role of the Central Bank
A payment system encompasses a set of instruments and means generally acceptable in making payments; the institutional and organizational framework governing such payments, including prudential regulation; and the operating procedures and communications network used to initiate and transmit payment information from payer to payee and to settle payments. This book, by Omotunde E.G. Johnson, with Richard K. Abrams, Jean-Marc Destresse, Tony Lybek, Nicholas Roberts, and Mark Swinburne, identifies main policy and strategic issues in payment system reform, describes the structure of payment systems in selected countries, highlights areas of consensus, and suggests the direction for future policy analysis.
Financial Risks, Stability, and Globalization
This book covers financial sector stability issues in the following areas: risk management and governance in financial institutions; financial crises and contagion; domestic monetary and financial policies; and international cooperation. The papers were presented at the IMF’s eighth Central Banking Seminar by authors from academia, investment banks, government, and international institutions. The papers discuss such subjects as bank soundness, systemic bank restructuring, and the safety and efficiency of systemically important payment systems and their interaction with the macroeconomic environment.
Cooperation, Emergence of the Economic Agency Role of Government, and Governance
This paper focuses on the emergence of the economic agency role of government and its relationship with cooperation and economic management. It distinguishes emergence under war, domination or capitulation, perfect cooperation, and strategic bargaining. Good governance is a consequence of constraints designed by principals with the incentive and ability to do so. The incentives are related inversely to the expected relative frequency of controlling government and directly to the expected relative share of costs of poor agency. The ability is directly related to bargaining power in determining the agency role. There are implications for the evolution of cooperation in the society and for macroeconomic performance.
Policy Reform As Collective Action
A government desiring support for its policy reform program, without coercion, behaves as if it faces a political constraint. Citizen support depends on the estimate, by at least some minimum proportion of the population, that the program will succeed and the outcome will be in their individual self-interest. Government behavior has implications for the program, whose contents constitute the set of signals used by citizens to estimate the probability that the program will succeed. The government uses various devices to mobilize support for its program. An informed expert could design a program acceptable to both the government and the citizens.
Payment Systems, Monetary Policy and the Role of the Central Bank
A payment system encompasses a set of instruments and means generally acceptable in making payments; the institutional and organizational framework governing such payments, including prudential regulation; and the operating procedures and communications network used to initiate and transmit payment information from payer to payee and to settle payments. This book, by Omotunde E.G. Johnson, with Richard K. Abrams, Jean-Marc Destresse, Tony Lybek, Nicholas Roberts, and Mark Swinburne, identifies main policy and strategic issues in payment system reform, describes the structure of payment systems in selected countries, highlights areas of consensus, and suggests the direction for future policy analysis.
Policy Reform, Adjustment Costs, and Investment
Adjustment assistance is provided to local investors responding to policy reform and facing adjustment costs, to facilitate their activity–a signal to foreign investors about the profitability of investing in the local economy. The government, in providing assistance, maximizes its utility subject to its budgetary constraint, taking into account the utility forgone in alternative uses of budgetary funds. Foreign investors use the signal to update beliefs about investors in the local economy and compute the expected return from investing in the country. The investment response of foreign investors depends on the expected return so computed relative to the expected returns in their alternative investments worldwide.
Financial Market Constraints and Private Investment in a Developing Country
Firms in developing countries that seek outside financing for investment must often choose their debt-equity combinations in the face of financial market constraints on debt service, on outside equity financing, and on internal finance (endowments). Inefficiencies in the allocation of available finance and in the equity-debt choices that can ensue can be prevented by appropriate policy measures to improve information on profitable investment opportunities and about firms; to directly strengthen financial intermediation; and to support appropriate credit guarantee schemes.
The Payment System and Monetary Policy
Achieving the primary objective of price stability without unduly compromising the operational efficiency of the payment system constitutes a major problem for central banks. Routine monetary policy presumes a given institutional and technological framework, including aspects of the payment system. Such a monetary policy concerns itself with intraday and interday credit for payments settlements and with float. Liquidity shocks and panics sometimes pose an additional challenge. In recent years, major and rapid institutional and technological changes in the payment system (mainly to lower risks and augment operational efficiency) have affected the monetary policy decision-making process, particularly in the short run.
IMF Staff papers
In the middle of 1985 Argentina and Israel launched frontal attacks on inflation which succeeded in reducing it drastically during the first year without very significant costs in employment and output. Despite basic differences in the countries’ structures, the programs were similar in their design and their effects. This paper covers some of these similarities in the implementation and the results of the two stabilization programs, and analyzes the rationale of the underlying conception of the plans. The focus is on the strategy for the transitional period, and the ability of the programs to sustain price stability.
