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The latest in a series of papers published by the International Monetary Fund on economies in transition examines the experience of disinflation in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union between 1993 and 1997. The paper reviews the economic policies underlying the dramatic drop in inflation during those years as well as other variables that facilitated the disinflation and notes that the adjustment of fiscal fundamentals as the driving force behind the disinflation, while nominal anchoring arrangements played a less prominent role. This was contrary to developments in countries, for example, in Latin America, that had experienced high inflation for a long period of time.
This paper presents evidence on the behavior of output and inflation in the transition economies during 1992–95. A regression analysis explores the differences in output performance across the transition economies during this period. The paper then engages in a numerical, somewhat speculative, exercise to assess the long-run growth potential of the transition economies. It concludes that it should take about 20 years for the faster reformers to reach current OECD per capita levels.
This volume reviews the experience of 25 non-Asian transition economies 10 years into their transformation to market economies. The volume is based on an IMF conference held in February 1999 in Washington, D.C., to take stock of the achievements and the challenges of transition in the context of three questions: How far has transition progressed ineach country? What factors explain the differences in the progress made? And what remains to be done?
The sizeable fiscal consolidation required to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratios in several countries in the aftermath of the global crisis raises a crucial question on its feasibility. To answer this question, we rely on historical evidence from a sample of 91 adjustment episodes of countries during 1945–2012 that needed and wanted to adjust in order to stabilize debt to GDP. We find that, in at least half the cases, countries improved their cyclically adjusted primary balances by close to 5 percent of GDP. We also observe that, while countries typically make substantial efforts to stabilize debt, once this objective is achieved, they tend to ease their primary balances and do not necessarily get back to their initial lower debt-to-GDP ratio. We find that consolidations tended to be larger when the initial deficit was high and adjustment efforts were sustained over time. Fiscal adjustments also tended to be larger when accompanied by an easing of monetary conditions and, to a lesser extent, by an improvement in credit conditions.
This report discusses key issues related to the economy of Portugal. Highly accommodative macroeconomic conditions have generated only modest growth in the presence of remaining structural impediments. In 2015, low interest rates, a weak euro, and low oil prices remained largely in place, allowing growth to reach 1.5 percent. The 2016 budget proposal appears insufficiently ambitious to put public debt on a firmly downward trajectory, with significant risks to execution. Bank balance sheets need to be strengthened to avoid further negative surprises and protect taxpayers. Envisaged labor and product market policies imply at least a partial reversal of structural measures introduced during the IMF-supported program.
The staff report for the Fourth Review on Nigeria highlights developments under the Policy Support Instrument (PSI). Robust non-oil sector growth significantly strengthened fiscal and external positions, reducing inflation that surpassed the original program goals. Fiscal risks have increased in the short term because recent practices on the use of an oil price rule and oil savings, which have been important to macroeconomic performance, are being revisited. The government’s consensual approach within the framework of the constitution offers the prospect of a lasting solution.
This 2017 Article IV Consultation highlights that the Italian economy is in the third year of a moderate recovery. Supported by exceptionally accommodative monetary policy, fiscal easing, low commodity prices, and the government’s reform efforts, the economy grew by 0.9 percent in 2016 and continued to expand in the first quarter of 2017. Unemployment and nonperforming loans have declined somewhat from their crisis-driven peaks. Growth is projected at about 1.3 percent in 2017 and about 1 percent in 2018–20 as favorable tailwinds become less supportive. Growth could surprise on the upside in the near term, including from a stronger European recovery.
This study takes stock of progress made so far in the financial sectors of sub-saharan African countries. It recommends further reforms and specific measures in the areas of supervision, development of monetary operations and financial markets, external sector liberalization, central bank autonomy and accountability, payments system, and central bank accounting and auditing.
A moderate recovery has set in, supported by an increasing number of new firms and rising employment. Fiscal deficits are contained and some efforts are underway to assess and better address test banking sector weaknesses. However, the challenges of restoring financial stability, creating fiscal space, and achieving sustainable growth remain considerable.
We investigate the conditions for sustainability of debt roll-over schemes under uncertainty. In contrast with the requirements identified in recent research, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability of such schemes is that the asymptotic interest rate on government debt be lower than the asymptotic growth rate of the economy, a natural extension of a familiar criterion in a deterministic framework. However, we also show that for realistic parameter values, Ponzi games that are sustainable in the long run may display explosive patterns over relatively long horizons. This may explain why governments may be reluctant to play Ponzi games even when they are feasible in the long run.