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On Impatience and Policy Effectiveness
An increasing body of evidence suggests that the behavior of the economy has changed in many fundamental ways over the last decades. In particular, greater financial deregulation, larger wealth accumulation, and better policies might have helped lower uncertainty about future income and lengthen private sectors' planning horizon. In an overlapping-generations model, in which individuals discount the future more rapidly than implied by the market rate of interest, we find indeed evidence of a falling degree of impatience, providing empirical support for this hypothesis. The degree of persistence of "windfall" shocks to disposable income also appears to have varied over time. Shifts of this kind are shown to have a key impact on the average marginal propensity to consume and on the size of policy multipliers.
The Dog That Didn’t Bark
This paper examines domestic policy cooperation, a curiously neglected issue. Both international and domestic cooperation were live issues in the 1970s when the IS/LM model predicted very different external outcomes from monetary and fiscal policies. Interest in domestic policy cooperation has since fallen on hard intellectual times—with knock-ons to international cooperation—as macroeconomic policy roles became highly compartmentalized. I first discuss the intellectual and policy making undercurrents behind this neglect, and explain why they are less relevant after the global crisis. This is followed by a discussion of: macroeconomic policy cooperation in a world of more fiscal activism; coordination across financial agencies and with macroeconomic policies; and how structural policies fit into this. The paper concludes with a proposal for a “grand bargain” across principle players to create a “new domestic cooperation.”
Aftershocks of Monetary Unification
Once upon a time, in the 1990s, it was widely agreed that neither Europe nor the United States was an optimum currency area, although moderating this concern was the finding that it was possible to distinguish a regional core and periphery (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993). Revisiting these issues, we find that the United States is remains closer to an optimum currency area than the Euro Area. More intriguingly, the Euro Area shows striking changes in correlations and responses which we interpret as reflecting hysteresis with a financial twist, in which the financial system causes aggregate supply and demand shocks to reinforce each other. An implication is that the Euro Area needs vigorous, coordinated regulation of its banking and financial systems by a single supervisor—that monetary union without banking union will not work.
Unfinished Business
Chapter 7 WILL REVAMPED FINANCIAL REGULATIONS WORK? -- Upgrading the Basel Rules -- Moving Toward a Euro Area Banking Union -- Taming the US Shadow Banks -- Charting the Post-Crisis Changes in the Financial System -- The Road Ahead -- Chapter 8 MAKING MACROECONOMICS MORE RELEVANT -- The Way We Were -- Expanding the Focus of Macroeconomics -- Strengthening Domestic Policy Cooperation -- A More Inclusive Approach to Macroeconomic Theory -- Toward a More Encompassing View of Macroeconomics -- Chapter 9 WHITHER EMU? -- The Institutional Response to the Euro Area Crisis -- What Makes a Good Currency Union? -- How Fast Is EMU Integrating? -- The Future of EMU -- FINAL THOUGHTS -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- INDEX
Official Financial Flows, Capital Mobility, and Global Imbalances
We use a cross-country panel framework to analyze the effect of net official flows (chiefly foreign exchange intervention) on current accounts. We find that net official flows have a large but plausible effect on current account balances. The estimated effects are larger with instrumental variables (42 cents to the dollar on average compared to 24 without instruments), reflecting a possible downward bias in regressions without instruments owing to an endogenous response of net official flows to private financial flows. We consistently find larger impacts of net official flows when international capital flows are restricted and smaller impacts when capital is highly mobile. A further result is that there is an important positive effect of lagged net official flows on current accounts that we believe operates through the portfolio balance channel.
Unfinished Business
A penetrating critique tracing how under-regulated trading between European and U.S. banks led to the 2008 financial crisis—with a prescription for preventing another meltdown There have been numerous books examining the 2008 financial crisis from either a U.S. or European perspective. Tamim Bayoumi is the first to explain how the Euro crisis and U.S. housing crash were, in fact, parasitically intertwined. Starting in the 1980s, Bayoumi outlines the cumulative policy errors that undermined the stability of both the European and U.S. financial sectors, highlighting the catalytic role played by European mega banks that exploited lax regulation to expand into the U.S. market and financed unsustainable bubbles on both continents. U.S. banks increasingly sold sub-par loans to under-regulated European and U.S. shadow banks and, when the bubbles burst, the losses whipsawed back to the core of the European banking system. A much-needed, fresh look at the origins of the crisis, Bayoumi’s analysis concludes that policy makers are ignorant of what still needs to be done both to complete the cleanup and to prevent future crises.
Apocalypse then
The financial crisis, originated from the collapse of US housing markets in 2008, reverberates around the world. Its destructive force was felt nowhere more keenly than Western Europe. Indeed, it continues to mire in financial volatility as the debt problem contagiously spreads around the periphery Euro area. Taking a wider historical view of the evolution over the recent decades of the North Atlantic economy, comprising North America and Western Europe, we argue that while trade links were in relative stasis, the increasing and uniquely-close Transatlantic financial relationship was a crucial conduit in transmitting US shocks into global ones.
A Peek Inside the Black Box
This paper uses vector autoregressions to examine the monetary transmission mechanism in Japan. The empirical results indicate that both monetary policy and banks’ balance sheets are important sources of shocks, that banks play a crucial role in transmitting monetary shocks to economic activity, that corporations and households have not been able to substitute borrowing from other sources for a shortfall in bank borrowing, and that business investment is especially sensitive to monetary shocks. We conclude that policy measures to strengthen banks are probably a prerequisite for restoring the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Monetary Policy in the New Normal
The proposed SDN would take stock of the current debate on the shape that monetary policy should take after the crisis. It revisits the pros and cons of expanding the objectives of monetary policy, the merits of turning unconventional policies into conventional ones, how to make monetary policy frameworks more resilient to the risk of being constrained by the zero-lower bound going forward, and the institutional challenges to preserve central bank independence with regards to monetary policy, while allowing adequate government oversight over central banks’ new responsibilities. It will draw policy conclusions where consensus has been reached, and highlight the areas where more work is needed to get more granular policy advice.
Macroeconomic Model Spillovers and Their Discontents
The Great Recession underlined that policies in some countries can have profound spillovers elsewhere. Sadly, the solution of simulating large macroeconomic models to measure these spillovers has been found wanting. Typical models generate lower international correlations of output and financial asset prices than are seen in even pre-crisis data. Imposing higher financial market correlations creates more reasonable cross-country spillovers, and is likely to become the norm in policy modeling despite weak theoretical underpinnings, as is already true of sticky wages. We propose using event studies to calibrate market reactions to particular policy announcements, and report results for U.S. monetary and fiscal policy announcements in 2009 and 2010 that are plausible and event-specific.
