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Predatory Pricing
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Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law and Economics
This new volume will examine the law and economics of predatory pricing, which is one of the most serious, and most debatable, antitrust violations. The analysis will cover both US and European antitrust law, assessing it through the viewpoint and method of the history of economic thought.
Predatory Pricing
Includes bibliography
Predatory pricing
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The Antitrust Paradox
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Exclusionary Practices
With discussions on economic theory, cases, law, and policy, this book gives a well-rounded view of exclusionary practices and monopolization.
Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law and Economics
Can a price ever be too low? Can competition ever be ruinous? Questions like these have always accompanied American antitrust law. They testify to the difficulty of antitrust enforcement, of protecting competition without protecting competitors. As the business practice that most directly raises these kinds of questions, predatory pricing is at the core of antitrust debates. The history of its law and economics offers a privileged standpoint for assessing the broader development of antitrust, its past, present and future. In contrast to existing literature, this book adopts the perspective of the history of economic thought to tell this history, covering a period from the late 1880s to prese...
Are Predatory Commitments Credible?
Predatory pricing has long been a contentious issue among lawmakers and economists. Legal actions are continually brought against companies. But the question remains: how likely are firms to cut prices in order to drive rivals out of business? Predatory firms risk having to keep prices below cost for such an extended period that it would become cost-prohibitive. Recently, economists have turned to game theory to examine circumstances under which predatory tactics could be profitable. John R. Lott, Jr. provides long-awaited empirical analysis in this book. By examining firms accused of or convicted of predation over a thirty-year period of time, he shows that these firms are not organized as the game-theoretic or other models of predation would predict. In contrast, what evidence exists for predation suggests that government enterprises are more of a threat. Lott presents crucial new data and analysis, attacking an issue of major legal and economic importance. This impressive work will be of great interest to economists, legal scholars, and antitrust policy makers.
