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Without Answers Vol 8
This is Volume VIII of none in a studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion. Originally published in 1969 and holds a collection of papers on talks to first year students not reading philosophy; science and questioning; and discussions on social engineering, politics and science as well as questions like 'where does the world come from?'
Moral Questions
Rush Rhees questions the viability of moral theories and the general claims they make in ethics. He shows how one can both be concerned with knowing what one ought to do while recognising that one's answer is a personal one. These insights, arrived at in a distinctive style, characteristic of Rhees, are then applied to issues of life and death, human sexuality and our relations to animals. To recognise why philosophy cannot answer such questions for us is an affirmation, not a denial, of their importance.
Wittgenstein's On Certainty
Rush Rhees, a close friend of Wittgenstein and a major interpreter of his work, shows how Wittgenstein's On Certainty concerns logic, language, and reality – topics that occupied Wittgenstein since early in his career. Authoritative interpretation of Wittgenstein's last great work, On Certainty, by one of his closest friends. Debunks misconceptions about Wittgenstein's On Certainty and shows that it is an essay on logic. Exposes the continuity in Wittgenstein's thought, and the radical character of his conclusions. Contains a substantial and illuminating afterword discussing current scholarship surrounding On Certainty, and its relationship to Rhees's work on this subject.
Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse
An edited collection of Rush Rhees's previously unpublished writings on Wittgenstein's Investigations.
Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy
A collection of unpublished papers by Rush Rhees, pupil and close friend of Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein
According to Wittgenstein, philosophical puzzles are due to deep prejudices about language. In this collection of essays, in honour of Rush Rhees, philosophers investigate the hold such prejudices have on us in a number of closely related areas of philosophical enquiry.
Beyond Moral Judgment
What is moral thought and what kinds of demands does it impose? Alice Crary’s Beyond Moral Judgment claims that even the most perceptive contemporary answers to these questions offer no more than partial illumination, owing to an overly narrow focus on judgments that apply moral concepts (for example, “good,” “wrong,” “selfish,” “courageous”) and a corresponding failure to register that moral thinking includes more than such judgments. Drawing on what she describes as widely misinterpreted lines of thought in the writings of Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, Crary argues that language is an inherently moral acquisition and that any stretch of thought, without regard to whether...
Wittgenstein’s Language
One of the first things to strike the reader of Wittgenstein's writings is the unique power of his style. One immediately notices the intriguing and arrangement of the paragraphs in Philosophical Investi composition gations, or the stark assertiveness of the sentences in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. A sense of the singular style being employed is unavoidable, even before the reader understands anything of what is happening philos ophically. Perhaps precisely for this reason it is too often assumed that coming to understand either work has little or nothing to do with re sponding to its form. The unusual style is a mere curiousity decorating the vehicle of Wittgenstein's ideas. Form is...
Philosophical Remarks
When in May 1930, the Council of Trinity College, Cambridge, had to decide whether to renew Wittgenstein's research grant, it turned to Bertrand Russell for an assessment of the work Wittgenstein had been doing over the past year. His verdict: The theories contained in this new work. . . are novel, very original and indubitably important. Whether they are true, I do not know. As a logician who like simplicity, I should like to think that they are not, but from what I have read of them I am quite sure that he ought to have the opportunity to work them out, since, when completed, they may easily prove to constitute a whole new philosophy.
