You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
This volume is a collection of essays on the contentious issues of judicial independence and federal judicial selection, written by leading scholars from the disciplines of law, political science, history, economics, and sociology.
This groundbreaking book contributes to an emerging literature that examines responses to the rights revolution that unfolded in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Using original archival evidence and data, Stephen B. Burbank and Sean Farhang identify the origins of the counterrevolution against private enforcement of federal law in the first Reagan Administration. They then measure the counterrevolution's trajectory in the elected branches, court rulemaking, and the Supreme Court, evaluate its success in those different lawmaking sites, and test key elements of their argument. Finally, the authors leverage an institutional perspective to explain a striking variation in their results: although the counterrevolution largely failed in more democratic lawmaking sites, in a long series of cases little noticed by the public, an increasingly conservative and ideologically polarized Supreme Court has transformed federal law, making it less friendly, if not hostile, to the enforcement of rights through lawsuits.
"This is quite simply the best study of judicial independence that I have ever read; it is erudite, historically aware, and politically astute." -Malcolm M. Feeley, Claire Sanders Clements Dean's Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley "Professor Geyh has written a wise and timely book that is informed by the author's broad and deep experience working with the judicial and legislative branches, by the insights of law, history and political science, and by an appreciation of theory and common sense." -Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School With Congress threatening to "go nuclear" ov...
Of the 1.65 million lawsuits enforcing federal laws over the past decade, 3 percent were prosecuted by the federal government, while 97 percent were litigated by private parties. When and why did private plaintiff-driven litigation become a dominant model for enforcing federal regulation? The Litigation State shows how government legislation created the nation's reliance upon private litigation, and investigates why Congress would choose to mobilize, through statutory design, private lawsuits to implement federal statutes. Sean Farhang argues that Congress deliberately cultivates such private lawsuits partly as a means of enforcing its will over the resistance of opposing presidents. Farhang...
This volume is a collection of essays on the contentious issues of judicial independence and federal judicial selection, written by leading scholars from the disciplines of law, political science, history, economics, and sociology.
Top US legal scholars and political scientists examine how the law shapes judges’ behavior and decisions, and what it means for society at large. Although there is a growing consensus among legal scholars and political scientists, significant points of divergence remain. Contributors to What’s Law Got to Do with It? explore ways to reach greater accord on the complexity and nuance of judicial decision making and judicial elections, while acknowledging that agreement on what judges do is not likely to occur any time soon. As the first forum in which political scientists and legal scholars engage with one another on these hot button issues, this volume strives to establish a true interdisc...
This book investigates the mechanisms of judicial control to determine an efficient methodology for independence and accountability. Using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts, the author creates a theoretical framework that can be applied to future case studies and decrease the frequency of accountability perversions.
In 2009 and 2010, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights underwent reforms to their judicial appointments processes, with the result that many of the candidates proposed by Member State governments were rejected. This book examines the rationale behind these reforms from the point of view of the Member States.
Traditional separation of powers theories assumed that governmental despotism will be prevented by dividing the branches of government which will check one another. Modern governments function with unexpected complicity among these branches. Sometimes one of the branches becomes overwhelming. Other governmental structures, however, tend to mitigate these tendencies to domination. Among other structures courts have achieved considerable autonomy vis-à-vis the traditional political branches of power. They tend to maintain considerable distance from political parties in the name of professionalism and expertise. The conditions and criteria of independence are not clear, and even less clear are...
Starting in the 1970s, conservatives learned that electoral victory did not easily convert into a reversal of important liberal accomplishments, especially in the law. As a result, conservatives' mobilizing efforts increasingly turned to law schools, professional networks, public interest groups, and the judiciary--areas traditionally controlled by liberals. Drawing from internal documents, as well as interviews with key conservative figures, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement examines this sometimes fitful, and still only partially successful, conservative challenge to liberal domination of the law and American legal institutions. Unlike accounts that depict the conservatives as fi...