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How can countries verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and detect and deter violations? It is in their interest to increase their verification readiness because the assessment of compliance with the treaty rests with states parties to the CTBT. The treaty provides countries with two verification elements: an international system of monitoring stations, and an on-site inspection regime. The monitoring system can detect nuclear explosions underground, in the atmosphere and under water. This book provides incentives to nations around the world on how they can organize their efforts to verify compliance with the CTBT and how they can collaborate with other coun...
The subject of this NATO Advanced Study Institute was seismic monitoring under a nuclear test ban - an application of scienti fic knowledge and modern technology for a political purpose. The international political objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban provided in turn the motivation for our technical and scientific discussions. In order to obtain a historical perspec tive on the progress of the work towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTB), it is necessary to go back to 1958, when a confer ence of scientific experts in Geneva made the first steps toward an international seismic monitoring system. However, agreement on actual capabilities of a monitoring system for verifying com...
"Efforts to create or maintain rules to contain the risks stemming from an unrestrained multilateral arms race are at the core of a world order based on consensual norms rather than on a pure balance of power. Whereas security cooperation is conventionally considered to be motivated primarily by interest- and security-based factors, studies have shown that all actors use moral arguments and are deeply embedded in the normative patterns surrounding their realm of action. Norm Dynamics in Multilateral ArmsControl, based on research conducted by a large PRIF team led by Harald M
This book provides an overview of how the UK tried to maintain and modernize its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons during 1974-82, whilst also pursuing a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The core question addressed in the book is how a test ban treaty would impact on the reliability and safety of the UK’s nuclear weapons and how this would constrain and limit efforts to secure a comprehensive treaty that would prohibit nuclear testing indefinitely. An added complication lay in the fact that a ban treaty could also prevent or limit the UK’s ability to test new warhead designs to replace its existing tactical nuclear weapons and a new strategic successor system to Polaris. How a...
Bargaining on Nuclear Tests tells the yet untold story of how Washington under Ronald Reagan's presidency duplicated the nuclear deal on ambiguity reached with Israel in 1969 in its dealings with Pakistan and South Africa in 1981. It puts the story of nuclear tests at the heart of a new Cold War historical narrative.
An authoritative and unbiased guide to nuclear technology and the controversies that surround it. Are you for nuclear power or against it? What's the basis of your opinion? Did you know a CT scan gives you some 2 millisieverts of radiation? Do you know how much a millisievert is? Does irradiation make foods safer or less safe? What is the point of a bilateral Russia-US nuclear weapons treaty in a multipolar world? These are nuclear questions that call for nuclear choices, and this book equips citizens to make these choices informed ones. It explains, clearly and accessibly, the basics of nuclear technology and describes the controversies surrounding its use.
This Research Handbook provides a broad yet detailed treatment of international arms control law. It takes stock of existing arms control agreements, addresses current challenges and aims to indicate avenues for the future development of this distinct branch of public international law.
This book explores how human factors, in particular the contested notion of trust, influence the conduct and practice of arms control verification. In the nuclear arena, disarmament verification is often viewed purely in terms of a dispassionate, scientific process. Yet this view is fundamentally flawed since the technical impossibility of 100 per cent verification opens the door to a host of complex issues and questions regarding the process and its outcomes. Central among these is the fact that those involved in any verification inspection process must inevitably conduct their work in a space that falls well short of absolute certainty. The lines between scientific enquiry and human psycho...