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This volume aims to present the basic results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games including stochastic games and repeated games with incomplete information. It is intended for graduate students with no previous knowledge of the field.
This book gives a concise presentation of the mathematical foundations of Game Theory, with an emphasis on strategic analysis linked to information and dynamics. It is largely self-contained, with all of the key tools and concepts defined in the text. Combining the basics of Game Theory, such as value existence theorems in zero-sum games and equilibrium existence theorems for non-zero-sum games, with a selection of important and more recent topics such as the equilibrium manifold and learning dynamics, the book quickly takes the reader close to the state of the art. Applications to economics, biology, and learning are included, and the exercises, which often contain noteworthy results, provide an important complement to the text. Based on lectures given in Paris over several years, this textbook will be useful for rigorous, up-to-date courses on the subject. Apart from an interest in strategic thinking and a taste for mathematical formalism, the only prerequisite for reading the book is a solid knowledge of mathematics at the undergraduate level, including basic analysis, linear algebra, and probability.
This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.
This volume is based on lectures given at the NATO Advanced Study Institute on "Stochastic Games and Applications," which took place at Stony Brook, NY, USA, July 1999. It gives the editors great pleasure to present it on the occasion of L.S. Shapley's eightieth birthday, and on the fiftieth "birthday" of his seminal paper "Stochastic Games," with which this volume opens. We wish to thank NATO for the grant that made the Institute and this volume possible, and the Center for Game Theory in Economics of the State University of New York at Stony Brook for hosting this event. We also wish to thank the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, for providing continuing financial support, without wh...
This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in comput...
Book contains: 1. All branches of country's military; 2. Their structure and organization; 3. Order of Battle; can follow officers through their commands; 4. Unit/ship insignia or design.
The four volumes of Game Equilibrium Models present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research. The reader finds innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced an unusual collecti...
The theory of revealed preference has a long, distinguished tradition in economics but lacked a systematic presentation of the theory until now. This book deals with basic questions in economic theory and studies situations in which empirical observations are consistent or inconsistent with some of the best known economic theories.
This work is intended to serve as a guide for graduate students and researchers who wish to get acquainted with the main theoretical and practical tools for the numerical minimization of convex functions on Hilbert spaces. Therefore, it contains the main tools that are necessary to conduct independent research on the topic. It is also a concise, easy-to-follow and self-contained textbook, which may be useful for any researcher working on related fields, as well as teachers giving graduate-level courses on the topic. It will contain a thorough revision of the extant literature including both classical and state-of-the-art references.
This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The impressive contributions fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem, that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work tha