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Desires lead to actions, influence feelings, and determine what counts as a reward. Recent empirical evidence shows that these three aspects of desire stem from a common biological origin. The author reveals this common foundation and builds a striking new philosophical theory of desire that puts desire's neglected face-reward-at its core.
Joining the ancient debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. The book makes the claim that acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue amount to nothing more than acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good, correctly conceived. In Praise of Desire shows that a desire-centered moral psychology can be richer than philosophers commonly think, accommodating the full complexity of moral life.
This book brings cutting edge neuroscience and psychology into dialogue with philosophical reflection to illuminate the loss of control experienced by addicts, and thereby cast light on ordinary agency and the way in which it sometimes goes wrong.
This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Molder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness perception and the awareness of one s own mental states in the interpretivist framework. (Series A)"
Discusses a range of philosophical questions about fictional characters and fictional objects, with implications for metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
Neil Sinhababu defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. This theory helps us to understand core aspects of human nature, such as intention, the will, moral belief, emotion, and the self; and it has revolutionary consequences for ethics.
With financial help from his father, Peter Joseph Schroeder, Peter Schroeder opened a small dry goods business in 1891 at the southeast corner of Eighteenth and Washington Streets in the B. Mayer Building. Over the next five years, his brothers Joseph, John, and Frank joined the operation. In 1899, business was flourishing. The current three-story building was constructed at the northwest corner of Seventeenth and Washington Streets, and the store became a physical anchor in the downtown business district. The Schroeders believe in giving back to the community they call home. Over four generations, the Schroeders and their spouses donated more than 5,000 hours to various civic organizations in Two Rivers. Many changes have taken place at Schroeder's in its 126-year history. Today's store offers a full line of men's and women's apparel and footwear, as well as a coffeehouse and alterations. Schroeder's also leases space to a toy shop, yarn shop, quilt shop, and gift shop.
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a forum for outstanding new work in an area of vigorous and broad-ranging debate in philosophy and beyond. What is involved in human action? Can philosophy and science illuminate debate about free will? How should we answer questions about responsibility for action?
Can emotions be rational or are they necessarily irrational? Are emotions universally shared states? Or are they socio-cultural constructions? Are emotions perceptions of some kind? Since the publication of Jerry Fodor's The Modularity of Mind (1983), a new question about the philosophy of emotions has emerged: Are emotions modular? A positive answer to this question would mean, minimally, that emotions are cognitive capacities that can be explained in terms of mental components that are functionally dissociable from other parts of the mind. But depending on the kind of modules that are considered, be they Chomskyan, Fodorian, Darwinian, and so on, the answer to this question might well be different. The twelve new essays in this volume address the question of whether emotions, or at least some of them, are, in some sense of the word, modules, and explore how this could potentially influence our understanding of emotional phenomena.
Expressing Our Attitudes pulls together over a decade of work by Mark Schroeder, one of the leading figures in contemporary metaethics. He weaves treatments of propositions, truth, and the attitudes together within an expressivist framework. Two of the essays are new, and the introduction provides a map to reading the volume as a unified argument.