Welcome to our book review site go-pdf.online!
You may have to Search all our reviewed books and magazines, click the sign up button below to create a free account.
Criminal Law Without Punishment
How can criminal punishment be morally justified? Zisman addresses this classical question in legal philosophy. He provides two maybe surprising answers to the question. First, as for a methodological claim, it argues that this question cannot be answered by philosophers and legal scholars alone. Rather, we need to take into account research from social psychology, economy, anthropology, and so on in order to properly analyze the arguments in defense of criminal punishment. Second, the book argues that when such research is properly accounted for, none of the current attempts to justify criminal punishment succeed. But that does not imply that the state should do nothing about criminal wrongdoing. Rather, the arguments that were supposed to justify criminal punishment actually speak in favor of an alternative approach to criminal law: restitution to the victim and restorative justice. That is to say, the state should coerce offenders to provide restitution for the harm inflicted on victims, and whenever possible restorative approaches should be taken to address criminal wrongdoing.
Guilt
Across the globe guilt has become a contentious issue in discussions over historical accountability and reparation for past injustices. Guilt has become political, and it assumes a highly visible place in the public sphere and academic debate in fields ranging from cultural memory, to transitional justice, post-colonialism, Africana studies, and the study of populist extremism. This volume argues that guilt is a productive force that helps to balance unequal power dynamics between individuals and groups. Moreover, guilt can also be an ambivalent force affecting social cohesion, moral revolutions, political negotiation, artistic creativity, legal innovation, and other forms of transformations...
Good Things to Do
Rüdiger Bittner argues that the aim of thinking about what to do, of practical reason, is to find, not what we ought to do, but what it is good to do under the circumstances. Neither under prudence nor under morality are there things we ought to do. There is no warrant for the idea of our being required, by natural law or by our rationality, to do either what helps us attain our ends or what is right for moral reasons. While common moral understanding is committed to there being things we ought to do and to our being guilty and deserving blame if we fail to do them, we can lay aside these notions without loss, indeed with benefit. The volume also explains what it is for something to be good to do under the circumstances and argues for understanding practical reason in these terms. What is good to do we find by experience: what we go through teaches us what helps and what hinders, and helps us figure out what is prudentially useful and what is morally right to do-although ultimately this difference itself gives way, and morality turns out to be a part of prudence.
Perspektivismus
Dass alles eine Frage der Perspektive sei, scheint selbst kaum mehr eine Frage der Perspektive zu sein. Die Vorschussplausibilität dieser Position verdeckt jedoch die Differenzen innerhalb des Perspektivismus. Zum einen kann damit die Gebundenheit unserer Sichtweisen gemeint sein, die je nach Standort wechseln; zum anderen kann zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, dass unterschiedliche Annahmen, Interessen oder Ziele dazu führen, 'denselben' Gegenstand unterschiedlich zu betrachten; zudem haben wir es mit oft divergenten, ja unvereinbaren Überzeugungen zu tun, wie in einer bestimmten Situation zu handeln ist. Es lassen sich demnach verschiedene Versionen des Perspektivismus unterscheiden: eine e...
Causing Harm
None
Imagining Human Rights
Why is it that human rights are considered inviolable norms of justice at local and global scales although the number of their violations has steadily increased in modern history? On the surface, this paradox seems to be reducible to a straightforward discrepancy between idealism and reality in humanitarian affairs, but Imagining Human Rights complicates the picture by offering interdisciplinary perspectives on the imaginary status of human rights. By that the contributors mean not merely subject to imagination, open to interpretation or far too abstract, but also formative of a social imaginary with emphatic identifications and shared values. From a variety of disciplinary perspectives, the...
Liberal Neutrality
Liberal neutrality has two underlying intuitions and therefore two distinct elements. On the one hand it refers to the intuition that there are matters the state has no business getting involved in. On the other hand it is motivated by the idea that the state ought to treat citizens as equals and show equal respect for their different cenceptions of the good life. This book defends this two-fold understanding of neutrality with reference to Rawls’ conception of citizens as free and equal persons. Treating citizens as equals requires the state to grant its citizens equal political rights and also to ensure that these rights have “fair value”. Given the danger that cultural bias undermines the equal standing of citizens, the state has to ensure procedures of political decision making that are able to take citizens’ different conceptions into account.
The Ethics of Social Punishment
This book critically evaluates the way ordinary people enforce morality in everyday life.
