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This volume examines power-sharing agreements, their legitimacy and their compatibility with human rights law. Providing a clear, accessible introduction to the political science and human rights law on the issue, the book is an invaluable guide to all those engaged with transitional justice, peace agreements, and human rights.
In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.
This book develops a general theory of law, inclusive legal positivism, which seeks to remain within the tradition represented by authors such as Austin, Hart, MacCormick, and Raz, while sharing some of the virtues of both classical and modern theories of natural law, as represented by authors such as Aquinas, Fuller, Finnis, and Dworkin. Its central theoretical questions are: Does the existence or content of positive law ever depend on moral considerations? If so, is this fact consistent with legal positivism? The author shows how inclusive positivism allows one to answer yes to both of these questions. In addition to articulating and defending his own version of legal positivism, which is ...
This book comprises sixteen papers selected from the 2014 McMaster University Philosophy of Law Conference (lawconf.mcmaster.ca) on the legacy of Ronald Dworkin (lawconf.mcmaster.ca). These pieces touch upon many aspects of Ronald Dworkin?s wide-ranging contributions to philosophy and jurisprudence, including his theory of value, political philosophy, moral philosophy, philosophy of international law, and legal philosophy. The book?s organizing principle and theme reflects Dworkin?s self-conception as a builder of a unified theory of value. Part I addresses the most abstract and general aspect of Dworkin?s work?the unity of value thesis. Part II comprises works that address themes from Dwork...
The last decade has witnessed a particularly intensive debate over methodological issues in legal theory. The publication of Julie Dickson's Evaluation and Legal Theory (2001) was significant, as were collective returns to H.L.A. Hart's 'Postscript' to The Concept of Law. While influential articles have been written in disparate journals, no single collection of the most important papers exists. This volume - the first in a three volume series - aims not only to fill that gap but also propose a systematic agenda for future work. The editors have selected articles written by leading legal theorists, including, among others, Leslie Green, Brian Leiter, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and William Twining, and organized under four broad categories: 1) problems and purposes of legal theory; 2) the role of epistemology and semantics in theorising about the nature of law; 3) the relation between morality and legal theory; and 4) the scope of phenomena a general jurisprudence ought to address.
In this book the author argues that judicial activism in respect of the protection of human rights and dignity and the right to due process is an essential element of the democratic rule of law in a constitutional democracy as opposed to being ‘judicial overreach’. Selected recent case law is explored from the US and Canadian Supreme Courts as well as the European Court of Human Rights illustrating that these Courts have, at times, engaged in judicial activism in the service of providing equal protection of the law and due process to the powerless but have, on other occasions, employed legalistic but insupportable strategies to sidestep that obligation.The book will be of interest to those with a deep concern regarding the factors that influence judicial decision-making and the judiciary's role through judgments in promoting and preserving the underpinnings of democracy. This includes legal researchers, the judiciary, practicing counsel and legal academics and law students as well as those in the area of democracy studies, in addition to scholars in the fields of sociology and philosophy of law.
The book brings together 33 state-of-the-art chapters on the import and the pros and cons of legal positivism.
Among the societies that experienced a political transition away from authoritarianism in the 1980s, South Korea is known as a paragon of 'successful democratization.' This achievement is considered to be intimately tied to a new institution introduced with the 1987 change of regime, intended to safeguard fundamental norms and rights: the Constitutional Court of Korea. While constitutional justice is largely celebrated for having achieved both purposes, this book proposes an innovative and critical account of the court's role. Relying on an interpretive analysis of jurisprudence, it uncovers the ambivalence with which the court has intervened in the major dispute opposing the state and parts of civil society after the transition: (re)defining enmity. In response to this challenge, constitutional justice has produced both liberal and illiberal outcomes, promoting the rule of law and basic rights while reinforcing the mechanisms of exclusion bounding South Korean democracy in the name of national security.
Under the Human Rights Act, British courts are for the first time empowered to review primary legislation for compliance with a codified set of fundamental rights. In this book, Aileen Kavanagh argues that the HRA gives judges strong powers of constitutional review, similar to those exercised by the courts under an entrenched Bill of Rights. The aim of the book is to subject the leading case-law under the HRA to critical scrutiny, whilst remaining sensitive to the deeper constitutional, political and theoretical questions which underpin it. Such questions include the idea of judicial deference, the constitutional status of the HRA, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and the constitutional division of labour between Parliament and the courts. The book closes with a sustained defence of the legitimacy of constitutional review in a democracy, thus providing a powerful rejoinder to those who are sceptical about judicial power under the HRA.
Since its first publication in 1996, Law and Morality has filled a long-standing need for a contemporary Canadian textbook in the philosophy of law. Now in its third edition, this anthology has been thoroughly revised and updated, and includes new chapters on equality, judicial review, and terrorism and the rule of law. The volume begins with essays that explore general questions about morality and law, surveying the traditional literature on legal positivism and contemporary debates about the connection between law and morality. These essays explore the tensions between law as a protector of individual liberty and as a tool of democratic self-rule, and introduce debates about adjudication a...