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Law and Macroeconomics
A distinguished Yale economist and legal scholar’s argument that law, of all things, has the potential to rescue us from the next economic crisis. After the economic crisis of 2008, private-sector spending took nearly a decade to recover. Yair Listokin thinks we can respond more quickly to the next meltdown by reviving and refashioning a policy approach whose proven success is too rarely acknowledged. Harking back to New Deal regulatory agencies, Listokin proposes that we take seriously law’s ability to function as a macroeconomic tool, capable of stimulating demand when needed and relieving demand when it threatens to overheat economies. Listokin makes his case by looking at both positi...
Law and Macroeconomics
In this Article, I offer a macroeconomic perspective on law that reshapes the microeconomic perspective that currently dominates law and economics. I argue that 1. The economy works one way in ordinary economic conditions, in which supply capacity determines output, and a different way in deep recessions, in which demand for spending determines output. 2. Because the economy functions differently in deep recessions than in ordinary times, a law causes one set of effects in deep recessions and a different set of effects at other times. 3. Because the same law has different effects at different times, law should be different in deep recessions than in other times. Specifically, law should do more to promote spending in deep recessions than in ordinary economic conditions. Because the stakes of deep recessions are so high (tens of trillions of dollars in lost output, countless lives impaired, and political upheaval), I argue that the (significant) costs associated with introducing macroeconomics into law are worth bearing.
Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype and Should They?
Existing research suggests that practicing litigators are too confident in the merits of their clients' cases. But practicing attorneys often self select (1) the area of law in which they practice, (2) the side on which to practice within that area, (3) law firms with whom they practice, and (4) the clients they represent. We explore whether, after stripping away these selection-biases, legal advocates are still overconfident in their clients' claims by exploiting a natural experiment involving participants in moot court competitions at three U.S. law schools. Students are randomly assigned to advocate for either petitioner or respondent, so none of the selection-bias problems above are present. We find that following participation in moot court contests, students overwhelmingly perceive that the legal merits favor the side that they were randomly assigned to represent. We also find that overconfidence is associated with poorer performance in advocacy as measured by legal writing instructors. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
Law, Economics, and Conflict
"The rise in global conflict, dramatic technological breakthroughs, and the floundering of traditional law and economics has precipitated a reexamination of the fundamentals of law and economics. This volume focuses on the new challenges arising from globalization, technological advance, and the social and political conflicts to which they give rise. Its contributors mull over the challenges of this new world and how we can steer a course giving individuals the space and freedom to work, innovate, earn, profit and prosper, and the state the wisdom to regulate and ensure that conflicts do not occur, externalities are managed, and some are not marginalized and impoverished, while others accumulate and prosper."--Provided by publisher.
Rethinking Corporate Law During a Financial Crisis
Since the Financial Crisis of 2008, most reform measures and discussions have asked how the law of financial regulation could be improved to prevent or mitigate future crises. These discussions give short shrift to the role played by corporate law during the Financial Crisis of 2008 and other financial crises. One critical regulatory tool during the crisis was “regulation by deal,” in which healthy financial firms (“acquirers”) would hastily acquire failing firms (“targets”) to mitigate the crisis. The deals were governed by corporate law, so corporate law played an outsize role in the response to the crisis. But few observers have asked how corporate law--in addition to financia...
A Theoretical Framework for Law and Macroeconomics
This Article considers the effects of law within a Keynesian macroeconomic model on the economy. Using the IS/LM model at the heart of “short-run” macroeconomics, I argue that law affects spending (“aggregate demand”) and that the changes in spending induced by law can affect output. I contrast the law and macroeconomic perspective with the law and microeconomic approach that has dominated law and economics. I demonstrate that law's effects on aggregate demand become particularly important when monetary policy is constrained by the “zero lower bound” on nominal interest rates. At the zero lower bound, interest rates cannot adjust to bring aggregate demand into balance with the economy's supply potential. Economic output falls short of its potential due to inadequate demand. At the zero lower bound, I argue that some micro-economically disfavored legal instruments, such as command and control regulation crafted to increase spending, become appealing relative to seemingly superior alternative instruments such as Pigovian taxation.
Macroeconomics and the Law
This article surveys recent work on the role of law in determining economic aggregates such as gross domestic product, unemployment, inflation, and productivity growth. We provide a brief overview of macroeconomics and discuss how legal interventions and institutional arrangements such as monetary, fiscal policy, financial regulation, and other legal changes can stabilize business cycles. Finally, we discuss the role of the law in promoting economic growth.
Law, Economics, and Conflict
In Law, Economics, and Conflict, Kaushik Basu and Robert C. Hockett bring together international experts to offer new perspectives on how to take analytic tools from the realm of academic research out into the real world to address pressing policy questions. As the essays discuss, political polarization, regional conflicts, climate change, and the dramatic technological breakthroughs of the digital age have all left the standard tools of regulation floundering in the twenty-first century. These failures have, in turn, precipitated significant questions about the fundamentals of law and economics. The contributors address law and economics in diverse settings and situations, including central...
Management Always Wins the Close Ones
While much has been made of quot;shareholder democracyquot; as a lever of corporate governance, there is little evidence about the efficacy of voting. This paper empirically examines votes on management-sponsored resolutions and finds widespread irregularities in the distribution of votes received by management. Management is overwhelmingly more likely to win votes by a small margin than to lose by a small margin. The results indicate that, at some point in the voting process, management obtains highly accurate information about the likely voting outcome and, based on that information, acts to influence the vote. The precise point at which this occurs is unclear, though it is likely to be near the quot;poll closingquot; time. Whatever the cause of management's advantage, it is clear that shareholder voting does not constitute a quot;representativequot; direct democracy.
