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Reasons for Belief
Philosophers have long been concerned about what we know and how we know it. Increasingly, however, a related question has gained prominence in philosophical discussion: what should we believe and why? This volume brings together twelve new essays that address different aspects of this question. The essays examine foundational questions about reasons for belief, and use new research on reasons for belief to address traditional epistemological concerns such as knowledge, justification and perceptually acquired beliefs. This book will be of interest to philosophers working on epistemology, theoretical reason, rationality, perception and ethics. It will also be of interest to cognitive scientists and psychologists who wish to gain deeper insight into normative questions about belief and knowledge.
Weighing and Reasoning
Fifteen essays offer a comprehensive evaluation of Broome's philosophical works over the past thirty years. The first part focuses on Broome's work on the theory of value; the second part on his work on practical and theoretical reasoning, which culminated in his rationality through reasoning.
Hume and Contemporary Epistemology
This is the first edited collection dedicated to demonstrating Hume’s relevance to contemporary debates in epistemology. It features original essays by Hume scholars and epistemologists that address a wide range of important questions, including the following: What does a Humean conception of knowledge look like? How do Hume’s understanding of belief and suspension of judgement bear on current debates about doxastic attitudes? Is there a Humean way of uniting reasons in the epistemic and practical domains? What is the proper role of reason at the foundations of ethics and epistemology from a Humean point of view? What contribution might an examination of Humean scepticism make to underst...
The Norm of Belief
John Gibbons presents a new account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms—truth and reasonableness, for example—but which one is the fundamental norm of belief? He explains both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable.
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
List of members in v. 1-
Kritik der biomedizinischen Prinzipienethik nach Tom L. Beauchamp und James F. Childress
Das von T. Beauchamp und J. Childress entwickelte, auf vier Prinzipien beruhende Modell der biomedizinischen Ethik ist der am meisten beachtete Ansatz zur Lösung biomedizinischer moralischer Konflikte. Die im Rahmen der Kritik vorgetragenen Argumente aus philosophischer Sicht werden in diesem Buch katalogisiert und vorgestellt. Die Argumente lassen sich zusammenfassen als Hinweis auf das inadäquate Verweilen auf der Abstraktionsebene moralischer Urteilsbildung, die sich auf die prima facie Plausibilität der Prinzipien verlässt. Dabei bleiben die Prinzipien theoretisch unterbestimmt und so einer ethischen Willkür ausgesetzt.
The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics
'The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics' presents up-to-date theoretical analyses of various problems associated with the moral standing of future people and animals in current decision-making. The essays in this handbook shed light on the value of population change and the nature of our obligations to future generations. It brings together world-leading philosophers to introduce readers to some of the paradoxes of population ethics, challenge some fundamental assumptions that may be taken for granted in debates concerning the value of population change, and apply these problems and assumptions to real-world decisions.--
Lying
Philosophers have been thinking about lying for several thousand years, yet this topic has only recently become a central area of academic interest for philosophers of language, epistemologists, ethicists, and political philosophers. Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics provides the first dedicated collection of philosophical essays on the emerging topic of lying. Adopting an inter-subdisciplinary approach, this volume breaks new methodological ground in exploring the ways that a better understanding of language can inform the study of knowledge, ethics, or politics - and vice-versa. How can we lie when it is unclear what exactly we believe, or when we have contradictory beliefs? Can corporations lie, and if so how? Is lying always wrong, or always at least prima facie wrong? What can one learn from a liar? Can we lie to mindless machines? These engaging questions and many more are explored at length in this accessible reference text.
