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A collection of papers by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics on the subject.
This special issue documents the results of a workshop on and with Alvin Goldman at the University of Düsseldorf in May, 2008. The topic was Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology. The volume contains the written versions of all papers given at the workshop, divided into five chapters and followed by Alvin Goldman's replies in the sixth and final chapter. The contributions of the first chapter (E. Brendel, C. Jäger, and G. Schurz) address general questions of social epistemology, veritism and externalism, including critical reflections on Goldman's notion of 'weak knowledge'. The subsequent chapter (T. Grundmann and P. Baumann) examines problems which are involved in the search for an ...
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE will be an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.
Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else. Offers a new answer to the ‘motivation question’ of how a normative belief motivates an action.
This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirements-e.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulations-make to normative reasons relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. At the outset, two competing positions are pitted against each other: Joseph Raz's view that (legitimate) legal authorities have pre-emptive force, namely that they give reasons for action...
This text provides an extensive exploration of the relationship between the thought of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, providing a new argument for the complementarity of their mature philosophies as part of a collaborative metatheory of science. In arguing that both Neurath and Carnap must be interpreted as proponents of epistemological naturalism, and that their naturalisms rest on shared philosophical ground, it is also demonstrated that the boundaries and possibilities for epistemological naturalism are not as restrictive as Quinean orthodoxy has previously suggested. Both building on and challenging the scholarship of the past four decades, this naturalist reading of Carnap also provide...
Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles M. Oreste Fiocco: An Absolute Principle of Truthmaking Daniel Alexander Milne: Everett¿s Dilemma: How Fictional Realists Can Cope with Ontic Vagueness Carlo Penco: Indexicals as Demonstratives: On the Debate between Kripke and Künne Roberto Horácio De Sá Pereira: Phenomenal Concepts as Mental Files Ángel García Rodríguez: A Wittgensteinian Conception of Animal Minds Stefan Lukits: Carnap¿s Conventionalism in Geometry Delia Belleri & Michele Palmira: Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement Matthew Lee: Conciliationism Without Uniqueness Emanuel Viebahn: Against Context-Sensitivity Tests Christoph Kelp: How to Motivate Anti-Lu...