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This paper introduces a simple, frequently and easily updated, close to the data epidemiological model that has been used for near-term forecast and policy analysis. We provide several practical examples of how the model has been used. We explain the epidemic development in the UK, the USA and Brazil through the model lens. Moreover, we show how our model would have predicted that a super infectious variant, such as the delta, would spread and argue that current vaccination levels in many countries are not enough to curb other waves of infections in the future. Finally, we briefly discuss the importance of how to model re-infections in epidemiological models.
How much does speculation contribute to oil price volatility? We revisit this contentious question by estimating a sign-restricted structural vector autoregression (SVAR). First, using a simple storage model, we show that revisions to expectations regarding oil market fundamentals and the effect of mispricing in oil derivative markets can be observationally equivalent in a SVAR model of the world oil market à la Kilian and Murphy (2013), since both imply a positive co-movement of oil prices and inventories. Second, we impose additional restrictions on the set of admissible models embodying the assumption that the impact from noise trading shocks in oil derivative markets is temporary. Our additional restrictions effectively put a bound on the contribution of speculation to short-term oil price volatility (lying between 3 and 22 percent). This estimated short-run impact is smaller than that of flow demand shocks but possibly larger than that of flow supply shocks.
The euro area periphery countries and the Baltic countries, which had large current account deficits in the run-up to the crisis, needed adjustment of relative prices to achieve both internal and external balances. Thus far, tangible progress has been made through lower wages and/or higher productivity relative to trading partners (“internal devaluation”), which contributed to narrowing current account deficits and shifting output towards the tradables sector. While some early adjusters cut wages more rapidly followed by productivity improvement, others have only slowly improved productivity largely through labor shedding. This adjustment for most countries has come along with a substantial recession as the unit labor cost improvement has largely come from falling employment and much of the current account improvement from import compression. Going forward, these countries still need to generate growing tradables sector employment and to continue adjustment to prevent imbalances from returning as output gaps close.
This report analyzes the possible spillover effects that could result if the U.S. normalizes its monetary policy while euro area countries are increasing monetary stimulus (a situation referred to as asynchronous monetary conditions). This analysis identifies country-specific shocks to economic activity and monetary conditions since the early 1990s, finding that real and monetary conditions in the United States and the euro area have oftentimes been asynchronous and have often resulted in significant spillover effects, particularly since early 2014.
Given the prospects of asynchronous monetary conditions in the United States and the euro area, this paper analyzes spillovers among these two economies, as well as the implications of asynchronicity for spillovers to other advanced economies and emerging markets. Through a structural vector autoregression analysis, country-specific shocks to economic activity and monetary conditions since the early 1990s are identified, and are used to draw implications about spillovers. The empirical findings suggest that real and monetary conditions in the United States and the euro area have oftentimes been asynchronous. The results also point to significant spillovers among them, in particular since early 2014—with spillovers from the euro area to the United States being particularly large. Against the backdrop of asynchronous conditions in these two economies, spillovers from real and money shocks to emerging markets and non-systemic advanced economies could be dampened.
We carry out an ex post assessment of popular models used to forecast oil prices and propose a host of alternative VAR models based on traditional global macroeconomic and oil market aggregates. While the exact specification of VAR models for nominal oil price prediction is still open to debate, the bias and underprediction in futures and random walk forecasts are larger across all horizons in relation to a large set of VAR specifications. The VAR forecasts generally have the smallest average forecast errors and the highest accuracy, with most specifications outperforming futures and random walk forecasts for horizons up to two years. This calls for caution in reliance on futures or the random walk for forecasting, particularly for near term predictions. Despite the overall strength of VAR models, we highlight some performance instability, with small alterations in specifications, subsamples or lag lengths providing widely different forecasts at times. Combining futures, random walk and VAR models for forecasting have merit for medium term horizons.
Explanations of the large current account deficits for the euro area periphery and the Baltics in the run up to the crisis revolve around two main factors: deteriorating export performance or demand driven booms. We add that there were important movements in transfers and net income balances. While export performance remained relatively stable in most countries, for some countries, when transfers declined, households and firms borrowed so as to maintain the same level of spending. This was part of a persistent failure to adjust to trade deficits, which, along with rising net income payments, led to growing current account deficits. All of these factors played varying roles in the development of current account deficits across these countries.
Many countries around the globe, particularly the systemic advanced economies, face the challenge of closing output gaps and raising potential output growth. Addressing these challenges requires a package of macroeconomic, financial and structural policies that will boost both aggregate demand and aggregate supply, while closing the shortfall between demand and supply. Each element of this package is important and one cannot substitute for the other: easy monetary policy will not raise potential output just as structural reforms will not close the output gap. This report studies the impact on emerging markets and nonsystemic advanced economies from monetary policy actions in systemic advanced economies, with a look also at knock-on effects from the decline in world oil prices.
The October 2012 World Economic Outlook (WEO) assesses the prospects for the global recovery in light of such risks as the ongoing euro area crisis and the "fiscal cliff" facing U.S. policymakers. Reducing the risks to the medium-term outlook implies reducing public debt in the major advanced economies, and Chapter 3 explores 100 years of history of dealing with public debt overhangs. In emerging market and developing economies, activity has been slowed by policy tightening in response to capacity constraints, weaker demand from advanced economies, and country-specific factors, but policy improvements have raised these economies' resilience to shocks, an issue explored in depth in Chapter 4.
A survey of the complex and intertwined set of forces behind the various commodity markets and the interplay between these markets and the global economy. Summarizes a rich set of facts combined with in-depth analyses distillated in a nontechnical manner. Includes discussion of structural trends behind commodities markets, their future implications, and policy implications.