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"A new U.S. grand strategy has been emerging, one that requires not only resources but patience and commitment: the promotion of democracy and freedom abroad. The U.S. armed forces will continue to be among the myriad contributors necessary to achieve this goal. In the face of increasing complexity, changing tactics, and tight budgets, the defense establishment will need to change in multiple ways, yet must also not risk its historic strengths. This volume draws together and integrates insights derived from a wide range of research efforts undertaken at RAND over the past few years. Some of the observations include different ways to organize and employ forces and to divide labor among them, updated insights about the natures of likely future conflicts, the need to further improve information resources, and the value of fostering partnerships among the services and with allies. the authors also offer specific recommendations, such as a recommendation to the Air Force to reevaluate its concepts for large-scale power projection." -- p. [4] of cover.
Tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army throughout American history, the authors of this four-volume series show that there is no such thing as a “traditional” U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and a series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940. Volume IV traces how Total Force Policy has been implemented since 1970.
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Examining the major academic and policy debates over China’s rise and related policy issues, this book looks into the motivations and intentions of a rising China. Most of the scholarly works on China’s rise approach the question at a structural level by looking at the international system and the systemic impact on China’s foreign policy. Traditional Realist theorists define China as a revisionist power eager to address wrongs done to them in history, whilst some cultural and historical analyses attest that China’s strategic culture has been offensive despite its weak material capability. Huiyun Feng’s path-breaking contribution to the debate tests these rival hypotheses by examining systematically the beliefs of contemporary Chinese leaders and their strategic interactions with other states since 1949 when the communist regime came to power. The focus is on tracing the historical roots of Chinese strategic culture and its links to the decision-making of six key Chinese leaders via their belief systems. Chinese Strategic Culture will be of interest to students of Chinese politics, foreign policy, strategic theory and international relations in general.
Publisher Provided Annotation The past 20 years have been a time of relative peace in Asia and, not withstanding the 1997-1998 financial crisis, a period of robust economic growth as well. Currently, however, Asia is beset by a variety of problems that could well imperil the stability it has long enjoyed--including territorial disputes, nuclear rivalry, rising nationalist sentiments, and increased military capabilities. This report summarizes the manner in which the United States can best meet these challenges and thereby ensure continued peace and stability in the region. In the interests of this goal, the report outlines an integrated political, military, and economic strategy that the United States can pursue to inhibit the growth of rivalries in Asia and, more broadly, prevent the rise of instability in the region. Also delineated are changes in U.S. military posture that will be made necessary by this strategy.
Taiwan is a flourishing liberal democracy and a key player in the global economy. Yet it is far from secure. China considers it a renegade province and has not renounced its right to use force to resolve the dispute. Taiwan must therefore deter China’s aggression by convincing Chinese leaders that the costs using force against Taiwan will outweigh any possible benefits. In this monograph, a team of researchers from George Mason University and the University of Waterloo suggest a holistic strategy that Taiwan can use to enhance its conventional deterrence posture. Their conclusions are simple but radical: instead of organizing its defenses around a small inventory of conventional jets, ships and tanks, Taiwan should acquire large numbers of cheap, asymmetric weapons. It should also transform its massive reserve command into a territorial defense force trained to wage guerrilla warfare. By threatening to wage a never-ending war of denial against an invader, Taiwan can more credibly impact China’s cost-benefit calculus.
Escalation is a natural tendency in any form of human competition, and today's security environment demands that the United States be prepared for a host of escalatory threats. This analysis of escalation dynamics and approaches to escalation management draws on a range of historical examples from World War I to the struggle against global Jihad to inform escalation-related decisionmaking.
United States has engaged in counterinsurgency around the globe for more than a century. But insurgencies have rarely been defeated by outside powers. Rather, the afflicted nation itself must win the war politically and militarily, and the best way to help is to offer advice, training, and equipment. Air power, and the U.S. Air Force, can play an important role in such efforts, which suggests making them an institutional priority.
This book examines the Army's role in the war on terrorism; the Army's homeland security needs; the implications of increased emphasis on Asia; the Army's role in coalition operations; the unfinished business of jointness-the lessons learned from operations and how to prepare for the future; the Army's deployability, logistical, and personnel challenges; and whether the Army can afford its Transformation. These examinations are bracketed by an introduction, a description of the Army's place in the new national security strategy, and a summary of the authors' conclusions.
This report documents the exceptional cross-service harmony that the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have steadily developed in their conduct of integrated strike operations since the first Persian Gulf War in 1991. That close harmony contrasts sharply with the situation that prevailed throughout most of the Cold War, when the two services maintained separate and unique operating mindsets and lacked any significant interoperability features.