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Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats
This book examines how Russia and Kazakhstan navigated the dilemmas associated with building regulatory state institutions on the ruins of the Soviet command and control system. The two nations developed predatory and wasteful crony capitalism but still improved their business climates and economic performance. To better understand these seemingly incompatible outcomes, the book advances a theory of authoritarian regulatory statehood. It argues that politicians use institutions of the state as a means to balance conflicting elite demands for economic rents and popular demands for public goods and economic growth. An effective balancing of the two prevents elite subversion and popular revolt ...
Building Business in Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe, and Eurasia
Prior to 1989, the communist countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR lacked genuine employer and industry associations. After the collapse of communism, industry associations mushroomed throughout the region. Duvanova argues that abusive regulatory regimes discourage the formation of business associations and poor regulatory enforcement tends to encourage associational membership growth. Academic research often treats special interest groups as vehicles of protectionism and non-productive collusion. This book challenges this perspective with evidence of market-friendly activities by industry associations and their benign influence on patterns of public governance. Careful analysis of cross-national quantitative data spanning more than 25 countries, and qualitative examination of business associations in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Croatia, shows that postcommunist business associations function as substitutes for state and private mechanisms of economic governance. These arguments and empirical findings put the long-standing issues of economic regulations, public goods and collective action in a new theoretical perspective.
Secessionism
An examination of the reasons independence movements remain peaceful or become violent
Interest Groups in American Politics
Americans rail against so-called special interests but at the same time many members of society are themselves represented in one form or another by organized groups trying to affect the policymaking progress. This concise but thorough text demonstrates that interest groups are involved in the political system at all levels of government – federal, state, and local – and in all aspects of political activity, from election campaigns to agenda setting to lawmaking to policy implementation. Rather than an anomaly or distortion of the political system, it is a normal and healthy function of a pluralist society and democratic governance. Nonetheless, Nownes warns of the dangers of unwatched i...
Hayek and Popper
Karl Popper and Friedrich von Hayek are remembered as two of the twentieth century’s greatest proponents of open society. However, over the years, Hayek’s ideas have tended to be favoured over Popper’s in both academic and political discussions. This book aims to improve understanding of Popper’s and Hayek’s philosophies by explaining their differences, and whilst doing so, to encourage liberal political philosophers to take a better-informed and more sympathetic look at Popper’s ideas about open society. Popper and Hayek differed in subtle but fundamental ways about rationality, economism, and democracy. They thus differed about whether and to what extent society is well served ...
Chambers of Commerce in Europe
Chambers of commerce are omnipresent in domestic public policy and play a crucial role in business self-governance. However, they are rather neglected in both public and scientific debates and seem to be in decline. This volume fills this gap in research on organised business and state-market coordination in Europe. The contributions discuss chambers of commerce as interest groups and actors in political systems, and address the institutional changes that this kind of self-governance is undergoing. The development of chambers of commerce in recent decades shows a wide array of mechanisms for institutional adaptation, ranging from displacement and conversion to enduring stability. This volume gives an insight into the dynamics and factors affecting these changes, with case studies on Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Spain, and the United Kingdom, all conducted by recognised experts in this field.
How Leaders Mobilize Workers
This book combines a thorough analysis of class politics in twenty countries between 1863 and 1919 with a general theory of political mobilization focusing on individual leadership. It explains why leaders chose social democracy, revolution, or moderate syndicalism to mobilize workers, and shows what lasting consequences their choices produced.
Hydrocarbon Citizens
In Hydrocarbon Citizens, Nimah Mazaheri tells the story of how the discovery of oil dramatically transformed politics and society in the Middle East. Including historical evidence and public opinion surveys, Mazaheri offers a nuanced description of how ordinary people in the region think about their government and evaluate national politics. He concludes that people in oil-rich countries adopt attitudes, beliefs, and values that are very different from those among citizens in oil-poor countries. Mazaheri provides a new way of thinking about current politics in the Middle East and explains why some of the region's long-lasting autocracies have been successful in resisting the rise of democracy.
The Pitfalls of Family Rule
In The Pitfalls of Family Rule, Barbara Junisbai questions the conceptual divide separating democracy from nondemocracy as well as that separating "strong" authoritarian rulers from "weak" ones. Focusing on patronage, endemic to post-Soviet Eurasia but also present the world over, she untangles the spoils agreements that bind elites to strongman presidents. Incorporating multiple case studies, including an in-depth investigation into Kazakhstan over the span of twenty plus years, Junisbai demonstrates the power of institutional norms to hold seemingly unconstrainable rulers accountable in surprising and unexpected ways. "Strong" autocrats can stumble even when they set in place robust, pro-presidential institutions, while "weak" autocrats can endure by upholding normative contracts that elites perceive as fair and just. An important lesson emerges from The Pitfalls of Family Rule: not even the most personalist of regimes functions free of rules. The institutions over which autocrats claim control also lay claim over them.
