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In this revised and extended edition of Napoleon and the Operational Art of War, the leading scholars of Napoleonic military history provide the most authoritative analysis of Napoleon’s battlefield success and ultimate failure. Napoleon’s development and mastery of the operational art of warfare is revealed as each chapter analyzes one Napoleonic war or major campaign of a war. To achieve this, the essays conform to the common themes of Napoleon’s planning, his command and control, his execution of plans, and the response of his adversaries. Napoleon's sea power and the British response to the French challenge at sea is also investigated. Overall, this volume reflects the finest scholarship and cutting-edge research to be found in Napoleonic military history. Contributors include Jonathan Abel, Robert M. Citino, Phillip R. Cuccia, Huw J. Davies, Mark T. Gerges; John H. Gill; Jordan R. Hayworth, Kenneth G. Johnson, Michael V. Leggiere, Kevin D. McCranie, Alexander Mikaberidze, Frederick C. Schneid, John Severn, Dennis Showalter, Geoffrey Wawro, and John F. Weinzierl. See inside the book.
In Napoleon and the Operational Art of War, the leading scholars of Napoleonic military history provide the most authoritative analysis of Napoleon’s battlefield success and ultimate failure. Napoleon’s development and mastery of the operational art of warfare is revealed as each chapter analyzes one Napoleonic war or major campaign of a war. To achieve this, the essays conform to the common themes of Napoleon’s planning, his command and control, his execution of plans, and the response of his adversaries. Napoleon's sea power and the British response to the French challenge at sea is also investigated. Overall, this volume reflects the finest scholarship and cutting-edge research to be found in Napoleonic Military History. Contributors include Jonathan Abel, Robert M. Citino, Huw Davies, Mark T. Gerges; John H. Gill; Jordan Hayworth, Kenneth G. Johnson, Michael V. Leggiere, Kevin D. McCranie, Alexander Mikaberidze, Frederick C. Schneid, John Severn, Dennis Showalter, Geoffrey Wawro, and John F. Weinzierl.
The little known Battle of Znaim (10th-11th July 1809) was the last battle to be fought on the main front of the Franco-Austrian War. Cut short to make way for an armistice it effectively ended hostilities between France and Austria and is now uniquely considered to be an episode both of conflict and simultaneously of diplomacy. The battle began as a result of the Austrian decision to stage a rearguard action near Znaim, prompting the Bavarians to unsuccessfully storm a nearby town. Battle ensued with the village changing hands a number of times over the course of the two days. Jack Gill delves deep into the respective tactics of both sides as the two armies continually changed positions and strategies. His account dissects and investigates the dual aspects of the Battle of Znaim and explains the diplomatic decisions that resulted in the peace treaty which was signed at Schonbrunn Palace on 14th October 1809. Gill’s book is an unrivaled analysis of the Battle of Znaim. Accessible, highly detailed and expertly crafted, it sheds new light on this fascinating moment in Napoleonic history.
“A very impressive piece of work, and it is unlikely to be surpassed for many years . . . A very valuable guide to Napoleon’s last great victory” (HistoryOfWar.org). With this third volume, John Gill brings to a close his magisterial study of the war between Napoleonic France and Habsburg Austria. The account begins with both armies recuperating on the banks of the Danube. As they rest, important action was taking place elsewhere: Eugene won a crucial victory over Johann on the anniversary of Marengo, Prince Poniatowski’s Poles outflanked another Austrian archduke along the Vistula, and Marmont drove an Austrian force out of Dalmatia to join Napoleon at Vienna. These campaigns set th...
Authoritative and concise, Warfare in the Western World concentrates on selected campaigns and battles, showing how political and military leaders in the West have used armies to wage war effectively over the last four centuries. The text moves through the centuries, discussing how operational developments and technological improvements eventually led to the concept of total war, first approached in the American Civil War and culminating in the twentieth century's two world wars.
This Volume contains papers presented at a symposium organized by the Center for Austrian Studies and held at the University of Minnesota in May 1989. Scholars from Austria, England, Canada, and the United States, specializing in Austrian history, music, art, and literature met to discuss a number of common topics and themes form a variety of perspectives relating to Austria in the age of the French Revolution. The symposium was remarkable for the congeniality of the participants and the easy and fruitful way in which they exchanged ideas and blended their approaches ind insights. The development of Austrian diplomacy, warfare, society, and culture in the period, and the impact of the French Enlightenment and Revolution on Austrian art, literature, music, drama, and journalism are explored in the essays that appear in this study.
The way an army thinks about and understands warfare has a tremendous impact on its organization, training, and operations. The central ideas of that understanding form a nation's way of warfare that influences decisions on and off the battlefield. From the disasters of the War of 1812, Winfield Scott ensured that America adopted a series of ideas formed in the crucible of the Wars of the French Revolution and epitomized by Napoleon. Reflecting American cultural changes, these French ideas dominated American warfare on the battlefields of the Mexican-American War, the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I. America remained committed to these ideas until cultural pressures and the successes of German Blitzkrieg from 1939 - 1940 led George C. Marshall to orchestrate the adoption of a different understanding of warfare. Michael A. Bonura examines concrete battlefield tactics, army regulations, and theoretical works on war as they were presented in American army education manuals, professional journals, and the popular press, to demonstrate that as a cultural construction, warfare and ways of warfare can be transnational and influence other nations.