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In this book, James Sias investigates the psychologies of those who have acted in ways widely regarded as evil, and uses this psychological data as a basis for developing his own theory of evil. Sometimes, he claims, an action is so horrific and despicable that a term like “wrong” seems to fall short of capturing its moral status. Likewise, occasionally a person’s character is corrupt in such a way that ordinary trait terms like “selfish” or “insensitive,” or more general labels like “bad” or “immoral,” seem inadequate. In such cases, we often resort to calling the person or action “evil.” But what does this term mean? What is it that makes a person or action morally evil? Taking a cue from Hannah Arendt, Sias argues that this sort of evil is essentially a matter of regarding others as “morally superfluous.” In other words, evil is a matter of utter moral disregard. In the course of developing and defending this view, Sias also describes and critiques a number of prominent theories of evil proposed by philosophers in recent years.
Expressivism has been dominating much of the metaethical debate of the past three decades. The aim of this book is to address a number of questions that have been neglected in the previous discussion.These primarily concern the psychological commitments and the methodological status of expressivism as well as important differences and similarities between the approaches of the ‘classic’ expressivists Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, Blackburn und Gibbard.
The Expression of Emotion collects cutting-edge essays on emotional expression written by leading philosophers, psychologists, and legal theorists. It highlights areas of interdisciplinary research interest, including facial expression, expressive action, and the role of both normativity and context in emotion perception. Whilst philosophical discussion of emotional expression has addressed the nature of expression and its relation to action theory, psychological work on the topic has focused on the specific mechanisms underpinning different facial expressions and their recognition. Further, work in both legal and political theory has had much to say about the normative role of emotional expressions, but would benefit from greater engagement with both psychological and philosophical research. In combining philosophical, psychological, and legal work on emotional expression, the present volume brings these distinct approaches into a productive conversation.
Challenges the idea that representation of how the world is should play a fundamental explanatory role in any explanation of language. Examines deflationary accounts of truth, the role of language in expressing mental states, and the normative and the natural as they relate to issues of representation.
Includes special sessions, 1908, 1912, 1920, 1926, 1928.