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Shadows of Syntax
What is the source of logical and mathematical truth? This volume revitalizes conventionalism as an answer to this question. Conventionalism takes logical and mathematical truth to have their source in linguistic conventions. This was an extremely popular view in the early 20th century, but it was never worked out in detail and is now almost universally rejected in mainstream philosophical circles. In Shadows of Syntax, Jared Warren offers the first book-length treatment and defense of a combined conventionalist theory of logic and mathematics. He argues that our conventions, in the form of syntactic rules of language use, are perfectly suited to explain the truth, necessity, and a priority ...
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind presents cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind, combining invited articles and articles selected from submissions. Each volume will highlight two themes to bring focus to debates. The series will reflect the diversity of methods adopted in contemporary philosophy of mind and provide a venue for rigorous and innovative work by both established and up-and-coming voices in the field. The themes covered in the fourth volume are twenty-first-century idealism, acquaintance and perception, and acquaintance and consciousness. It also contains a book symposium on David Chalmers' Reality+, and an article on Aristotle's philosophy of mind.
The A Priori without Magic
The distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is an old and influential one. But both the distinction itself and the crucial notion of a priori knowledge face powerful philosophical challenges. Many philosophers worry that accepting the a priori is tantamount to accepting epistemic magic. In contrast, this Element argues that the a priori can be formulated clearly, made respectable, and used to do important epistemological work. The author's conception of the a priori and its role falls short of what some historical proponents of the notion may have hoped for, but it allows us to accept and use the notion without abandoning either naturalism or empiricism, broadly understood. This Element argues that we can accept and use the a priori without magic.
Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning
Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning develops a new, non-reductionist, response to the sceptical argument about meaning famously developed in Saul Kripke's book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy, it begins by outlining an intuitive notion of following a rule, explaining its relationship to the notions of linguistic meaning and intentional content. It then gives an outline and development of Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument, going into detail on the arguments against reductive dispositional accounts of meaning. It also explains Kripke's Wittgenstein's objections to non-reductionist views which take semantic and inte...
A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2 Volume Set
“Providing up-to-date, in-depth coverage of the central question, and written and edited by some of the foremost practitioners in the field, this timely new edition will no doubt be a go-to reference for anyone with a serious interest in the philosophy of language.” Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Stockholm University Now published in two volumes, the second edition of the best-selling Companion to the Philosophy of Language provides a complete survey of contemporary philosophy of language. The Companion has been greatly extended and now includes a monumental 17 new essays – with topics chosen by the editors, who curated suggestions from current contributors – and almost all of the 25 original...
Knowledge and God
This Element examines a main theme in religious epistemology, namely, the possibility of knowledge of God. Most often philosophers consider the rationality or justification of propositional belief about God, particularly beliefs about the existence and nature of God; and they will assess the conditions under which, if there is a God, such propositional beliefs would be knowledge, particularly in light of counter-evidence or the availability of religious disagreement. This Element surveys such familiar areas, then turns toward newer and less-developed terrain: interpersonal epistemology, namely what it is to know another person. It then explores the prospects for understanding what it might take to know God relationally, the contours of which are significant for many theistic traditions.
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions. It also explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism.
Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World
A collection of new essays that develop themes from the work of the philosopher Jaegwon Kim.
Constructing the World
David Chalmers develops a picture of reality on which all truths can be derived from a limited class of basic truths. The picture is inspired by Rudolf Carnap's construction of the world in Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt. Carnap's Aufbau is often seen as a noble failure, but Chalmers argues that a version of the project can succeed. With the right basic elements and the right derivation relation, we can indeed construct the world. The focal point of Chalmers' project is scrutability: the thesis that ideal reasoning from a limited class of basic truths yields all truths about the world. Chalmers first argues for the scrutability thesis and then considers how small the base can be. The result is...
Transcendental Epistemology
Transcendental arguments were prominent in Western philosophy, German idealism, phenomenological tradition, and P. F. Strawson's thinking. They have fallen out of fashion because of their associations with transcendental idealism and verificationism. They are still invoked by important figures in the analytic tradition even if the very same tradition has cast doubt on such arguments. The nature of transcendental arguments remains unclear: Are they supposed to be deductive? Are they synthetic or analytic? If they are a priori, how are they supposed to be about the empirical world? What are their relations to necessity, conceivability, and essence? This Element takes up the challenge of elucidating the nature of transcendental arguments, embedded in the wider context of transcendental epistemology. It will be argued that the key premise 'transcendental conditional' is synthetic, necessary, and a posteriori.
