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What Darwin Got Wrong
Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piatelli-Palmarini, a distinguished philosopher and scientist working in tandem, reveal major flaws at the heart of Darwinian evolutionary theory. They do not deny Darwin's status as an outstanding scientist but question the inferences he drew from his observations. Combining the results of cutting-edge work in experimental biology with crystal-clear philosophical argument they mount a devastating critique of the central tenets of Darwin's account of the origin of species. The logic underlying natural selection is the survival of the fittest under changing environmental pressure. This logic, they argue, is mistaken. They back up the claim with evidence of what actually happens in nature. This is a rare achievement - the short book that is likely to make a great deal of difference to a very large subject. What Darwin Got Wrong will be controversial. The authors' arguments will reverberate through the scientific world. At the very least they will transform the debate about evolution.
Supersizing the Mind
When historian Charles Weiner found pages of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman's notes, he saw it as a "record" of Feynman's work. Feynman himself, however, insisted that the notes were not a record but the work itself. In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that our thinking doesn't happen only in our heads but that "certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world." The pen and paper of Feynman's thought are just such feedback loops, physical machinery that shape the flow of thought and enlarge the boundaries of mind. Drawing upon recent...
Psychosemantics
Psychosemantics explores the relation between commonsense psychological theories and problems that are central to semantics and the philosophy of language. Building on and extending Fodor's earlier work it puts folk psychology on firm theoretical ground and rebuts externalist, holist, and naturalist threats to its position. This book is included in the series Explorations in Cognitive Science, edited by Margaret A. Boden. A Bradford Book.
Holism
The main question addressed in this book is whether individuation of the contents of thoughts and linguistic expressions is inherently holistic. The authors consider arguments that are alleged to show that the meaning of a scientific hypothesis depends on the entire theory that entails it, or that the content of a concept depends on the entire belief system of which it is part. If these arguments are sound then it would follow that the meanings of words, sentences, hypotheses, predictions, discourses, dialogs, texts, thoughts and the like are merely derivative. The implications of holism about meaning for other philosophical issues (intentional explanation, translation, Realism, skepticism, etc.) will also be explored. Authors discussed include Quine, Davidson, Lewis, Bennett, Block, Field, Churchland, and others. The book is intended for all those interested in language, mind, metaphysics or epistemology.
The Elm and the Expert
Written in a highly readable, irreverent style, The Elm and the Expert provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, Twin cases, and the putative indeterminacy of reference. Bound to be widely read and much discussed, The Elm and the Expert, written in Jerry Fodor's usual highly readable, irreverent style, provides a lively discussion of semantic issues about mental representation, with special attention to issues raised by Frege's problem, Twin cases, and the putative indeterminacy of reference. The book extends and revises a view of the relation between mind and meaning that the author has been devel...
The Mind Doesn't Work that Way
Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian.
Representations
These essays will shape discussion in the philosophy of psychology for years to come. A collection of eleven essays dealing with methodological and empirical issues in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind, Representations convincingly connects philosophical speculation to concrete empirical research.One of the outstanding methodological issues dealt with is the status of functionalism considered as an alternative to behavioristic and physicalistic accounts. of mental states and properties. The other issue is the status of reductionism considered as an account of the relation between the psychological and physical sciences. The first chapters present the main lines of argument whic...
Consciousness and Its Place in Nature
Panpsychism is the philosophical view that consciousness, mentality, or 'mindedness' in some form is fundamental in the universe. The idea has existed for centuries, but only recently has it had a serious resurgence. Galen Strawson has been on the front line of the battlefield on the topic of panpsychism since the 1990s. His paper on ‘realistic monism’, contained in this volume and originally published in 2006, is now considered something of a classic and a catalyst for panpsychism’s recent revival. This long overdue new edition of the book gives the original commentators, where they feel they have something more to add, an opportunity to update their thinking on the topic of panpsychism in general and Strawson’s realistic monism in particular. Seven new postscripts are included, which aim to enhance the original collection and push the discussion onwards. Eighteen years have passed since the first edition of this groundbreaking volume, and Strawson remains a distinctive and important voice in the field — the new edition is a must-read for all who are interested in consciousness studies.
The Problem of Consciousness
Can consciousness be fitted into a naturalistic worldview or is it inherently mysterious? In virtue of what d does a physical organism come to have an inner conscious life? This book argues that we are not equipped to understand the workings of conciousness, despite its objective naturalness. Introspection does not reveal the hiddent structure of consciousness and it is this that joins experience to the material world.
