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Insurgent, Raiders and Bandits explores the history of irregular warfare over the past 250 years through the lives and campaigns ofFrom w the greatest masters of this mode of conflict. The book not only tells their stories, but shapes an alternate history of the world as seen through the eyes of those who made up for their small numbers with clever, unorthodox methods that often brought them victory. Their lesson for military affairs in our time must not be ignored.
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The information revolution--which is as much an organizational as a technological revolution--is transforming the nature of conflict across the spectrum: from open warfare, to terrorism, crime, and even radical social activism. The era of massed field armies is passing, because the new information and communications systems are increasing the lethality of quite small units that can call in deadly, precise missile fire almost anywhere, anytime. In social conflicts, the Internet and other media are greatly empowering individuals and small groups to influence the behavior of states. Whether in military or social conflicts, all protagonists will soon be developing new doctrines, strategies, and ...
Netwar-like cyberwar-describes a new spectrum of conflict that is emerging in the wake of the information revolution. Netwar includes conflicts waged, on the one hand, by terrorists, criminals, gangs, and ethnic extremists; and by civil-society activists (such as cyber activists or WTO protestors) on the other. What distinguishes netwar is the networked organizational structure of its practitioners-with many groups actually being leaderless-and their quickness in coming together in swarming attacks. To confront this new type of conflict, it is crucial for governments, military, and law enforcement to begin networking themselves.
Swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions. It will work best-perhaps it will only work-if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units (what we call "pods" organized in "clusters"). Developing a swarming force implies, among other things, radical changes in current military organizational structures. From command and control of line units to logistics, profound shifts will have to occur to nurture this new "way of war." Our study examines the benefits- and also the costs and risks-of engaging in such serious doctrinal change. Examples of swarming can be found throughout history, but it is only now able to emerge as a doctrine in its own right. That is largely because swarming depends on a devolution of power to small units and a capacity to interconnect those units that has only recently become feasible, due to the information revolution.
Traces the recent evolution of international terrorism against civilian and U.S. military targets, looks ahead to where terrorism is going, and assesses how it might be contained. The authors consider the threat of information-based terrorism and of weapons of mass destruction, with an emphasis on how changes in the sources and nature of terrorism may affect the use of unconventional terror. The authors propose counterterrorism strategies that address the growing problem of homeland defense.
This volume develops information strategy as a construct equal in importance to military strategy as an influential tool of statecraft. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer explore three principal themes: the rise of the ‘information domain’ and information strategy as an equal partner alongside traditional military strategy the need to consider the organizational implications of information strategy the realm of what has been called ‘information operations’ (IO) - the building blocks of information strategy - has been too narrowly depicted and must be both broadened and deepened. Information Strategy and Warfare will be essential reading for students and practitioners of information strategy, as well as scholars of security studies and military strategy in general.
The factors leading to the defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II have been debated for decades. One prevalent view is that overwhelming Allied superiority in materials and manpower doomed the Axis. Another holds that key strategic and tactical blunders lost the war--from Hitler halting his panzers outside Dunkirk, allowing more than 300,000 trapped Allied soldiers to escape, to Admiral Yamamoto falling into the trap set by the U.S. Navy at Midway. Providing a fresh perspective on the war, this study challenges both views and offers an alternative explanation: the Germans, Japanese and Italians made poor design choices in ships, planes, tanks and information security--before and during the war--that forced them to fight with weapons and systems that were too soon outmatched by the Allies. The unprecedented arms race of World War II posed a fundamental "design challenge" the Axis powers sometimes met but never mastered.
Strategy, at its best, knits together ends and means, no matter how various and disparate, into a cohesive pattern. In the case of a U.S. information strategy, this requires balancing the need to guard and secure access to many informational capabilities and resources, with the opportunity to achieve national aims by fostering as much openness as practicable. The authors' term to represent such strategic balancing is guarded openness. They go on to describe noopolitik (nu-oh-poh-li-teek)--an emerging form of statecraft that emphasizes the importance of sharing ideas and values globally, principally through the exercise of persuasive soft power rather than traditional military hard power. Thi...
Worst Enemy offers an inside analysis of the events that have derailed our efforts to transform the nation's military into a leaner, lighter, and much more networked force. Mr. Arquilla places these events in historical context and assesses Donald Rumsfeld's role as secretary of defense of the post-9/11 era. Beyond articulating a thorough critique of what has gone wrong, he outlines new solutions, in detail, to remedy the ills that beset American defense policy, including the elimination of the Pentagon, the end of strategic bombing strategy, and force reductions to 100,000 in each of the main services.