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Most books on epidemiology have treated the subject from a statistical, mathematical or computer applicational point of view. However, experiments must be performed first to provide the data for models which in turn can then be proven by further experimentation. This mutual interplay of theory and empirics gives epidemiology its scientific thrust and charm. This book provides a choice of methods for varying applications and objectives, covering all important aspects for the designing of experiments. Furthermore, the reader is supplied with solutions to his experimental problems and many "tricks of the trade". The newcomer to the field will also profit by this methodology guide.
This edited volume brings together many of the world’s leading scholars of intelligence with a number of former senior practitioners to facilitate a wide-ranging dialogue on the central challenges confronting students of intelligence. The book presents a series of documents, nearly all of which are published here for the first time, accompanied by both overview and commentary sections. The central objectives of this collection are twofold. First, it seeks to build on existing scholarship on intelligence in deepening our understanding of its impact on a series of key events in the international history of the past century. Further, it aims to explore the different ways in which intelligence can be studied by bringing together both scholarly and practical expertise to examine a range of primary material relevant to the history of intelligence since the early twentieth century. This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence, strategic and security studies, foreign policy and international history.
This book looks at the influence of military regimes in seven cases: Pakistan in 1965, India in 1971, Israel in 1956 and 1967, Egypt in 1973, Iran in 1969 and Iraq in 1980. The author contends that countries with military governments are warlike not because they glorify war, but rather because they are poorly equipped to manage diplomacy.
In this comprehensive and unique theory-practice study, Ofer Israeli examines complex effects of international relations relating to various indirect—intended and unintended—consequences of intentional human action. These effects may be desirable or undesirable, overt or covert, anticipated or surprising, foreseeable but unanticipated, and anticipated but simultaneously neglected or discounted. Israeli focuses on six case studies from the Middle East, analyzing the unexpected and accidental results of interventions in this region by the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western powers during the Cold War. From this research, he develops a complex-causal mechanism or practical tool that countries may use to implement foreign policy, with the goal of reducing the number of conflicts and wars globally, especially in the Middle East.
This new book looks at the relationship between the Israeli armed forces, the government, and the origins of the 1967 War. Ami Gluska discusses the effect of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on Israel’s defense policy between 1963-1967 against the backdrop of the developments in the Middle East. In addition, he describes in detail the decision-making process leading to the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in June 1967 through the prism of the relations between the military and political echelons. He shows how the Six Day War was a watershed event in the Middle-Eastern conflict and had a profound effect on the development of the Palestinian problem and the character of the State of Israel over the past four decades. This book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, strategic studies, Israeli politics and military history in general.
This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional deterrence theory, and applies it to enduring rivalries in the Middle East. The work argues that many of the problems encountered in the development of deterrence theory lay in the fact that it was developed during the Cold War, when the immediate problem it had to address was how to prevent catastrophic nuclear wars. The logic of nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of stability over credibility; however, because the logic of conventional deterrence is different, the solution of the tension between credibility and stability is achieved by deference to credibility, due to the requirements of reputation and costly signaling. This book aims to narrow the gap between theory and evidence. It explores how a reconceptualization of the theory as a process that culminates in the internalization of deterrence within enduring rivalries is better suited to account for its final success: a finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long. This interdisciplinary book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, strategic studies, international security, Middle Eastern studies and IR in general.