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This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional deterrence theory, and applies it to enduring rivalries in the Middle East. The work argues that many of the problems encountered in the development of deterrence theory lay in the fact that it was developed during the Cold War, when the immediate problem it had to address was how to prevent catastrophic nuclear wars. The logic of nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of stability over credibility; however, because the logic of conventional deterrence is different, the solution of the tension between credibility and stability is achieved by deference to credibility, due to the requirements of reputation and costly signaling. This book aims to narrow the gap between theory and evidence. It explores how a reconceptualization of the theory as a process that culminates in the internalization of deterrence within enduring rivalries is better suited to account for its final success: a finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long. This interdisciplinary book will be of much interest to students of deterrence theory, strategic studies, international security, Middle Eastern studies and IR in general.
“An outstanding historical analysis of a core component to the current Middle East dilemma between Israel and the Palestinians.”—Choice Reviews Was Israel’s occupation of the West Bank inevitable? From 1949-1967, the West Bank was the center of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many Israelis hoped to conquer it and widen their narrow borders, while many Arabs hoped that it would serve as the core of a future Palestinian state. In The Limits of the Land, Avshalom Rubin presents a sophisticated new portrait of the Arab-Israeli struggle that goes beyond partisan narratives of the past. Drawing on new evidence from a wide variety of sources, many of them only recently declassified, Rubin argues...
This new book looks at the relationship between the Israeli armed forces, the government, and the origins of the 1967 War. Ami Gluska discusses the effect of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on Israel’s defense policy between 1963-1967 against the backdrop of the developments in the Middle East. In addition, he describes in detail the decision-making process leading to the Arab-Israeli Six Day War in June 1967 through the prism of the relations between the military and political echelons. He shows how the Six Day War was a watershed event in the Middle-Eastern conflict and had a profound effect on the development of the Palestinian problem and the character of the State of Israel over the past four decades. This book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern politics, strategic studies, Israeli politics and military history in general.
Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history.
Nasser's Gamble draws on declassified documents from six countries and original material in Arabic, German, Hebrew, and Russian to present a new understanding of Egypt's disastrous five-year intervention in Yemen, which Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser later referred to as "my Vietnam." Jesse Ferris argues that Nasser's attempt to export the Egyptian revolution to Yemen played a decisive role in destabilizing Egypt's relations with the Cold War powers, tarnishing its image in the Arab world, ruining its economy, and driving its rulers to instigate the fatal series of missteps that led to war with Israel in 1967. Viewing the Six Day War as an unintended consequence of the Saudi-Egyptian ...
A multi-archival documentary history of British policy towards Nasser's Egypt under the Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Home and Wilson governments. The primary focus of the study is an enquiry into the causes of the Anglo-Egyptian Cold War from 1952 to 1967.
For 15 years the name of Isser Harel, the man in charge of all the intelligence branches of Israel, was top secret in Israel. Even when he resigned from office in March 1963 his name and picture remained undisclosed. Only in 1965, when he was appointed special adviser on intelligence and security to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, were his name and picture revealed. But most of his past feats were still kept secret, even when stories about underground activities, the capture of a spy, or a mission abroad were disclosed. Alan Dulles, head of the CIA, declared at the time, “the Israeli services are the best in the world”. For what operations did the Israeli services deserve such credit? What was their modus operandi? How had they been established and developed? How did they conceive rules of ethics and morality? These questions and many more are answered in this book, which reveals the life story and operations of Isser Harel, whom David Ben-Gurion called “the guardian of Israel’s secrets and honor”.
In June 1967 Israel, which seemed on the verge of being annihilated by its Arab neighbors, took six days to redraw the Middle Eastern strategic map in one of the most dramatic reversals of fortune in modern times. The success was over a decade in the making following the Suez Crisis, with the Israeli forces being radically changed to create an army and air force upon which the country would rely when it became obvious the international community would take no action to implement guarantees made after the events of 1956. The Israeli forces were honed in low level clashes during the 1960s, notably the Water Wars which the Israelis did so much to provoke. By contrast, the Arab forces became com...
For more than forty years Yitzhak Rabin played a critical role in shaping Israeli national security policy and military doctrine. He began as a soldier in the Palmach, the elite underground unit of the Jewish community in Palestine, served in the 1948 War of Independence, and ultimately became chief of staff of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), defense minister in several governments, ambassador to the United States, and, twice, prime minister. As chief of staff, Rabin led the IDF to its triumph in the 1967 Six Day War. He was assassinated in 1995 as prime minister as he left a peace rally. Drawing on unpublished materials and interviews with important sources, including Rabin himself, Efraim ...