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Rethinking Virtue Ethics offers a model of Aristotelian virtue ethics based on a deductive paradigm. This book argues that, contrary to what many contemporary thinkers are inclined to believe, Aristotelian virtue ethics is consistent with at least some action-guiding moral principles being true unconditionally, and that a justification for general moral principles can be grounded in fundamental concepts within Aristotle’s theory. An analysis of ethical propositions that hold for the most part is proposed that fits well within the deductive paradigm developed. This unique interpretation of virtue ethics has implications for recent discussions of the virtues in social psychology, issues about how fundamental moral principles are known, questions about the justification of inalienable rights, debates about moral particularism and generalism, and discussions of moral realism and anti-realism.
A provocative and lucid defense of retributivism against several long-standing criticisms. The author explores the matter of reparations for past wrongs in the case of crimes committed against Native Americans by the United States Government. Unequaled in its depth and scope of discussion the book delves deeply into particular concerns with retributivism, responsibility, and certain areas of compensation.
The outstanding features of this book are that it directly confronts the challenge posed by G.E.M. Anscombe in Modern Moral Philosophy of how moral philosophy can be done, it makes a significant contribution to the debate on virtue theory and anti-theory in ethics, and it shows the relevance of such theoretical discussion by grounding it in, and applying it to, contemporary moral issues such as abortion, suicide, and the moral status of animals. No other book currently available covers this ground. The book is aimed primarily at upper-level undergraduates, graduate students and faculty in philosophy, but it should be accessible to anyone with an interest in practical ethics or the philosophy of Wittgenstein.
Applied or practical ethics is perhaps the largest growth area inphilosophy today, and many issues in moral, social, and politicallife have come under philosophical scrutiny in recent years. Takentogether, the essays in this volume – including two overviewessays on theories of ethics and the nature of applied ethics– provide a state-of-the-art account of the most pressingmoral questions facing us today. Provides a comprehensive guide to many of the most significantproblems of practical ethics Offers state-of-the-art accounts of issues in medical,environmental, legal, social, and business ethics Written by major philosophers presently engaged with thesecomplex and profound ethical issues
A provocative and lucid defense of retributivism against several long-standing criticisms. The author explores the matter of reparations for past wrongs in the case of crimes committed against Native Americans by the United States Government. Unequaled in its depth and scope of discussion the book delves deeply into particular concerns with retributivism, responsibility, and certain areas of compensation.
In bringing the concepts and methods of philosophy to bear on specific, pressing, practical concerns, applied philosophy is the modern expression of a perennial concern: to understand, in part to control, and to come to terms with the conditions in which human life is to be lived. Originally published in 1991 and written by distinguished philosophers and academics from Europe, the USA and Australia, the essays collected in this volume examine subjects of continued concern and debate, such as the environment, personal relationships, terrorism and medicine. The contributions were originally published in the Journal of Applied Philosophy.
Most people (including moral philosophers), when faced with the fact that some of their cherished moral views lead up to the Repugnant Conclusion, feel that they have to revise their moral outlook. However, it is a moot question as to how this should be done. It is not an easy thing to say how one should avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, without having to face even more serious implications from one's basic moral outlook. Several such attempts are presented in this volume. This is the first volume devoted entirely to the cardinal problem of modern population ethics, known as 'The Repugnant Conclusion'. This book is a must for (moral) philosophers with an interest in population ethics.
Even though several branches of philosophy meet in the notion of trust, it has nevertheless been largely neglected by mainstream philosophy. Arguably, most existing analyses fail to give a just account of the reality of human experience. The author believes that this is not a coincidence but symptomatic of the irrelevance of received ideas of rationality for crucial areas of human agency. `Individualist' approaches, he argues, can be accused precisely of ignoring fundamental questions about the nature of the individual. Expanding on the works of Wittgenstein, Winch, and others, in Trust: The Tacit Demand the author demonstrates the conceptual significance of our dependence on others. The discussion stretches over philosophical psychology, epistemology, political philosophy and moral philosophy. The book may be of interest to anyone in philosophy, psychology or the social sciences.
In this book, an international group of philosophers, economists and theologians focus on the relationship between justice, luck and responsibility in health care. Together, they offer a thorough reflection on questions such as: How should we understand justice in health care? Why are health care interests so important that they deserve special protection? How should we value health? What are its functions and do these make it different from other goods? Furthermore, how much equality should there be? Which inequalities in health and health care are unfair and which are simply unfortunate? Which matters of health care belong to the domain of justice, and which to the domain of charity? And t...