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The updated casebook, Manning and Stephenson's Legislation and Regulation, 2d, is designed for a first-year class on Legislation & Regulation, and provides a proven, ready-to-use set of materials for those interested in introducing such a class to their 1L curriculum. The book focuses on the tools and methods of interpreting legal texts, using Supreme Court and other appellate decisions as the primary texts, yet the note material gently introduces students to applicable insights from political science, history, economics, and philosophy. The book aims to familiarize students with tools and techniques that lawyers and judges use when crafting legal arguments in statutory or regulatory contexts, and to give students a sense of the larger questions of institutional design implicated by these interpretive questions.
Ever since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. used "imperial presidency" as a book title, the term has become central to the debate about the balance of power in the U.S. government. Since the presidency of George W. Bush, when advocates of executive power such as Dick Cheney gained ascendancy, the argument has blazed hotter than ever. Many argue the Constitution itself is in grave danger. What is to be done? The answer, according to legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, is nothing. In The Executive Unbound, they provide a bracing challenge to conventional wisdom, arguing that a strong presidency is inevitable in the modern world. Most scholars, they note, object to today's level of executi...
This interdisciplinary volume highlights the crucial role of effective government in sustaining democratic constitutionalism. In each chapter, leaders in the fields of constitutional law and politics provide innovative analyses of the relationships between effective government and democratic constitutionalism, its principles, and its institutions.
The second issue of 2014 features articles and essays from recognized scholars. Contents include these Articles: • "Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony," David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin • "Game Theory and the Structure of Administrative Law," Yehonatan Givati • "Habeas and the Roberts Court," Aziz Z. Huq • "Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence," Michael A. Livermore • "Accommodating Every Body," Michael Ashley Stein, Anita Silvers, Bradley A. Areheart & Leslie Pickering Francis In addition, the issue includes a Review Essay by Sharon R. Krause entitled "The Liberalism of Love," and these student Comments: • "Toward a Uniform Rule: The Collapse of the Civil-Criminal Divide in Appellate Review of Multitheory General Verdicts," Nathan H. Jack • "All out of Chewing Gum: A Case for a More Coherent Limitations Period for ERISA Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty Claims," Raphael Janove Quality ebook formatting includes active TOC, linked notes, active URLs in notes, and all the charts, tables, and formulae found in the original print version.
The Harvard Law Review is offered in a quality ebook edition, featuring active Contents, linked footnotes and cross-references, linked URLs, legible tables, and proper formatting. This current issue of the Review is March 2012, the fifth issue of academic year 2011-2012 (Volume 125). Featured articles in this issue are from such recognized scholars as Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, on the coordination of administrative agencies when they share regulatory space, and James Whitman, reviewing Bernard Harcourt's new book on the illusion of free markets as to prisons. Student contributions explore the law relating to antitrust law and business deception; the failed Google Books settlement; mergers and acquisitions; materiality in securities law; administrative law; patentable subject matter; and paid sick leave. Finally, the issue includes two Book Notes.
The Constitution of Risk is the first book to combine constitutional theory with the theory of risk regulation. The book argues that constitutional rulemaking is best understood as a means of managing political risks. Constitutional law structures and regulates the risks that arise in and from political life, such as an executive coup or military putsch, political abuse of ideological or ethnic minorities, or corrupt self-dealing by officials. The book claims that the best way to manage political risks is an approach it calls "optimizing constitutionalism" - in contrast to the worst-case thinking that underpins "precautionary constitutionalism," a mainstay of liberal constitutional theory. Drawing on a broad range of disciplines such as decision theory, game theory, welfare economics, political science, and psychology, this book advocates constitutional rulemaking undertaken in a spirit of welfare maximization, and offers a corrective to the pervasive and frequently irrational attitude of distrust of official power that is so prominent in American constitutional history and discourse.
The Harvard Law Review is offered in a digital edition for ereaders, featuring active Contents, linked footnotes, legible tables, and proper ebook formatting. This current issue of the Review is November 2012, the first issue of academic year 2012-2013 (Volume 126). The November issue is the special annual review of the Supreme Court’s previous term. Each year, the issue is introduced by noteworthy andextensive articles from recognized scholars. In this issue, the Foreword is authored by Pamela Karlan, on “democracy and disdain.” Extensive Comments by Gillian Metzger and Martha Minow explore the Supreme Court’s decision on the Affordable Health Care Act and Chief Justice Roberts’s reasoning, while Stephanos Bibas discusses the gray market of plea bargaining and the potential involvement of neutral judges in the process. In addition, the first issue of each new volume provides an extensive summary of the important cases of the previous Supreme Court docket, covering a wide range of legal, political and constitutional subjects.
Of the 1.65 million lawsuits enforcing federal laws over the past decade, 3 percent were prosecuted by the federal government, while 97 percent were litigated by private parties. When and why did private plaintiff-driven litigation become a dominant model for enforcing federal regulation? The Litigation State shows how government legislation created the nation's reliance upon private litigation, and investigates why Congress would choose to mobilize, through statutory design, private lawsuits to implement federal statutes. Sean Farhang argues that Congress deliberately cultivates such private lawsuits partly as a means of enforcing its will over the resistance of opposing presidents. Farhang...