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We show that, in a monetary equilibrium, trade and asset prices depend on both the supply of the liquidity by the Central Bank and the liquidity of assets and commodities. As a result, monetary aggregates are informative for the conduct of monetary policy. We also show asset prices are higher in liquidity-constrained states of nature. This generates a term premium even in absence of aggregate uncertainty. These results hold in any monetary economy with heterogeneous agents and short-term liquidity effects, where monetary costs act as transaction costs and the quantity theory of money is verified.
This paper presents a new version of MAPMOD (Mark II) to study the effectiveness of macroprudential regulations. We extend the original model by explicitly modeling the housing market. We show how household demand for housing, house prices, and bank mortgages are intertwined in what we call a deadly embrace. Without macroprudential policies, this deadly embrace naturally leads to housing boom and bust cycles, which can be very costly for the economy, as shown by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09.
The paper examines the implementation of macro-prudential policy. Given the coordination, flow of information, analysis, and communication required, macro-prudential frameworks will have weaknesses that make it hard to implement policy. And dealing with the political economy is also likely to be challenging. But limiting discretion through the formulation of macro-prudential rules is complicated by the difficulties in detecting and measuring systemic risk. The paper suggests that oversight is best served by having a strong baseline regulatory regime on which a time-varying macro-prudential policy can be added as conditions warrant and permit.
We propose a framework to link empirical models of systemic risk to theoretical network/ general equilibrium models used to understand the channels of transmission of systemic risk. The theoretical model allows for systemic risk due to interbank counterparty risk, common asset exposures/fire sales, and a “Minsky" cycle of optimism. The empirical model uses stock market and CDS spreads data to estimate a multivariate density of equity returns and to compute the expected equity return for each bank, conditional on a bad macro-outcome. Theses “cross-sectional" moments are used to re-calibrate the theoretical model and estimate the importance of the Minsky cycle of optimism in driving systemic risk.
This book addresses the interaction of monetary and regulatory policy to achieve the important goal of price and financial stability. The authors show how financial stability can be assessed and measured continuously, and discuss the interrelationships between liquidity and default. Without default there would be no concern about liquidity. But the financial crisis was not just a liquidity problem, and requires a general equilibrium model. Their general equilibrium analysis demonstrates how policy should depend on understanding all the relevant factors.
The paper provides an overview of the profound and rapid changes in banking brought about by technology and deregulation, and discusses the hurdles that will have to be negotiated for putting in place the three pillars-capital adequacy rules, supervision, and market discipline-of the bank regulatory framework envisioned by the New Basel Accord (Basel II). It argues that, especially for developing countries, finding the right balance between regulation, supervision, and market discipline is likely to be difficult. Considerable technical expertise as well as political discipline-which can be viewed as a fourth pillar-will be required to implement Basel II.
This paper presents a "second-generation" solvency stress testing framework extending applied stress testing work centered on Cihák (2007). The framework seeks enriching stress tests in terms of risk-sensitivity, while keeping them flexible, transparent, and user-friendly. The main contributions include (a) increasing the risk-sensitivity of stress testing by capturing changes in risk-weighted assets (RWAs) under stress, including for non-internal ratings based (IRB) banks (through a quasi-IRB approach); (b) providing stress testers with a comprehensive platform to use satellite models, and to define various assumptions and scenarios; (c) allowing stress testers to run multi-year scenarios (up to five years) for hundreds of banks, depending on the availability of data. The framework uses balance sheet data and is Excel-based with detailed guidance and documentation.
This Handbook provides an overview of major current debates, trends and perspectives in ecological economics. It covers a wide range of issues, such as the foundations of ecological economics, deliberative methods, the de-growth movement, ecological macroeconomics, social metabolism, environmental governance, consumer studies, knowledge systems and new experimental approaches. Written by leading authors in their respective areas of specialisation, the contributions systematize the “state of the art” in the selected topics, and draw insights about new knowledge frontiers.
If monetary policy is to aim also at financial stability, how would it change? To analyze this question, this paper develops a general-form framework. Financial stability objectives are shown to make monetary policy more aggressive: in reaction to negative shocks, cuts are deeper but shorter-lived than otherwise. By keeping cuts brief, monetary policy tightens as soon as bank risk appetite heats up. Within this shorter time span, cuts must then be deeper than otherwise to also achieve standard objectives. Finally, we analyze how robust this result is to the presence of a bank regulatory tool, and provide a parameterized example.
We examine the effect of bank capital levels on firm investment drawing on a sample of 11,106 non-financial firms from 2007 to 2013 in 16 advanced economies. We examine two measures of bank capital adequacy, the Tier 1 ratio and a simple leverage ratio, and find that firms with larger external financial needs invest relatively more when domestic financial systems have relatively high leverage ratios. This pattern is more pronounced for those firms that have sound fundamentals, suggesting that bank balance sheets and their willingness to extend credit can be an important factor in determining aggregate investment and growth outcomes. The empirical findings are robust to a range of specifications. Bank Tier 1 capital ratio does not appear to have a significant effect on corporate investment, possibly because a higher Tier 1 ratio also captures a high share of assets with low risk weights.